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Abstract:  
Institutional development theory asserts that institutions play a primary role in economic development 
(North D. , 1990), (Acemoglu, 2003), and (Kuran, Aoki, & Roland, 2012) and development failure in many 
poor countries is the failure of their institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). This is a bigger problem in 
ethnically-diverse countries with weak institutions (Easterly W. , 2001). Empirical studies produced similar 
results, showing a negative and significant relationship between ethnic diversity and economic growth when 
institutions are poor (Alesina & Ferrara, 2005) and (Easterly W. , 2001). Despite the broad agreement on 
the significance of institutions, they do not entirely agree on how ethnic diversity effects institutions and 
economic growth, the channels through which diversity impacts growth, according to them are 
underinvestment in public goods (this paper studies education in detail), lower redistribution, rise of 
powerful elites and their manipulation of institutions, corruption, and ‘social exclusion’ or discrimination. 
In the absence of reliable data on Afghanistan, this research conducts a qualitative and descriptive study of 
Afghanistan’s postwar development failure in institutional context, the conclusion is in line with above 
studies. Afghanistan’s development failure is largely due to the failure of its institution which was 
based/founded on the ethnic Afghan’s* right to rule excluding the majority non-Afghan ethnicities in the 
country. Similar to above issues, the four fundamental issues of the Afghan institutions suggested by this 
paper are 1. Afghan nationalism and ethnic marginalization, ‘social exclusion’ 2. centralization of Kabul 
government and concentration of power (elites of Kabul), 3. political Islam (a relatively unique case), and 
4. foreign assistance (aid-dependence). However, contrary to the popular believe, the development failure 
in Afghanistan is not a postwar (post-2001) phenomenon but a legacy and continuation of prewar (1880-
1978) institutions, both prewar and postwar Afghan institutions same at least the above four issues. More 
research and better data can expand and improve this somewhat unique view of development failure in 
Afghanistan.  
* Afghan in this paper means Pashtun and used interchangeably, not including other ethnic groups in 
Afghanistan. 
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
Today after seventeen years of postwar reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan, economic 
development indexes reveal that the country is still one of the least developed countries in Asia, a result far 
different from the initial expectations and plans for postwar Afghanistan. Estimates1 show that more than 
thirty-six percent of the population live under poverty line and a similar percent are unemployed. In 
Transparency International’s ranking, Afghanistan ranked as one of the top three most corrupted countries 
in the world in the past several years (Transparency International, 2012-2017)2, Afghanistan is still a highly 
conflict-ridden and aid-dependent country. The current trend and its projection do not leave much scope 
for optimism at least in the foreseeable future. The deteriorating situation in the past decade forced millions 
of people out of the country making Afghanistan one of the biggest sources of refugees in the world 
(UNHCR, 2018) 3 . The natural question to ask may then be why did Afghanistan fail despite the 
unprecedented large-scale international support and a new government for almost two decades of postwar? 
The common answers by experts (economists and statesmen)4 and others usually refer to factors such as 
the country’s decades of wars, foreign intervention, corruption, poverty, illiteracy and so on. However, this 
research proposes a different argument by including deeper and wider issues concerning the one century of 
Afghan institution-building and ethnic politics which remain largely unspoken, for two important reasons. 
The first reason is that reports and studies conducted outside Afghanistan usually focus on the impact of 
their specific country’s involvement in Afghanistan particularly that of the United States of America, with 
limited interest beyond the US invasion since 20015. The second reason is that discussing ethnic politics in 
the last century is highly sensitive especially to the Afghan government which tries to systematically 
remove the dark history of the past century from open discussions and textbooks.  
The issue of ethnic diversity hampering state, institution-building and economic development has been 
studied by numerous authors such as Easterly (2001), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Greif (1993), Desmet, 
Ortuo, and Weber (2009), Baldwin and Huber (2010), and Easterly and Levine (1997) among others. 
Easterly concludes that “ethnic diversity has a more adverse effect on economic policy and growth when 
institutions are poor” and “conversely, in countries with sufficiently good institutions, ethnic diversity does 
not lower growth or worsen economic policies. Good institutions also lower the risk of wars and genocides 
that might otherwise result from ethnic fractionalization. Ethnically diverse nations that wish to endure in 
                                                          
1 The World Bank and Afghan government estimates until 2015 show the poverty line at around thirty-six percent, 
however, a recent report by the Central Statistics Office shows it as high as fifty percent (CSO, 2018) as reported here 
by Tolo News: https://www.tolonews.com/business/54-percent-afghans-live-below-poverty-line-survey    
2  Afghanistan’s transparency score for 2012-2017 is available at Transparency International’s website here: 
https://www.transparency.org/country/AFG  
3 The surge in refugee issues since 2001 is also reported by other sources (besides UNHCR) such as Norwegian 
Refugee Council, their links are included in this The Guardian report https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2018/jan/25/violence-forces-refugees-to-flee-afghanistan-again  
4 Many articles discuss the failure in Afghanistan in that context such as in, 
Foreign Policy: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/10/why-did-we-fail-in-the-afghan-war-because-we-didnt-
understand-the-place-2/ 
Brookings: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/08/22/why-are-we-losing-in-afghanistan/  
Forbes: https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2017/03/01/the-nation-building-experiment-that-failed-time-for-
u-s-to-leave-afghanistan/#3873f1d365b2  
5 For example in addition to the links provided above, one such article is available here at the Cambridge University 
website:” https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/afghanistan-what-went-
wrong/E580C38E7A5F9E18C4CD9E8D3BAEED34 
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peace and prosperity must build good institutions” (Easterly W. , 2001, p. 703). Alesina and La Ferrara 
“found overwhelming evidence supporting” the argument that “public good provisions was lower in 
fragmented societies” and for the positive impact of diversity they state that “the picture is more complex”. 
“Even within the developing world, similar levels of ethnic diversity are associated with very different 
degrees of conflict and interethnic cooperation”, and they too point at the importance of institutions that 
“useful theoretical progress would incorporate” a “more realistic institutional features that would 
distinguish cases in which the economy manages to actually take advantage more or less well of the 
potential benefits of variety in production” (Alesina & Ferrara, 2005, p. 796).  
The factors such as wars, illiteracy, corruption, and poverty in Afghanistan are not primary causes of the 
development failure in Afghanistan but are rather products of the failure (of its institution). Afghanistan 
was a stable country before the war and relatively similar to other countries in the region in terms of poverty, 
literacy, peace and development level around the World Wars periods but then stagnated and remained 
behind ever since (statistics later). Why did Afghanistan, then, stagnate in poverty, illiteracy, and conflict 
towards the end of the century more than other countries? And why does Afghanistan still remain one of 
the poorest and least developed countries in the world despite a large flow of foreign assistance since 2001 
which brought large capital, military, expertise and knowledge, and more importantly a ‘democratic’ 
government replacing the Taliban government in the country? 
This paper believes that the real challenges may lie beyond those product issues (wars, poverty, foreign 
intervention, although they are important in their own right) mentioned above but rather in the failure of its 
institutions. The four fundamental issues which this research identified for studying are directly related to 
the Afghan ethnic politics and the institutions evolving around it and those issues are: 1. Afghan nationalism 
and (national) identity crisis, 2. centralized government of elites, 3. political Islam, and 4. dependence on 
foreign assistance. Each of these four fundamental factors has roots in prewar periods (1878-1980), which 
played a determinant role in the wars of (1978-2001) and became even stronger factors in postwar period 
(2001-2018) when the interaction between ethnic groups increased under the first “democratic” government. 
These four fundamental factors, as this paper argues, are the major causes of issues in Afghanistan, and 
other issues such as wars, conflict, poverty and instability are their product-issues, and those are not just 
postwar (post-2001) issues (as popularly noted) but issues rooted in the institutions of prewar transcending 
to the postwar periods.  
To study these four fundamental issues in Afghanistan, this paper draws upon the history of governance in 
the past century and specifically discuss those four fundamental issues in three periods of prewar6 (1880-
1978), war (1978-2001) and postwar (2001-2018). The reason for choosing this period is that 1880s mark 
a major institutional change in Afghanistan, in fact it is the birthdate of modern Afghanistan in its current 
boundaries. “Afghanistan boundaries demarcated for the first time … in 1893” (Kakar, 1979, p. 20). The 
rule of Afghan leaders inside this boundary established in 1880s by Abdurrahman Khan and continued until 
1978 which marks the start of the communist government and the Soviet invasion followed by another 
decade of civil wars until 20017. The postwar government started from 2001 when the United States 
removed the Taliban government and established the postwar “democratic” government8. As designated 
chapters in this paper will show, the situation in the country did not improve for the common people despite 
                                                          
6 These three periods with respect to the wars in Afghanistan refer to conflicts starting with the communist revolution 
and the Soviet invasion of 1978 and the following civil war which lasted until 2001 when the US invaded the country 
and ended the Taliban government. The timeline of this event is available in the link below. 
7 A timeline of governments and major events, including the information used in this paper, since 1840s in Afghanistan 
is available at this link to the BBC website: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12024253  
8 The timeline and details available at “7” 
3 
the changes in government leaders throughout the three periods and that is the question this paper wants to 
address. The short answer is that the foundational elements in creation of Afghanistan which are Afghan 
identity and political Islam (the Afghan institution) did not change to a significant level throughout the three 
periods and those are key issues in the multiethnic society of Afghanistan and the rapidly changing 
globalized world. And that is where the real issue is hiding and remains out of the common debate and 
spotlight.  
Afghanistan was established in 1880s in its current boundaries on the basis of Afghan identity and 
leadership on the territory between the two encroaching superpowers, the British India and Russia, and the 
Afghan king of Kabul Abdurrahman Khan (1880-1901). According to Kakar, Abdurrahman Khan “was the 
first Afghan ruler to make deliberate attempts to build an Afghan nation” (Kakar, 1979, p. 10).  The borders 
of this (new) country were arbitrarily drawn across communities dividing people of the same community 
in to two nations and making Afghanistan an unnatural country of multiple heterogenous ethnic minorities.9 
With the absence of history of power-sharing and statehood (in modern sense of nation state) the diverse 
and disconnected ethnicities were autonomous. Abdurrahman Khan decided to establish a unified country 
under a strong central government, to his assessment the autonomous mirs (leaders) of Hazara and other 
regional ethnic and tribal powerhouses were stronger than the central government. “up to 1889 the Hazaras 
were partially or wholly independent… enjoyed a relatively high degree of autonomy until the Amir’s 
accession”. “their religious and secular elders (sayyeds and mirs) had still retained most of their traditional 
power over the common Hazaras” (Kakar, 1979, p. 23). Amir Abdurrahman Khan devised a comprehensive 
plan combining forces of military, religion, Pashtun/Afghan and as importantly, signing the Durand Line 
border agreement with the British Raj with two significant provisions of increased supply of arms, 
ammunitions and finance as well as no-intervention policy (Durand Line, 1893)10. The condition was set 
for annihilating all oppositions and establishing the first Afghan state, Afghanistan. According to Sungur, 
“Abdurrahman as the founder of modern Afghanistan…set out to establish direct control throughout the 
country with the help of: (1) a stable basis of legitimacy for his rule… (2) reforms for centralization … (3) 
the destruction of all alternative centers of power; and (4) the recruitment of a new state elite loyal to the 
state and not to their tribal following” (Sungur, 2016, p. 442).  
From many aspects, the reign of Abdurrahman Khan marks the most important events and institutional 
change in modern history of the country, of which the Afghan-led centralized government in Kabul, 
crushing of ethnic and tribal oppositions, application of political Islam “becoming in effect the first Afghan 
ruler to invoke the concept of the divine right of kings” (Kakar, 1979, p. 8), and receiving of official foreign 
assistance (of annual 120,000 pound and military supplies by the British Raj)11 are of great significance for 
this study. These four fundamental characteristics of the new establishment became central pillars of 
governance and socio-economic order in the country which may easily fare as the most important 
determinant of the situation in prewar, war, and postwar era in Afghanistan as will be discussed in this 
paper. Abdurrahman’s legacy passed on to his son and down the tribal/family lineage the centralized 
Afghan monarchies of the twentieth century and thus the guiding force for the country to where it is now.  
                                                          
9 Ethnic groups in Afghanistan such as Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen are divided between Afghanistan Pakistan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan respectively with majority of each ethnicity living outside Afghanistan in those 
respective countries. More information on the ethnicities is available here in the Country Studies website:” 
http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/38.htm” 
10 This link to Afghanic website has the information on the Durand Line Agreement provided here: 
http://afghanic.de/images/Docs/Durand%20Line%20Agreement.pdf  
11 This was an article of the Durand Agreement between Abdurrahman and the British Raj of India (same source: The 
Durand Line Agreement). 
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The development in Afghanistan should be studied in the light of this history and context, and the conditions 
created thereby for the country’s institutional and economic development. It is in this context that most of 
modern challenges of Afghanistan find meaning and explanation, and therefore may hold possible solutions. 
The four fundamental issues of political Islam, ethnic and national identity crisis, centralized government, 
and aid-dependence have had many ups and downs across the past century, however, they consistently 
remained as significant factors in governance and economic development as well as domestic (ethnic 
fragmentation and conflict) and international politics (especially with regards to the Durand Line issue with 
Pakistan which will be discussed later). The issues of poverty, illiteracy, corruption, and (ethnic) conflicts 
have much to do with ethnic politics and the Afghan institution, the study of one without or isolated from 
the other would leave us in the dark and may not help in problem solving as has been the case in the postwar 
development. Thus, this research identifies those four fundamental issues12 and study the origin, evolution, 
and status of each one in three distinct periods in modern history of the country. The nature and scope of 
this research requires making a trade-off between detailed discussion of one specific research question, 
which is more common approach, or including more than one topic to make it more comprehensive but less 
specific on each topic. For example, this research could select only one of its four central factors as research 
topic and leave out the other three or choose all four factors but sacrifice in-depth discussion of each one. 
It determined that an inclusive study of all four factors has certain advantages over a single topic in that in 
the case of Afghanistan those factors are incredibly interlinked and complex, making other choices difficult 
and inadequate.  
As stated above, in ethnically diverse countries like Afghanistan if the institutions are not strong-enough 
ethnic diversity may become the reason for the “tragedy of the common” and disagreement over matters of 
public interest (investment in education, for example) and institution-building for protection of a particular 
group’s interest which over a longer term will create poverty, inequality of income distribution and wars. 
This paper contains two related research topics, the first one studies the relationship between ethnic 
diversity, governance (institutions) and development in Afghanistan. This section is a top-down outlook of 
the development issues in Afghanistan, comparing the structure and policy of governments and its impact 
on development in prewar and postwar Afghanistan. The second research topic is a bottom-up outlook of 
the development issues in Afghanistan with regards to knowledge and human capital formation. It is hard 
to attribute bottom-up or top-down approach specifically to each one because the direction for both topics 
may not be unidirectional, nonetheless, the real intention is simply to point at governance and development 
at the top level, and education (rather lack of education in Afghanistan) and development at the bottom.  
Education enters our study in two related manners. First, stagnation of education in Afghanistan in the past 
century is correlated, among other things, with its ethnic politics and institution of Afghanistan under the 
same argument and findings of the researches stated above about under-provision of public good, and 
restriction of access to opportunities and growth outside one’s ethnic group. Second, uneducated population 
and less-productive workforce become a contributor to poverty in general, and thus creation of a vicious 
circle. Therefore, this paper includes a separate sector on education complementing the first topic on 
institution and economic development in Afghanistan.  
The study on education and economic development in Afghanistan includes a thorough background study 
of the status and challenges of formal education inside Afghanistan, and the status of human capital 
formation in Afghanistan as compared to other developing countries in the region such as Turkey, Iran, 
India, China, Malaysia and Pakistan. The data on education provided in the figures below shows that 
Afghanistan started constructing public schools 1920s relatively on par or better than some of these 
                                                          
12 Of course, these four issues are not answer to all of the problems in Afghanistan, however, as far as institutional 
development goes, these four factors have been central to most of the developments in Afghanistan in the past century. 
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countries as measured in school enrolment and literacy rate, but Afghanistan grew significantly slower than 
these countries in post-World War II era. As stated by Elizabeth, High Performing Asian Economies 
introduced the policy of universal primary education in early stages of development (Elizabeth, 2006, p. 
595) raising literacy rate and school enrolment ratio as high as eighty percent in 1980s and hundred percent 
in  by 2015 (figures 14 and 15), whereas, Afghanistan’s literacy rate remained at around twenty percent at 
1980s and was around forty percent in 2015 (figures 14 and 15), which is significantly below those countries. 
However, Afghanistan’s school enrolment ratio increased sharply at annual rate of around hundred percent 
in postwar era, increasing the number of students from one million to ten million in less than two decades 
as reported by (USAID Afghanistan, 2016)13 and (UNICEF, 2016)14 websites. Quality of education and 
curricula remains a great challenge despite the quantitative increase in number of students in schools and 
universities. A bigger challenge relates to the country’s ongoing political instability and religious and 
traditional barriers, especially for girls’ education in areas under the control or influence of religious 
fundamentalists. Data analysis reflect a regional pattern of greater school dropout ratios for girls in those 
areas (figure 6).  
A remarkable change in access to knowledge and information happened in postwar Afghanistan with the 
help of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Telephone and internet coverage increased to 
much of areas of Afghanistan. Ministry of Communication of Afghanistan reported that over seventy 
percent of the population uses GSM phones (Ministory of Communitication and Information Technology, 
2015)15. ICT is a true hope for Afghanistan to quickly reduce its wide gap in education and experience a 
quick catchup and convergence. The relatively unrestricted access to the internet in postwar Afghanistan 
revolutionized the traditional order around acquiring knowledge and access to information which tore the 
age-old walls of religious and political barriers beyond anybody’s control, playing a similar role like 
printing press and cultural revolution in the advancement of Europe. Although the use of ICT is not 
significantly widespread for professional and education purposes yet, it definitely has the highest potential 
in future development of the country as arguably the most powerful means of transforming the society, ICT 
connected Afghanistan’s villages to the world knowledge before they got connected to the local roads and 
power grids.   
In conclusion for the first chapter, the issues of development in Afghanistan should go beyond the common 
discussion relating them to wars, poverty, foreign intervention and so on, and include the fundamental 
issues of ethnic politics and institutional development particularly political Islam, crisis of ethnic and nation 
identity, centralized government of elites, and dependency on foreign assistance. These four elements have 
deep roots in the past century and require due attention at higher levels of the government. At the bottom 
level, investment in accumulation of knowledge and human capital formation, particularly using ICT may 
be the strongest bet for Afghanistan’s long-term economic development. The following sections of this 
paper are as following.  
Chapter two is a general introduction to Afghanistan discussing its economy, infrastructure, and the 
reasons for the country’s delayed development. After a general introduction to Afghanistan which provides 
information necessary for understanding the situation in the country and particularly understanding this 
paper, the following subsection in chapter two will discuss the reasons for development failure in 
Afghanistan. Afghanistan was established as a buffer zone between the British Raj of India in the south and 
the Russian empire in the north on the basis of Afghan identity and Sunni Islam. At the time of the 
                                                          
13 Full report is available here at the USAID website: https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/education  
14 Reported here at the UNICEF website: https://data.unicef.org/country/afg/  
15 Link to the report in the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, Government of Afghanistan is 
available here: http://mcit.gov.af/fa/page/public-documents/6005  
6 
establishment of the new country, King Abdurrahman found that regional and ethnic groups which were 
autonomous and powerful were effectively not under any (central) government. Abdurrahman started a 
bloody campaign and brought them under his centralized government in Kabul. Abdurrahman setup a 
highly centralized government on the basis of ethnic Afghan identity (one of many ethnic groups in the 
country) and Sunni Islam. This period marks establishment of a country with institutionalized 
authoritarianism, ethnic cleansing and forced migrations as stated above and will be discussed more later. 
As Kakar stated, Abdurrahman Khan became the first Afghan ruler who setup new order and institutions, 
and much to the interest of this paper, Abdurrahman’s iron rule and centralized government became more 
or less the foundation of Afghan governments for one century. The level of ethnic fragmentation, illiteracy 
and poverty in Afghanistan for the entire period remained high and this paper is seeking to study the 
relationship between that institution and the developments in Afghanistan under it.  
Because Afghanistan was established on the basis of these factors (Afghan and Islam as stated above) 
introduction of major reforms (power sharing, equality, progressive laws, and public education) would hit 
one or both of these two factors and because Afghanistan identifies with these two (Afghan and Islam), the 
reforms (for example calling Amanullah Khan’s introduction of secular education as un-Islamic16) have 
been blocked and challenged by these two factors throughout the past century and most importantly the 
same factors are present in postwar Afghanistan. Chapter two will discuss these issues in more details.    
Chapter three is the study of the relationship between governance and economic development in 
Afghanistan, particularly studying the role of political Islam, Afghan nationalism and ethnic versus 
national/Afghan identity crisis, the legacy and implications of the authoritarian system established in 1880s. 
Institutional development is the theme of this chapter in the context of institutional barriers to development 
in Afghanistan’s multiethnic society. The primary role of governments in economic development is a 
widely accepted in the literature specially among institutional economists such as North (1989, 1990, 1997), 
Acemoglu (2003) and Rodrick, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002). After laying a theoretical foundation from 
the literature about the positive and significant relationship between institution (governance in particular), 
chapter three will discuss why good governance did not evolve in Afghanistan and how those four 
fundamental factors (national identity crisis, political Islam, dependence on foreign aid, and centralized 
government of Kabul elites) were responsible for the country’s poor institutions and therefore poverty and 
underdevelopment in the country. The additional but related factor under this topic is dependence on foreign 
aid and quality of governance. Dependence on foreign assistance has a long history in Afghanistan, notably 
the British aid to Abdurrahman Khan as cited from the Durand Agreement, but it has never been as 
significant as it has been in the postwar government with foreign aid making around thirty percent of the 
GDP (table 1). This chapter will assess how heavy aid-dependence has contributed to poor governance and 
corruption in Afghanistan. 
Chapter four discusses the relationship and importance of knowledge and human capital formation for 
economic development and institution-building. This chapter will particularly focus on education in 
Afghanistan in the three periods and assess the current condition of education in Afghanistan. After 
discussing the literature on education and economic development, this paper will also study the role of 
education in economic development of successful Asian economies and compare their level of education 
(school enrolment ratio) with Afghanistan. The data available for school enrolment ratio spans from 1970 
to 2015. The data (figure 14) on Afghanistan shows that it has the lowest rate of literacy and school 
enrolment in all of Asia and there are serious qualitative and quantitative weaknesses with education system 
                                                          
16  “…majority of the Pashtun people continued to view the central state as a unit external to their tribal structure – as 
something that needs to be kept at bay. Any change in the points of conflict between the tribe and the state – border 
tolls, conscription, and the place of women in the society …” (Sungur, 2016, p. 452) 
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in Afghanistan which chapter four will cover. The four fundamental issues introduced in previous chapters 
played significant role in (impeding) education in Afghanistan17. A special emphasis is laid on the role of 
Afghanistan’s ethnic politics and Islamic laws and traditions in prevention of modern knowledge (in the 
Muslim world in general, in Afghanistan in particular). Chapter four also includes a regional comparison 
of the status of education in Afghanistan based on the number of students in education and higher education 
system from Afghanistan’s all thirty-four provinces. The descriptive data analysis on Afghanistan’s 
education shows that there are regional patterns in male/female participation ratio in different parts of the 
country, especially notable is the regions under the influence of religious extremists have relatively smaller 
share of female students than other regions/provinces (figures 6 and 7), despite their disproportionately 
higher (education) budget reception.   
Chapter five covers findings, conclusion and policy suggestions. In conclusion this paper maintains that 
Afghanistan’s development issues should be studied and understood in the context of its ethnic diversity 
and institutional development in form of the suggested four fundamental issues which are Afghan 
nationalism and ethnic division, centralized government of Kabul, political Islam, and dependence on 
foreign assistance. Majority of the issues in Afghanistan come under one or more of these categories. The 
two important conclusions of this paper are 1. Ethnic diversity in Afghanistan has been a challenge to nation 
and institution-building and in the absence of strong institutions, the ethnic diversity of the country became 
a serious issue for its economic development. On top of that, the Afghan governments in the past century 
pursued ethnically biased politics (inegalitarianism) which further exacerbated the ethnic fragmentation and 
thus institution-building and development. 2. Provision of public goods specially investment in education, 
as found by other studies, has been significantly poor in Afghanistan which made Afghanistan as the least 
literate country in the region. Drawing from the lessons of successful Asian economies as well the studies 
covered in this paper all of which emphasize on the significance of education for economic growth and 
institution building, Afghanistan should also employ universal education and knowledge accumulation for 
its future growth. The country’s diverse, politicized and religious population on the one hand and its weak 
institutions are not the right ingredients for development. The country’s future development may greatly 
depend upon its degree of success in education and (the right) institution-building for its diverse population. 
This chapter is followed by policy bibliography and appendix. 
Introduction to Afghanistan 
Afghanistan is a country of ethnic minorities and has kept its tribal structure to a great extent and is far 
away from a nation-state and citizenship in modern sense. The notion of qawm which is a reference to 
ethnic group is at the center of the country’s society, politics and has been a determinant factor in its recent 
history. According to Sungur “the majority of the Afghan society was made up of rural and tribal people 
whose primary unit of belonging was the qawm – not the state, which was something external to their daily 
lives” (Sungur, 2016, p. 451). Despite being an ethnically diverse country, the level of inter-ethnic 
interaction and power-sharing has been marginal. This is evident from most people living together with 
fellow qawm in provinces with limited to no mixture with neighboring qawm even after centuries of living 
as neighbors. The level of fragmentation in Afghanistan may also be seen in election results, for instance 
Dubow wrote that in 2004 presidential elections “Panjshir province, runner-up Yunis Qanooni (a Tajik) 
received 95% of the vote. In Paktia province, incumbent Hamid Karzai (a Pashtun/Afghan) received 96.9%”. 
according to him “the crisis which presents itself when a population is so divided that 90% of one region 
                                                          
17 Investment in education as in other public goods, has been significantly low in Afghanistan. It is discussed under 
the “tragedy of commons” and under-provision of public goods in diverse societies as cited before. 
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will vote against 90% of another is staggering. But it reflects Afghanistan’s history. The electoral partition 
fell along ethnic lines.” (Dubow, 2009, p. I).  
Recognition of the ethnic structure and fragmentation of Afghanistan is important in understanding the 
country and its issues. The aim of this section is to provide a general introduction to Afghanistan in first 
part and provide a detailed discussion on development failure in Afghanistan in the context of its past 
institutions. The socio-economic conditions in decades before the war had been critical as a result of 
authoritarian monarchies focused on strengthening political power of the centralized governments of elites 
in Kabul ignoring the rest of the population in isolated rural areas. The institution shaping and leading this 
society was established in 1880s under Abdurrahman Khan. According to Kakar “Amir Abd Al Rahman 
[Abdurrahman] concentrated power in his hands to the extent that no Afghan ruler had done either before 
or after him” (Kakar, 1979, p. 21). However, the institution he set up passed on to his son and his successors. 
The Afghan governments kept the population illiterate (or at least did not invest in their education) in 
isolated rural areas for the entire century of the Afghan rule. Sungur wrote that “due to high levels of 
illiteracy (98% according to Gregorian 1969, p. 184), the central state could not establish links with its rural 
society and yet, continued taxing rural people for urban reforms that targeted merely the Kabuli population 
which consisted 1.8% of the total population even as late as the 1960s” (Gregorian,1969, p. 357, in (Sungur, 
2016, p. 451)).  
Retaining its rural and traditional structure, Afghanistan has never had a sense of ‘state’ and ‘government’ 
outside Kabul and did not experience rule of law, justice, education, health, infrastructure and other basic 
services for general public. The discussion of economic development in relation to governance and 
education will be discussed in next chapters, this chapter will provide a general introduction to economy of 
Afghanistan. There is not much data from prewar periods to measure the socio-economic situation in 
Afghanistan, however, the data on more recent situation in Afghanistan reveal the extent of poverty and 
economic challenges in the country in general.  
Afghanistan is a less developed country in south Central Asia with a multiethnic population of 
approximately thirty-two million people18. Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is USD 
561 (World Bank, 2016)19 which is the lowest in the region below Nepal, Pakistan and Tajikistan which are 
next low-income countries of the region (figure 1). According to the World Bank statistics Afghanistan’s 
agriculture share of GDP was thirty-eight percent in 2002, it reduced to thirty percent in 2009, and to 
twenty-two percent in 2016 (World Bank, 2016)20. The GDP share of industry in 2013 was twenty-one 
percent, and GDP share of services was forty-seven percent (Gharjistani T. , 2015, p. 258). GDP growth in 
Afghanistan has been wildly fluctuating between twenty one percent in 2009, 2.2 percent in 2014 and one 
percent in 2015 (World Bank, 2016)21. Taking an average of the annual growth rate of GDP in the past ten 
years amounts to approximately seven percent (Asian Development Bank, 2017)22.  
                                                          
18 Official estimate for the population is 31.6 million in 2018 (CSO, 2018), however, multiple sources reported the 
population between 30 to 35 million people. The CSO estimate is available here:  
“http://cso.gov.af/en/page/demography-and-socile-statistics/demograph-statistics/3897111” 
19 As noted in previous footnote, lack of exact population information impacts all other statistics about Afghanistan, 
and here the GDP statistics are also subject to variation depending on different sources.  
20 Link to the data on the World Bank website: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=AF  
21 Same source as 16 
22 Link to the of Asian Development Bank website: https://www.adb.org/countries/afghanistan/economy  
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The seventy percent of the population living in rural areas mostly depend on agriculture. The statistics 
provided in this paragraph are retrieved from online sources23. Knowing the fact that data on Afghanistan 
is not reliable and are only estimates, this statistic should be viewed as rough approximations. Agriculture 
products of Afghanistan mainly include grains, fruits, livestock, as well as saffron and other products 
common in dry geography. Despite being agrarian economy, Afghanistan’s biggest import items are also 
agricultural products such as wheat flour ($664 million), peat ($598 million), and other import items were 
ornamental trimmings ($334 million), inedible fats and oils ($316 million) and petroleum ($296 million) in 
2016 (Simoes & Hidalgo, 2018). Afghanistan has a trade deficit of negative $3.29 billion. Its import in 
2016 amounted to $3.77 billion and its export to only $482 million. Top export items include fruits and 
vegetables ($272.1 million) as well as knotted carpets worth of $39 million in 2016 (Simoes & Hidalgo, 
2018) 24 . Trade composition of Afghanistan reveals that its trade items are largely basic food and 
consumption goods mostly with neighboring countries such as Pakistan, India, Iran, China, Turkey and 
central Asia. Afghanistan is believed to have rich natural resources that include natural gas, oil, uranium, 
copper, gold, iron and precious stones which are mostly remained untapped (Gharjistani T. , 2015, pp. 310-
330).  
Afghanistan has a total land area of 65,223025 square kilometers (Central Statistics Office, 2015). It is 
mostly rugged mountains with Hindukush mountains stretched across the country from the northeast to the 
west. Of the total land area of the country twelve percent is arable land, three percent forest, thirty-nine 
percent mountains and forty-six percent pasture land, (Gharjistani T. , 2015, p. 20). The prewar 
governments constructed three water dams in Kandahar and Helmand and Kabul provinces to irrigate plains 
in the south (Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan) and east (Nangarhar) of the country which increased agriculture 
products but droughts of the 1970s and 1990s and wars (1980-2001) heavily impacted agricultural products 
and food security26. The postwar governments also built another two water dams and plan to build more to 
bring more lands under irrigation27 . One of the most important agricultural product is illegal drugs. 
Afghanistan’s opium production has been increasing in recent years, it produces around eighty percent of 
the world opium. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes in 2012 reported that opium trade makes 
fifteen percent of the economy of Afghanistan amounting to USD 2.4 billion. This article titled “The High 
Cost of Afghanistan’s Opium Economy” further says that around nine percent of the total arable land area 
is under opium cultivation majority of which come from southern and eastern provinces, and three biggest 
producers of opium in the country are provinces of Helmand (35%), Nangarhar (29%) and Uruzgan (12%). 
Taken together 95% of the total opium production takes places in this region of the country (Quigley-Jones, 
2012)28.  
The past seventeen years of postwar governments could not improve economic and political situation in the 
country as poverty, unemployment, political instability, corruption and black market (illicit drugs) and 
heavy dependence on foreign aid remain severely high (table 1). Foreign aid amounts to around thirty 
percent of the GDP and seventy percent of the government expenditure (table 1). Likewise, another 
                                                          
23 The link to the webpage at Atlas Media:” https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/afg/” 
24 Statistics retrieved from here Atlas Media:  https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/afg  
25 Library of congress’s document shows the area approximately 647,500 square kilometers (Library of Congress, 
2008) available online at: https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Afghanistan.pdf  
26 Elizabeth Hessami an adjunct professor of environment at Linfield College has written an article on Afghanistan’s 
water which contains valuable information about these water dams. Available here at New Security Beat 
organization: https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2017/03/afghanistans-water-plans-complicated-worried-neighbors/  
27 Same source as “21” Elizabeth Hessami 
28 Full report is available on American Progress website: 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2012/06/08/11715/the-high-cost-of-afghanistans-opium-
economy/  
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significant portion of the GDP comes from illicit drug production and unreported black market as reported 
by Quigley-Jones above. The economic impact of this dependence on foreign aid and illicit trade is through 
weakening governance quality and distorting people-government relationships, which will be discussed in 
details in the next chapter under governance.  
Lack of reliable data on Afghanistan is the biggest challenge for conducting quantitative analysis. Data 
from different sources show different numbers for GDP per capita, for example. Even data from the same 
source could be inconsistent. The World Bank data on Afghanistan retrieved by the author in 2013 was not 
identical with data retrieved in 2018 for the same years and same indexes. The exact population number of 
Afghanistan is unknown and is estimated between thirty-one and thirty-five million. For example, in the 
following table it was estimated 34.6 million in 2016 whereas in previous pages the Afghanistan statistics 
office reported it 31.6 million in 201829. Many of the data we use depend on population statistics, with 
unknown population number and massive migration as well as unregistered (black) economic activities, the 
real economic data may differ significantly from available estimates, and that is partly the reason for data 
inconsistency on Afghanistan and a major challenge for this paper. Acknowledging these limitations, the 
data in the table below gives a glimpse of the state of the country’s economy.  
Table 1: major economic indicators of Afghanistan (2016) 
No. Indicator Value No. Indicator Value 
1 GDP per capita 561 (Current USD) 
1944 (PPP, Int’l $) 
9 Population 
Population Growth 
34.6 million 
2.7% 
2 Military Expenditure 
(%GDP) 
0.9 10 Literacy rate (adult 
aged 15 and above) 
34 
3 Expenditure on 
education (%GDP) 
3.31 11 Poverty Ratio 36% (2008, 09) 
4 ODA (as percent of 
govt. expenses) 
73 12 Corruption Rank* 172/175 
5 GDP USD 19.47 billion 13 Unemployment 35% (2008) 
6 Inflation Rate 5.1% 14 Life expectancy 63 
7 Agriculture value 
added %GDP 
22 15 Service value added 55.4 
8 Industry value added 22.6 16 Rural population  73% of total 
Sources: The World Bank 2018, *Transparency International 2016, and Gharjistani 2015. 
As (table 1) shows the economic situation in Afghanistan is alarming with high unemployment rate between 
thirty-five to forty percent, poverty ratio around thirty-five percent, illiteracy rate of more than sixty percent 
and corruption level of third most corrupt country of the world. This is even more alarming when 
considering the recent history and bitter experience of the country in long and persistence poverty and 
unemployment which were major contributors to the wars and migrations. Researches also suggest that 
                                                          
29 Population report by Central Statistics Office (government of Afghanistan) is available here: 
“http://cso.gov.af/en/page/demography-and-socile-statistics/demograph-statistics/3897111  
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economic stagnation and persistent poverty increase chances of revolt and conflict which Afghanistan 
experienced firsthand in the past few decades (more details later).  
Afghanistan’s persistent poverty, insecurity and high rate of unemployment of more than thirty percent 
have forced over five million people out of the country as refugees and immigrants over the decades of 
wars30. Afghan refugees made the second largest group of migrants in Europe in 2015 and 2016 (Stanzel, 
2016)31 adding extra pressure on the country’s already scarce human resources. The postwar governments’ 
investment in human capital is often referred to as one of the few success stories, however, large-scale 
migration of the young generation on the one hand, and high rate of population growth on the other hand 
are serious challenges for human capital formation in the country and refugee crisis abroad. Afghanistan 
has one of the world’s youngest populations. About sixty percent of the population is below twenty-five 
years of age and ninety percent of the people are less than fifty-four years old (Gharjistani T. , 2015, p. 21). 
Around two-third of the population still live in rural Afghanistan despite the high rate of urbanization at 
around four percent per year (CSO Afghanistan, 2014)32.  
Being a predominantly agrarian and less developed economy, Afghanistan’s agriculture sector too remained 
traditional and subsistence level. The Asian model of development such as in Japan, South Korea, and 
Chine contained increasing agricultural productivity specially at lower levels of development as a major 
policy of economic development. According to a study by Asian Development Bank ADB, 
“… in the most successful Asian economies, apart from the cities of Singapore and Hong 
Kong in China, agriculture played an important role in launching the period of high growth. 
In these economies, the link between agricultural development and poverty alleviation 
indicated the positive interaction between the political economy of rapid growth and a 
development strategy that emphasized the role of the rural economy. Indonesia after 1966, 
the PRC after 1978, and Viet Nam after 1989, tilted investment priorities toward rural 
growth, while the transformation of agriculture in other Asian countries, e.g., India or 
Pakistan, has been slow”. (Briones & Felipe, 2013, p. 13).   
Afghanistan’s agriculture sector is still traditional and just as discussed about lack of investment in 
education, Afghanistan also did not invest in increasing its agricultural productivity by investing in 
infrastructure, mechanization, water management to irrigate more arable lands, invest in agricultural 
product processing industries. Investment in agriculture has been slow in Afghanistan as the traditional 
subsistence level agriculture dominates the sector in the country. As discussed under Abdurrahman Khan’s 
forced migration and land expropriation the distribution of land in the country became highly unequal. As 
reported by Kakar, Abdurrahman Khan (1880-1901) “deployed 100,000 troops and tribal levies” to crush 
the Hazaras. “after the defeat, large number of the Hazaras were enslaved, their land in Uruzgan was granted 
to the Durranis and Ghilzays, and [other] Pashtun nomads nomad were allowed to take Hazaras pasture for 
their own flocks. A large number of the Hazaras migrated. The Hazara power was, as a consequence, broken 
to the extent that it never again challenged the government” (Kakar, 1979, p. 23). The devastating impact 
of such policies by the Afghan government was to be felt in the country for generations to come in terms 
                                                          
30 The full report on refugees are available here at UNHCR website: http://www.unhcr.org/556725e69.pdf and here at 
The Diplomat website: https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/afghanistans-32-year-refugee-crisis/  
31 As reported here at European Council on Foreign Relations website:  
www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/enternally_displace_afghanistans_refugee_crisis_and_it_means_for_europ  
32 This rate of urbanization however is debatable is the World Bank report shows urbanization in Afghanistan was 
only 1.2% and the increase in urban population was because of the 4.1% between 2002 to 2010 percent natural 
population growth rate and not because of urbanization. Reported here:  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/publication/leveraging-urbanization-afghanistan” 
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of poverty, further fragmentation and violence in the society as well as the emerging institution which 
safeguarded the new order. Expropriation of land and unequal distribution of land (as a result), forced 
migration and population movement continued in successive governments as well, albeit at varying pace. 
The Afghan governments more or less continued Abdurrahman’s policy “… that no reliance can be placed 
on any other tribe than on the Afghans. Thus, it can be seen that the amir’s [Abdurrahman] internal policy 
was based on tribal and religious lines and favored the Sunnis against the Shias and the Pashtuns over non-
Pashtuns” (Kakar, 1979, p. 10). Another instance of land expropriation and forced migration happened in 
frontier territories. Sungur quotes from Kakar that for Pashtunization of the country the plan was that “it is 
proper that as the king is an Afghan [Pashtun], his tribesmen, the Afghan [Pashtun] should guard the frontier 
(Kakar 1979, p 132)” and Abdurrahman Khan “initiated a project of Pashtunizing northern Afghanistan 
through voluntary or forced Pashtun migrations to the north” (Sungur, 2016, pp. 443-444).  
Thus, such was the development under the Afghan governments and the state of property protection, justice, 
and economic development. There is no evidence of the Afghan governments redistributing lands post-
Abdurrahman Khan neither the expropriated lands nor other major land redistribution under reconciliation 
or development policies ever since. Evidently, ethnic suppression and fragmentation, massive poverty, and 
inegalitarian institutions in Afghanistan in the past century have been in practice. This should come to no 
surprise that lack of economic development in Afghanistan was/is not a coincidence and not a result of 
foreign intervention or the civil wars of 1990s. It will be greatly misleading to ignore a century of such 
developments and buildups in Afghanistan and only try to understand the current failure in the context of 
the past three decades of wars and foreign interventions. Now it is easier and more obvious to see why this 
paper emphasizes on ethnic politics, Afghan institutions/government and economic development in 
Afghanistan.  
What happened between 1880-1980 in Afghanistan in terms of the institution-building, ethnic politics, and 
economic development left a legacy for the postwar Afghanistan. The fundamental issues of identity crisis, 
political Islam and the type of institution in the country did not change in any meaningful manner, ethnic 
politics and fragmentation is still a severe issue33. Not only no reforms and restitutions were introduced to 
undo or heal the past horrors and injustices, the postwar governments have increasingly titled towards a 
similar path as the prewar’s. In addition to the two instances already mentioned, namely ethnic politics as 
in the presidential elections, for example, and the government’s high level of corruption and aid-
dependency, the problems of “the common pool” and “tragedy of the commons” became even stronger. 
Despite the highly centralized government of Kabul under the president, disagreements on national budget, 
appointments, legislation, provision of public goods have been extraordinarily high, it is again revolving 
overwhelmingly around the ethnic divides34. The list of this phenomenon is long in postwar governments 
that it would require a separate paper to discuss them. For sake of evidence for these claims, this paper will 
include some important instances in the following chapter under government corruption, “ghost schools”, 
“family ministries”, and the fact that most, if not all, political parties in the country are ethnically founded 
and motivated, these issues correlated with ethnic politics and diversity and institutional defects will be 
discussed later. As for this section, it was deemed important to provide a quick background and description 
                                                          
33 This study titled “Playing the Ethnic Card: On the Ethnicization of Afghan Politics”, and the author believes that 
“the Bonn Agreement sought to outbalance ethnic interest to overcome a decisive root cause of this protracted conflict” 
however, it produced a contrary outcome and that reflects “the political manifestation of ethnicity in Afghan politics” 
(Schetter, 2016, p. 460). Link to the article is here at the Online Library website: 
 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/sena.12203  
34 The central issue of ethnic politics in Afghanistan is the subject matter of many studies which this paper will refer 
to, one such paper is available in the link above. 
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of the situation in Afghanistan, and to have this picture in mind and imagine the environment in which the 
overall developments take place in Afghanistan.  
The environment described above has not been attractive for investment and entrepreneurship specially in 
postwar Afghanistan. Nonetheless, postwar Afghanistan witnessed resumption of the “industrial parks” and 
some private businesses. As reported by Gharjistani, Afghanistan has a total of nine industrial parks (not 
all are active) consisting of around 580 companies employing around thirty thousand people. Afghanistan 
has (one of the poorest) the poorest business environment in terms of access to electricity, financial and 
legal support to investors and registration (Gharjistani T. , 2015, pp. 345-346) in addition to the challenges 
of security and corruption. Some small to medium scale domestic investments in light industries include 
processed agricultural products, detergents, leather and fabrics, and foods and beverages (Gharjistani T. , 
2015, pp. 346-347). The industrial parks are mainly confined to five big cities/provinces of Herat, Kabul, 
Nengarhar, Kandahar and Balkh. Difficulty of doing business due administrative and security issues as well 
as lack of proper roads and electricity have made investment and other economic activities difficult in other 
areas of the country. The government’s inability to create a favorable condition for investment through 
effective rule of law, curb of corruption and provision of other basic public services (electricity and roads) 
remain serious problems. Gharjistani states that investment in the past decade started well but lack of 
infrastructure and a clear investment strategy, among other issues, many of these businesses stopped their 
activities (Gharjistani T. , 2015, p. 348).  
The region around Afghanistan is home to the two most populated countries of the world which are also 
economic powerhouses. The rise of India and China and other rapidly growing economies such as Turkey 
and Iran in the region has created new opportunities for Afghanistan as a country at the heart of the region. 
However, political crisis in Afghanistan remain a great challenge to benefiting from potentials such as 
investment and trade, and the country remains among the poorest country of the region. Figure 1 shows that 
Among the Southeast Asian countries Afghanistan and Nepal have the lowest and Maldives and Sri Lanka 
have the highest GDP per capita among SAARC35 countries, other low income (non-SAARC) countries are 
the northern neighbors of Afghanistan, the former Soviet members of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan. Although these countries are developing countries and share geographic proximity, their 
GDP per capita ranges from less than one thousand to more than six thousand USD as shown below.  
Figure 1: GDP per capita of Afghanistan and countries in the region 
 
Source: World Bank country data 
                                                          
35 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, to which Afghanistan is also a member. 
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The two countries with the highest level of GDP per capita are Maldives and Sri Lanka with USD 6665 and 
USD 3280 respectively and the two with the lowest GDP per capita are Nepal and Afghanistan at USD 694 
and USD 665 respectively. Afghanistan’s economy even comparing with its developing neighbors is small. 
GDP per capita of Pakistan is almost twice that of Afghanistan at $1275, and GDP per capita of India is 
slightly higher than Pakistan at $1500 as shown in figure 1 above.  
Another characteristic of Afghanistan’s economy, which sets it apart from other countries, is its dependence 
on foreign aid. Afghanistan is the biggest aid-recipient country in the region both in terms of aid received 
as percentage of its national income as well as the percentage of government consumption. Aid constitutes 
around twenty five percent of Afghanistan’s GNI and two-third of the government expenditure as shown 
in figure 2 below.   
Figure 2: Net ODA received as percentage of GNI (2013) 
 
Source: World Bank country data 
The scale of aid dependency of Afghanistan is much higher than other countries in this figure. This level of 
dependency on foreign aid and black market (opium economy as cited previously) in Afghanistan have 
significant implications for the country’s institutions (corruption on the one hand and weakening of people-
government relationship on the other) and of course for economic development of the country. Because this 
is an importance topic it will be discussed in details under the section on foreign aid later.  
The widespread corruption, weak rule of law, inequality and political instability characterize the poor 
quality of governance and great challenges to economic development in Afghanistan. The measures36 
planned by the government to deal with these issues such introduction of e-governance, registration of 
assets of government officials, and prosecuting corrupt officials were certainly good initiatives, however, 
the experience in the past seventeen years of the postwar governments indicates that the issue of corruption 
                                                          
36 The Afghan government’s plan for “National Strategy for Combating Corruption” set out five priority areas in 
combating corruption including “public procurement, high council on anti-corruption, ministry action plans, anti-
corruption justice center, and introduction of electronic procurement and payment” among others. The full report is 
available here at the Ministry of Finance (government of Afghanistan) website:  
http://mof.gov.af/Content/files/AFG_AntiCorruptionStrategy_Eng_.pdf  
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did not improve as Afghanistan remains in the top three most corrupt government in the world37. One 
example of corruption and weak rule of law is the Kabul Bank crisis of 2010. The Kabul Bank was one of 
the first and biggest private investment in financial in the country. Most of the shareholders of the bank 
were relatives of top government officials including the former president and vice president’s families38. 
This is particularly an interesting instance of top government officials’ fraudulent accumulation of wealth 
and inability of the justice department to fight corrupt officials. In Kabul Bank crisis of 2010, around one 
billion dollars went missing from the bank’s internal loans39. The bank came close to liquidation before the 
government intervened and took control of it. The story of corruption and mishandling of public funds is 
well-known 40  issue in all levels of the government. High level of corruption in procurement and 
appointments of government officials has been so bad that Afghanistan kept is position at the bottom of the 
transparency lists for the past several years, for instance, ministers have to buy their positions and once in 
the office, hire the people of their choice, often family and friendsi, what became known as the ‘family 
ministries’. Reports of some infamous incidents of corruption, specially involving high level government 
officials are included in the footnote and appendix/endnotes. Corruption involving aid-funded development 
projects will be covered later under foreign-aid section.  
The current status of Afghanistan’s economy shows that the scale and depth of challenges are ridiculously 
high and the statistics (at least for the past decade) do not show an improving trend either in governance, 
jobs and income, or stability and peace. The latest data (2017-2018) from the Central Statistics Office show 
that poverty level increased from previously thirty-six percent to more than fifty-four percent of the 
population in 201841. The high level of economic and political challenges in Afghanistan indicate the scale 
of challenges and failure of its development. The failure of the Afghan government and its international 
supporters in providing the people with basic services and economic development should raise serious 
doubts about the effectiveness of their plans. As in most of the recent history of the country, the institutions 
of the country failed one more time to effectively solve the issues of conflicts, poverty, corruption and other 
basic services stemming, as this paper argues, from its weak institutions.  
Infrastructure 
Afghanistan has limited infrastructure such as roads, electricity, urban and industrial constructions. 
Afghanistan until the war period had only one stretch of road connecting capital Kabul with four other 
major cities, as covered previously, this underinvestment in public good and infrastructure has been a major 
issue in the country the past century. The governments in the past primarily focused on political power and 
                                                          
37 The latest ranking of corruption index by Transparency International for 2018 shows that Afghanistan’s ranking in 
the world did not improve and it still holds the 177th place out of 180 countries in transparency as reported here: 
“ https://www.transparency.org/country/AFG“   
38 Then president Hamid Karzai and his vice president Qasim Fahim’s brothers were shareholders of the bank, more 
details are provided in the following links. 
39  Read here at The Guardian’s website: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/16/kabul-bank-afghanistan-
financial-scandal  
40 Famous newspapers report on corruption by Afghan and US officials in Afghanistan are here in The Guardian and 
in The Investigation Fund websites respectively: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/09/afghan-minister-
tears-denies-corruption  
http://www.theinvestigativefund.org/investigations/iraqafghanistan/1842/how_the_us_fueled_the_taliban_insurgenc
y/   
41 ToloNews reported “a joint survey carried out by the Central Statistics Organization (CSO) and ICON International 
shows that almost 54 percent of the population in Afghanistan live below the poverty line”. Full report is here:  
https://www.tolonews.com/business/54-percent-afghans-live-below-poverty-line-survey  
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stability in the country and majority of the population remained in remote and disconnected villages42. Apart 
from the one stretch of road between major cities the rest of the country had little to no access to public 
services such as roads, education, hospitals and electricity. Postwar era witnessed greater construction of 
infrastructure and provision of public services specially education and health. However, there still are 
regions such as central highland areas where an entire province does not have any paved roads, electricity 
grid and hospitals. Overall, construction of infrastructure is reaching many regions of the country even 
though the government is often criticized for unbalanced development (discussed later). 
Afghanistan is a mountainous and landlocked country and transportation mode is limited to roads. The road 
system connecting its major cities stretch from Kabul to northern provinces of Balkh and Kunduz bordering 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and from Kabul to the south and west running from Ghazni and Kandahar to 
Herat bordering Iran and Turkmenistan, this makes the national highway system known as ‘the ring road’43. 
The eastern stretch of the road goes from Kabul to Nangarhar province bordering Pakistan. Roads remain 
the sole mode of transportation in the country, however, road transport system is still limited to major cities. 
Afghanistan has “3,300 km of regional highways, 4,900 km of national highways, 9,700 km of provincial 
roads, 17,000–23,000 km of rural roads, and about 3,000 km of urban roads, including 1,060 km in Kabul” 
(Asian Development Bank, 2016)44. About four billion US dollars were spent on transport projects in 
Afghanistan in postwar era with the assistance of aid by international communities and organizations such 
as World Bank, Asian Development Bank and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members 
engaged in the country (more details provided in the links below).  
The railroad systems coming from neighboring countries end at the border areas. Afghanistan refused45 the 
railroad construction in the past fearing invasion by the British and Russian empires. The only two railroads 
in the country are located in the north which are actually extensions of railway systems from Turkmenistan 
to Afghanistan (Qara Tipa or Torghondi) at a length of 24.6 kilometers and the other one from Uzbekistan 
in to Afghanistan (Hairatan) at a length of 75 kilometers (Asian Development Bank, 2016) there is no 
functioning internal railroad system in the country (yet). There are twenty-two domestic and two 
international airports in the country (Asian Development Bank, 2016). The two international airports are in 
Kabul and Herat. The three other international airports which are underway or already operational are 
Mazari Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad airports. Afghanistan’s air transport system is relatively very small 
with limited domestic flights and international flights are mostly limited to the region.  
Despite the international assistance for reconstruction of infrastructure and public goods and services in the 
postwar era, the actual amount spent on projects was a small fraction of the original aid (issues pertaining 
to foreign aid in Afghanistan will be covered in the section on foreign aid). Corruption and multiple layers 
of contracts increased the cost and negatively impacted the quality of construction of these roads. Majority 
of this road system was built after 2001, as the statistics from Asian Development Bank showed above, it 
improved connectivity between provinces and increased market accessibility in the country. Population in 
                                                          
42“Due to high levels of illiteracy (98% according to Gregorian 1969:184), the central state could not establish links 
with its rural society and, yet, continued taxing rural people for urban reforms that targeted merely the Kabuli 
population which constituted 1.8% of the total population even as far as the 1960s” (Gregorian,1969, p. 357, in (Sungur, 
2016, p. 451)). That number was 70% in 2017 (CSO, 2018), which is still the highest in the region. 
43 ADB is helping construction of the “ring road” in Afghanistan, more details here at ADB’s website:  
https://www.adb.org/news/adb-provides-330-million-afghanistan-complete-national-ring-road  
44 Details on the road system in Afghanistan is provided in the link above. 
45 Emir Abdurrahman (1880-1900) turned down British East India Company’s proposal to extend Indian railways 
system inside Afghanistan. The governments of Afghanistan also did not let the Soviet rail network to extend inside 
Afghanistan and the country does not have any internal railroad system. More details on railroad is here which includes 
the Durand Line Agreement: https://www.valleyswat.net/literature/papers/The_Durand_Line_Agreement.pdf  
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the cities increased rapidly, for example population of Kabul increased from less than one million to over 
four million in the decade after war46. Similarly, the other four cities which grew to major population centers 
are Herat, Mazari Sharif, Jalalabad and Kandahar. The roads connecting these cities were also used for 
military purposes. This is important to mention the military use of it because the military convoys and their 
supplies were/are primary targets for insurgents’ roadside attacks which greatly damaged the roads 
throughout the country. The damaged roads became unusable in many areas in just one decade after 
construction. Audit reports by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction stated that 
many sections of the roads built in Afghanistan have become “impassable” (SIGAR, 2016)47. This is 
because of poor construction quality, poor or no maintenance, road-side bombs, and overloaded trucks. The 
Ministry of Public Works announced its plan to repair the national highway after complaints from motorists 
that the roads are getting impassable (ToloNews, 2017)48. The overall condition of road infrastructure is 
deteriorating as the country is constructing more roads the issue of quality and maintenance of the (existing) 
road system remains a challenge.  
Another big challenge for infrastructure in the country is the unbalanced development of different regions 
of the country. Unbalanced development now could become a greater challenge for the country’s economic 
development plans for future in terms of population movement, income distribution, and the risk of political 
instability 49 . A look at the provincial budget allocation, development projects, infrastructure and 
representation in the government clearly shows the gap between different provinces and regions of the 
country. Looking at the past eight years of the national budget the biggest portion of the budget were given 
to southern provinces of Nimruz, Kandahar, Helmand and Paktia (Pashtun-majority provinces), much 
higher than the rest of the country. For instance, per capita budget for Paktia province was $313 whereas it 
was only $50 for Badgis, Ghazni, Faryab and Saripol (central and northern, non-Pashtun dominated areas) 
provinces (The Daily Afghanistan, 2018)50. Similar stories are true for infrastructure, public employment 
opportunities, and majority (if not all) government plans and policies have been contested, mostly by 
different ethnic groups, as discriminatory and unbalanced approach to development.  
This limiting of equal to certain groups the population, which is mainly a product of country’s diverse 
ethnicities and the absence of institutions to effectively ensure equality for all citizens (regardless of ethnic 
background) have been hurting development in the country, as development failure and stagnation in the 
country have been a hallmark of both prewar and postwar periods. Blocking opportunities to certain people 
is economically counterproductive as talents cannot effectively grow and engage in productive activities. 
As studies show this issue is not unique to Afghanistan as “central governments in many less developed 
countries are notorious for underproviding recurrent expenses, like textbooks for schools and road 
maintenance” (Easterly, 2001, in (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005, p. 2361)). To conclude this section on 
infrastructure, “formation of meaningful economic linkages extending beyond the immediate community 
                                                          
46  A World Bank report on population growth in Afghanistan argues that urbanization in Afghanistan is more 
“attributed to natural population growth more than rural-urban population movement. Population growth is reported 
4.5 percent where as urbanization was only 1.2 percent between 2002-2010. Full report is available here at the World 
Bank’s website: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/publication/leveraging-urbanization-afghanistan  
47 Link to the report is here at the SIGAR website: https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-17-11-AR.pdf  
48 The link to the Tolo News webpage on the topic is here: http://www.tolonews.com/business/ministry-under-fire-
not-fixing-highways  
49 The biggest protest in the country was against the unbalanced development and ethnic-based discrimination in 
development projects. The so-called “enlightening movement” was formed to protest to what they called the “re-
routing” of a power gridline away from Hazara-dominated area. A report on this subject is here in Indian Council on 
World Affairs website: https://icwa.in/pdfs/VP/2014/TUTAPowerProjectAfghanistan27052016.pdf  
50 The link to the article (in a newspaper, in Persian) has more details at Daily Afghanistan newspaper’s website: 
http://dailyafghanistan.com/national_detail.php?post_id=141960  
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is a necessary precondition for modern economic growth” as quoted by Easterly from (Simmel, 1971 
[1908]; Greif, 1993; Woolcock, 1998). They further emphasize on the importance of building “social capital 
across ethnic groups” for successful economic development in ethnically diverse countries (Miguel & 
Gugerty, 2005, p. 2362). Afghanistan’s firsthand experience of its recent past has many valuable lessons 
regarding the importance of balanced development, equality and access to opportunities for all citizens 
which Afghanistan’s institutions have not been successful to provide in the past but should adopt for its 
future. 
Chapter Two: 
Afghanistan’s century of failure 
This research believes that not only the conventional discussion around introduction and application of 
(new) measures by the government did not produce any tangible results, as evident from the statistics and 
realities discussed, it is rather misleading to divert the focus to the issues commonly cited in terms of 
corruption, ineffective plans, conflicts, political instability, instead of asking what created these issues in 
the first place. This paper believes that those issues themselves are products of the unfit and outdated tribal 
system which could not and cannot function for the entire population but rather benefit the top few at the 
cost of the rest of the population. So far as the government structure and its policy remain the same, those 
issues will keep appearing. Even if the government succeeds in applying effective policies to combat those 
issues, the cycle of production of those issues will not cease. An institution which is not designed to address 
the issues common to multiethnic countries such as Afghanistan, the issues that exists in Afghanistan as 
real-life experiments as well as studied by many authors as previously covered, specially “the tragedy of 
commons”, under-provision of public goods, conflict between different ethnicities, growth of inequality as 
a result of favoritism and corruption, and the overall underperformance of the economy and rise of poverty. 
These issues exist in Afghanistan at a wide scale and the country should come to this realization, sooner 
than later, because as Easterly stated “ethnic diversity has a more adverse effect on economic policy and 
growth when institutions are poor” and “good institutions also lower the risk of wars and genocides that 
might otherwise result from ethnic fractionalization. Ethnically diverse nations that wish to endure in peace 
and prosperity must build good institutions” (Easterly W. , 2001, p. 703). 
Afghanistan’s recent history itself is a manifestation and living example of weak institutions failing to 
prevent wars and poverty among its ethnically diverse population. And this in Afghanistan is not a postwar 
phenomenon because they existed in prewar period as well as shown by statistics. The institutions 
governing the affairs of Afghanistan was established a century ago and it has not gone a significant reform 
throughout the period, despite the significant time lapse and ups and downs in the meantime51. The society 
of Afghanistan is still fragmented along ethnic lines and the fragmented pockets of communities do not 
have a history and experience in cooperation. As Sungur quotes Saikal (2004, pp 29-30) that Afghanistan’s 
“microsocieties… evolve around a tribal, ethnic, or religious leader or a local hero” and she thinks that this 
“microsocieties may be best explained with the local word qawm” (Sungur, 2016, p. 438). In addition to 
the naturally existing different ethnic groups in Afghanistan, the Afghan government notably Abdurrahman 
Khan “introduced a new dimension the practice of tribal/community manipulation. He invested 
considerable energy in splitting local polities into smaller units” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 5) for sake of 
weakening the oppositions and bringing them under his control.  
                                                          
51 For example, Amanullah Khan’s (1919-1929) introduction of modern education, end of the Afghan monarchy in 
1974, and more importantly the changes in postwar era such as increased public education and participation by broader 
members of the society, these events are further discussed in other sections of the paper. 
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Going back to the developments in Afghanistan in prewar period, the government of Abdurrahman Khan 
(1880-1901) mainly spent this time on military conquests, during the period “(1881-1996) about 40 revolts 
and civil wars were recorded” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 6). If we highlight a salient feature of this period, 
unification of the country under a highly centralized government with the help of a strong army and 
ethnonationalist ambitions. Keeping a strong army was “a top priority” for which “he received a lot of 
financial and material help from the British” and “from Germany and France” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 11). 
Abdurrahman Khan as the “first Afghan ruler52” in modern Afghanistan set to establish “an Afghan state” 
in an ethnically-diverse country. Being surrounding by tow ‘infidel’53 superpowers at the northern and 
southern borders, and to confront powerful ethnic and tribal leaders inside the country, he needed to unite 
his people behind him around two principles, (ethnic) Afghan and (Sunni) Islam. The reason for choosing 
this approach might have been the ethnoreligious reality inside the country and the hostile ‘infidel’ empires 
at the neighborhood. Inside the country, the powerful Hazara people were independent and autonomous54, 
who happened to be Shia Muslim-majority and ethnically different from the ethnic Afghans. Another 
religiously different group of people were the people of Kafirstan (land of infidel) which Abdurrahman 
converted to Islam and renamed the land as Nuristan (land of light). “while he [Abdurrahman] was bringing 
the clergy under his control, he could claim to be the true defender of Islam. By organizing jihads against 
groups of the population such as the Kafirs of future Nuristan and the Shias of Hazarajat, he effectively 
prevented the clergy from unifying and mobilizing sectors of the population against him” (Giustozzi, 2008, 
p. 8) [text inserted]. Sungur also talks about Abdurrahman’s combining the forces of Afghan and Islam in 
his campaign. “What Abdurrahman did for the first time was to present himself deriving power from Islam 
for protecting the Afghan state stuck between two ‘infidel’ powers” (Sungur, 2016, p. 442) and that he was 
largely successful in his approach. According to Barfield, Abdurrahman Khan “linked elements of Islamic 
belief with Afghan tribal customs” (Barfield, 2010 pp. 158–59) and successfully gathered broad support 
around these two causes and effectively used them in his campaign. Abdurrahman’s successful 
establishment of the ‘first Afghan state’ and the institutionalization of the Afghan state and political Islam 
are two most important factors in institutional development study of the country in the past century, 
particularly with respect to the challenges of institution-building for long-term economic growth in an 
ethnically-diverse country, which this paper will cover in details. 
The succeeding two governments of Habibullah Khan and Amanullah Khan (1901-1919-1929) inherited a 
strong centralized government setup by Abdurrahman Khan. Given that, their attention shifted more 
towards reforms and modernization specially opening of the first schools in the country in this period. 
According to Giustozzi, the number of army reduced from Abdurrahman to Habibullah and to Amanullah’s 
period from 88,4000 to 24,000 and to 10,000 respectively (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 12). The two reasons for 
reduction in the army were shifting priorities from military conquest and wars (because Abdurrahman had 
crushed oppositions and had established tight state control) to reforms and modernization55. The second 
reason was that after independence from the British in 1919, foreign assistance (from the British) to the 
Afghan government stopped. “Having lost the British subsidies” Amanullah Khan “had to increase taxes 
and reduce expenditure. Neither initiative was particularly popular” on top of that “he decided to launch his 
ambitious reforms” which included “introduction of secular legal codes (based on Turkish model) and of a 
                                                          
52 Abdurrahman was “the first Afghan ruler to make deliberate attempts to build an Afghan nation” (Kakar, 1979, p. 
10). 
53 “Afghan state [was] stuck between two ‘infidel’ powers” (Sungur, 2016, p. 442), the Russians in the north and the 
British in the South. 
54 “up to 1889 the Hazaras were partially or wholly independent… enjoyed a relatively high degree of autonomy until 
the Amir’s accession” (Kakar, 1979, p. 23) 
55 Specially during Amanullah Khan who himself “had been a member of the nationalist and reformist circle before 
1919 and soon embarked on a ambitious reform program and nationalist tinges” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 6)  
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corresponding judicial system, the prohibition of blood money, the abolition of subsidies and privileges for 
tribal chiefs and the royal family…” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 6).   
Amanullah Khan’s reforms were set to fail as his exclusion of the influential religious and tribal leaders 
without having replacements or alternatives ready for them, and introduction of new laws and reforms 
without preparing the ground work and the manpower to execute them were unrealistic and dangerous. As 
Giustozzi cited Zikria and Missan that “Kemal Ataturk himself is reported to have advised Amanullah not 
to proceed with radical reforms” when he “persistently underinvested in the army and particularly in its 
human resources” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 6). For example, one of his “overambitious” reforms was the school 
of law he established in 1920s for which he could not find a qualified professor to run (Fouchet 1971 in 
(Giustozzi, 2008, p. 6)). The same source also states that having distanced the traditional (religious and 
tribal) players as well as “the reform-minded nationalist intelligentsia”, Amanullah became more and more 
“autocratic” and dictatorial by handling “the smallest details” by himself, and that “freedom of opinion and 
discussion virtually disappeared” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 6).  
Another important point to mention is the fact that reforms, education, change in institution and leadership 
largely started and finished in Kabul with limited to no impact beyond Kabul where more than 98%56 of 
the population lived (remember that this figure is from 1969). Even if Amanullah had succeeded with his 
reforms as he planned, it would probably remain limited to Kabul (that’s what happened in succeeding 
governments. Again, refer to that statistics from 1969). As previously discussed, the success of Asian 
economies greatly depended on introduction of universal education and increasing productivity of 
agriculture. The implications of these approaches for economic development and institution-building are 
more significant, more than their face value and apparent benefits, and much different than introduction of 
reforms and modernization for a tiny group of people in capital city (of Kabul). A more important aspect 
of this Asian model is the institutions and policies which target greater number of people and the fact the 
impact of this approach reaches people at the bottom laying a broad foundation for development, which is 
absent in the Afghan case which focuses and remains limited to a certain group of people, often in Kabul. 
Comparing the two contrasting cases of the successful development in High Performing Asian Economies 
(the Asian Model) and the failed development in Afghanistan (say the Afghan Model), their approaches to 
reforms and development have been greatly different. It will be discussed further, specially under education. 
At this point, the paragraphs below aim at shedding light on the ethnic structure of the society and the rise 
of ethnic politics in Afghanistan, which would serve as a foundation for latter discussions on the relationship 
between Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity and institution-building and economic development. 
Ethnoreligious politics and creation of Afghan state 
Given the introduction on the status and characteristics of Afghanistan’s economy and society in previous 
pages, the following section will cover some important factors in shaping the politics of ethnic suppression 
and fragmentation, and failure of the Afghan governments to successfully plan and execute reforms and 
development. in other words, what was holding Afghanistan from undertaking reforms to its institutions 
and invest in public goods and services? The biggest suspect in this discussion seems to be the prevalent 
ethnic politics and the institutions (r)evolving around them. This, as will be shown, was a hallmark of the 
Afghan governments throughout the century, and it is in this context one can better understand the Afghan 
government’s hesitance to undertake reforms in institutions and become inclusive and egalitarian towards 
the whole population beyond a certain ethnic group. The fear of the Afghan leaders of losing control (of 
                                                          
56 As cited earlier from Gregorian, illiteracy rate was 98% (Gregorian 1969, 184). Government reforms mainly 
targeted Kabul residents which consisted only “1.8% of the total population even as far as the 1960s” (Gregorian 1969, 
p357)”. 
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political power to the ethnic and tribal rivals) has been the main driver and probably the best explanation 
for their exerting tight control over Kabul government and blocking entry and empowerment of the rest of 
the population. And thus, unsurprisingly the institution evolving through such environment and mindset 
would be a reflexive of that realities. Numerous studies on other countries show (as discussed above) that 
in ethnically diverse countries the chances of conflict, poverty and corruption are higher and they need 
strong-enough institutions to regulate the conflicting interests of the diverse groups and safeguard equality 
and justice for all citizens because the tendency and motivations for inegalitarianism (group favoritism and 
discrimination) is particularly higher in diverse societies. In Easterly’s words “ethnic diversity has a more 
adverse effect on economic policy and growth when institutions are poor” and therefore, “ethnically diverse 
nations that wish to endure in peace and prosperity must build good institutions” (Easterly W. , 2001, p. 
703). 
Afghanistan is a country of such diversity and the inevitable conflicting interests in the absence of an 
institution to provide that safeguard for equality, justice and cooperation. That makes it extremely difficult 
to come to consensus and collective decision making particularly in matters concerning the greater good. 
The level of heterogeneity of culture and race, history of ethnic suppression and conflict, lack of experience 
in cooperation and power sharing, lack of sense of national identity and unity, deep-rooted religious and 
cultural beliefs and more, all of which have intertwined with each other over time. In such a society, the 
closer these contradictions are pushed to each other, the higher the chances of opposition and conflict. The 
highly centralized government of Kabul itself became the manifestation of those contradictions and hence 
decision making on matters of national interest usually fall in to tribal and religious confrontations. Policy 
making and consensus in the government (including the parliament) remain regularly debated and 
undecided mainly due to ethnic differences and often taken advantage of by the ethnic leaders. For example, 
the most powerful political parties in Afghanistan are fundamentally formed on the basis of ethnic interests 
and representation. The political party representing the Tajik population is Hezb57 e Jamiyat, and Hezb e 
Junbish for the Uzbek population, Hezb e Wahdat for the Hazara population, and the two dominant parties 
among the Pashtun/Afghan population are Afghan Millat (an Afghan nationalist party) and the Taliban (a 
religious fundamentalist party)58. There are some other political parties too but ethnicity is the dominant 
factor in most (if not all) of these parties despite their claims of being supra-ethnic and Islamic (details in 
the link at the footnote).  
The period after Amanullah Khan’s failed reforms and secularization is the period of long stagnation in the 
country. As far as institutional development is concerned, the period from 1930s to 1978s was the longest 
period of relative stability with no major developments in Afghanistan’s history. Zahir Shah (1934-1974) 
inherited the throne at young age and the actual power was in the hands of his prime ministers. Notable 
events in this period are the ever-present struggle and suspicion between the Afghan aristocrats and the 
royal family over securing political power. According to Giustozzi, to challenge the authority and to 
position himself in the ranks Defense Minister Daoud “ordered the armed forces to shut down the border 
with Pakistan” – without Prime Minister Shah Mahmoud’s authorization – “and sent units of the army into 
Pakistani territory” in support of the Pashtunistan cause, which Pakistan “successfully retaliated with an 
economic blockade” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 13). The two important features of this period in addition to rivalry 
are Daoud’s sense of Pashtun nationalism grew stronger as “he had started surrounding himself with a 
network of Pashtun nationalists, often characterized by racist tendencies (Saikal 2004 in Giustozzi, 2008, 
p. 13)) and that “Daoud, like the rest of the royal clan, used international aid resources mainly to benefit 
                                                          
57 “Hezb” meaning party and “e” is Persian equivalent of “of”. Hezb e Wahdat means Party of Wahdat (Unity Party) 
58 A more detailed discussion on major political parties in Afghanistan is provided here National Democratic Institute 
webstie: https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Afghanistan-political-parties-july-2011.pdf  
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Pashtuns, presumably in order to consolidate Pashtun nationalism as the base of the monarchy” (Rubin 
1995, p 66, in (Giustozzi, 2008, p 13)). The second feature of this period was that in the face of rivalry and 
economic pressures, Zahir Shah did not undertake any serious reforms. Even after the introduction of legal 
reforms which included reforming the constitution and opening of the parliament “Zahir’s reforms were 
mainly motivated by internal rivalries” (Saikal 2004, pp 150-151, in Giustozzi, 2008, p 14). Daoud 
succeeded to overthrow Zahir in 1974 but just like Amanullah Khan, Daoud too resorted to concentration 
of power and becoming increasingly authoritarian by holding multiple high offices (ministries and 
presidential) at the same time.  
What is amazing is the similarity between the characteristics of prewar (as described above) and postwar 
governments on the one hand and the forgotten rural population who are virtually absent from what goes 
on in Kabul. The following may describe key similarities between the two periods, and thus our argument 
about the failure of institutional development in Afghanistan in both periods. The ever-present struggle for 
political power through application of any means, as none of the prewar rulers came to power through 
peaceful or democratic process. The two dominant methods of power transfer were either the former king 
was killed or ousted and someone from the aristocracy replaced him. This is to emphasize Afghanistan’s 
lack of experience in peaceful power transfer, as the country could not develop an institution and 
mechanism for power-sharing, cooperation and reconciliation even among the ethnic Afghan close-circle. 
The second characteristic is once in power, the highest priority for the ruler was to strengthen his position 
in power by weakening (potential) rivals and surrounding himself with “cronies” and “sycophants” 
(Giustozzi, 2008, p. 14). The third characteristics of Afghan governments was depending on foreign aid. 
The data one foreign aid as percentage of government expenditure between 1952 and 1988 shows that it 
was 18 percent in 1952, 53 percent in 1960 and fluctuated around 30% towards 198859 . In postwar 
government the level of aid dependency increased to a new height of more than 70% as shown in figure 3. 
The fourth similarity between the governments in the two periods is probably the most central one of all 
the government structure which resembles a hierarchy of the ruler and his political power as the highest 
priority followed by the aristocracy and kinship with Afghan nationalistic ideology and of course reformists 
and Islamists always existed albeit at the margins.  
The two great absentees in both periods have been an established and functioning institution capable of 
regulating the political and economic affairs at some minimum threshold, with which the state could 
function without discontinuity with every change in the leadership. And the second great absentee has been 
the vast majority of the people who have largely been ignored and left to their own device in rural 
areas60.The breakdown and collapse of the government in Kabul during the war period (1992-2001) despite 
being a significant event in recent history, however, for the overwhelming majority of the population living 
in rural areas the collapse of government in Kabul would not mean distortion of rule of law and of provision 
of services (they did not exist for them anyways) the rural population would largely feel the impact of wars 
more than the absence of government. The role of ethnic diversity and its influence on the type of 
institutions and governments in Afghanistan should not be underestimated. In addition to the political 
situation and developments described above throughout the past century, the underlying and often hidden 
role of ethnicity in that development make better sense of why the Afghan ruler were so obsessed with 
centralization of power, negligence of the rural population, and institution-building around a narrow 
foundation of Afghan interests. All of which may well stem from the fear of empowerment and rise of other 
                                                          
59 This data from (Rubin, 1955) is part of research on Afghanistan by (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 18). 
60 The 98% illiterate and rural population as cited earlier from Gregorian.  
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ethnicities, specially the Turkic (Hazara, Uzbek, and Turkmen) people who traditionally ruled over this 
region before the Afghans61 (and were independent as late as 1886 as mentioned under Abdurrahman).  
The ethnicity factor together with the historical developments described above, led Afghanistan down this 
unique path of fragmentation of its society and establishment of institution unfit for its modernization and 
prosperity of its diverse population. Having gone through such fragmentation and divide the different ethnic 
groups of Afghanistan experienced the first real interaction during the civil wars. The factors contributing 
to the wars or at least failing to prevent those wars may have been lack of experience in inter-ethnic 
cooperation, power-sharing, and the long history of suppression and poverty in the country. As importantly, 
when the political instability of 1980s created the environment for different ethnic groups to rise for their 
rights and representation, the institution and the platform (the government) did not exist to facilitate a 
peaceful and gradual settlement and integration. Because the institution was mainly designed for the small 
ruling class residing in Kabul and the government at that time was in crisis and later collapsed in the civil 
wars. After this violent meeting between the different groups, the postwar period became the second major 
meeting albeit more peacefully this time. However, the process of a broad-based institution-building in the 
postwar period has largely remained limited on the paper, as the actual reconciliation, tolerance, and power-
sharing among different groups in the government and in the parliament have not been very successful62. It 
is hard to find evidence of significant increase in constructive interaction and mingling among different 
ethnic groups be it in the government level (it is actually worse there) or at the grassroots levels inside 
communities. Despite the initial optimism and improvements in early prewar period63, the last decade has 
increasingly witnessed deterioration in the overall situation, particularly ethnic polarization and political 
instability64. There has been a general recognition of existence of ethnic division in Afghanistan both 
internally and internationally. As Schetter pointed to the early days of the postwar government, the 
international community was of the idea that the solution to the ethnic conflict of Afghanistan is to build 
“ethnic identity” and “well-balanced representation of the ethnic groups” and this “had to be given top 
priority” in the “multi-ethnic composition of the Afghan government” but this emphasis “unintentionally 
opened Pandora’s Box” (Schetter, 2016, pp. 465-466).  
Similarly, “politicization of ethnicity” in the postwar constitution adopted in 2004 was a “dominant 
demarcation” with reestablishment of “exceptional[ly] strong president” as was in prewar model of 1964 
(Schetter, 2016, p. 466). Obviously, as also stated by Schetter in the same page, this concentration of power 
under the president was opposed by the non-Pashtuns but favored by the Pashtuns (Schetter, 2016, p. 466). 
In many respects, as in the case of government structure and the constitution, the postwar institution became 
a postwar copy of the prewar institution reestablishing the system which proved failure and is facing a 
similar destiny, as the extent of failure (economics, ethnic conflict, political instability, refugee etc. which 
we already discussed) is getting wider and deeper. Two more similarities in prewar and postwar system are 
the president (or the king in prewar period) getting increasingly authoritarian as was the case with 
Amanullah Khan, and Daoud, among others in prewar, and Ashraf Ghani in postwar era. For example, a 
                                                          
61 For example, the Ghaznavids, Timurids, Baburids etc. who ruled over this region from 13th to 18th century. 
62 Obviously, the postwar experience in Afghanistan has been a failure in many respects as described before, this 
whole research is actually trying to understand and explain this failure in postwar development. 
63 From 2001 to 2007 Afghanistan witnessed a remarkable period of peace and development as the number of security 
incidence dropped and economic growth, school enrolment, and refugee returns increased remarkably. The statistics 
and specifics of these developments are reported in this paper multiple times.   
64 Some reports on recent incidence of increased ethnic polarization and conflict are included here at Al Jazeera 
website: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/07/ethnic-polarisation-afghanistan-emerging-threat-
160725120143630.html and here at Online Library website:  
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/sena.12203  
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recent New York Times article65 reports that “Mr. Ghani is bringing billions of dollars in procurement deals 
under his direct purview, denying ministries the opportunity to contract their own goods and services” and 
“leaving some ministry officials wondering what their jobs are anymore”. The increasingly authoritarian 
approach by the president is also felt and protested inside Afghanistan as well. Afghanistan’s parliament 
members “raised concerns over… Ghani’s authoritarianism” and that the president “is part of the problem 
in the country”66.  
The relationship between the government leaders resorting to increased authoritarianism and (political) 
crisis in prewar and postwar government is probably not a mere coincidence or personal trait. It could well 
be a result of the realities in the country in terms of the ethnic composition in contrast with the unfit 
institutions. On the one hand we have diverse ethnic groups wanting participation and rights (a reality), on 
the other hand we have an institution with a (nationalistic) drive for an Afghan/Pashtun state incompatible 
with that reality. It is likely that at least some of the Afghan leaders (particularly, Amanullah Khan 1919-
1929, Mohammad Daoud 1974-1978, and Ashraf Ghani 2016-present) may genuinely believe and try to 
develop and modernize the country. However, they could not get passed this dilemma around ethnic reality 
on the one hand, and Afghan nationalism on the other. When the institution of the country does not help 
them achieve their progressive goals, and that they are unable or unwilling to reform for a more conducive 
and inclusive institution for that matter, they resort towards authoritarianism in the face of that frustration 
and disappointment. Another issue rooted in this dilemma is exaggeration of population share to justify the 
right to rule67. In other words, just as resorting to authoritarianism, discrimination and inequality, under-
provision of public goods are products of incompatible institutions in multiethnic and fragmented 
Afghanistan, exaggeration of population share has a similar interpretation in this context. In the absence of 
actual population statistics in Afghanistan, the estimates in use vary widely. One such estimate is accounted 
by Schetter drawing from multiple studies. Schetter’s accounting for the largest ethnic groups in 
Afghanistan produced this numbers. 
Table 2. diversity and share of ethnicities in population of Afghanistan 
Ethnic 
group 
Language Living area** Race68 Percent in 
parliament 
(2005) 
Percent in 
parliament 
(2015) 
Percentage 
Pashtun  Pashto South, Southeast Indo-Iranian 47.4% 38.5% 35%–50% 
Tajiks   Dari* Northeast Indo-Iranian 21.3% 24% 20%–35% 
Hazara  Dari Central region Turkic 16.4% 24.5% 7%–25% 
Uzbek Uzbeki North Turkic 8% 6% 8%–15% 
Aimaq Dari West Turkic (counted with 
Tajik) 
(counted with 
Tajik) 
3%–8% 
Turkmen Turkmeni Northwest Turkic 1%–3% 
Baloch Baloch Southwest Indo-Iranian (others 6.8%) (others 6.5%) ~1% 
                                                          
65 The article is available here at New York Times website: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/21/world/asia/ghani-
afghanistan-unity-government-plan.html and another similar report is available below. 
66  The link to the Tolo News webpage is here: https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/mps-split-over-
ghani%E2%80%99s-ability-fix-national-issues  
67 The ethnic Afghans have traditionally led the Kabul government. The actual statistics on total population as well as 
population share of each ethnic group is unavailable. The Afghan government’s lack of producing real population 
statistics (ever) adds more questions and suspicion around what the real statistics are and what secret does it hold. An 
example of severity of ethnic issues is reported here in BBC website (Persian):  
 
68 More information on races and ethnic groups in Afghanistan is available in World Atlas website at:  
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/ethnic-groups-of-afghanistan.html  
25 
Source: (Schetter, 2016, p. 464 and 471), [added columns by author: religion, racial group, area and 
language] 
* Dari is also called Farsi or Persian and is the lingua franca in the country69 
** this rea shows where each ethnic group is predominantly living, however, population movement and 
urbanization have created mixed neighborhoods particularly in cities and also there are some divers regions 
(more information in the footnote). 
The new government (post-Taliban) agreed on participation of ethnic groups in the government with 
Pashtun’s share of 33%, Tajik 24%, Hazara 19% and Uzbek 13 % based on the agreements made in Bonn 
Conference in 200170. If the two parliamentary elections show a more accurate population share, then there 
are some changes but it still remains within the rage proposed by Schetter. The first change is the Hazara 
percentage of 16.4 - 24.5 in 2005 and 2015 respectively is closer to the Scetter’s upper bound of 25%, while 
the Tajik’s percentage of 21.3 – 24 in the parliamentary is closer to the Schetter’s lower bound of 20%. A 
similar observation is true for Pashtun percentage of 47.4 – 38.5 is closer to the lower bound of 35% 
especially considering that the Pashtun Kuchi (nomads) get 10 reserved seats71 without voting in the 
election. This ‘reserved seats’ has also roots in ethnic politics of finding ways to keep the Pashtun majority, 
else the number of seats for the three top ethnic groups would be around the same between 25-35 percent72. 
In the absence of actual population data and the massive frauds73 in elections this data should be used with 
great caution as it may actually be different than what appears here. The point to stress here is the systemic 
problem with the current institutions which is inherently problematic for such ethnically diverse society. It 
is hard to imagine how would the supposedly democratic elections solve the ethnic polarization problem 
when important national events, for example elections, induce ethnic alignment and fragmentation.  
However, these percentages are much worse in the government in favor of the Pashtuns. President Ghani 
(2016-current) is criticized for surrounding “himself with advisors from his Pashtun ethnic group and clan, 
while shutting out those from other backgrounds” and just as was the case with Amanullah and Daoud, 
Ghani too takes “centralized oversight to absurd extreme” and “appoints ministers but does not give them 
authority to do their jobs” and “he humiliates people who object to his decisions”74. Marginalization of non-
                                                          
69 This report on Radio Free Europe has more details about why Dari is the lingua franca and more on language in 
Afghanistan https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-dari-farsi-persian-language-dispute/28840560.html   
70 In the Bonn Conference leaders from different ethnic and political groups participated and established the post-
Taliban government. Mohammad Nateqi (2015) wrote this number with a little difference as 34% Pashtun, 34% Tajiks, 
20% Hazara and 12% Uzbek. This was included in a BBC report available here:  
http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2015/12/151222_k02-power-sharing-afghanistan  
71 an article on the Afghan parliament system and Kuchi reserved seats (election 2014) is available here on Pajhwok 
website: http://elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/national-assembly  
72 Total number of seats in the parliament are 249 (this information available in the above link), considering the latest 
election of 2014/15, from the Pashtun percentage of 38.5 if the 10 reserved seats get deducted this percentage will 
reduce to approximately 34.1. And distributing these 10 seats to all ethnic groups would increase their percentage by 
one or two points, hence the gap in ethnic share will reduce to approximately 25-35 percent for the top three ethnic 
groups (Hazara, Tajik and Pashtun). However, this should not be taken as a fact, it just a calculation of reducing the 
10 kuchi seats from the last parliament (2014-present) regardless of the (unknown) actual population statistics.  
73 For example, this New York Times report on election fraud titled “E.U. confirms wide fraud in Afghan 
presidential runoff election” is available here: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/world/asia/afghan-voting-
fraud-detailed-in-new-report.html   
74 This is reported by Washington Post, but there are numerous other articles with similar contents some of which are 
included in the following links:  
1. Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghanistan-has-many-problems-its-
president-may-be-one-of-them/2016/09/01/8e00cd00-6e11-11e6-993f-
73c693a89820_story.html?utm_term=.60ece92cc184  
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Pashtun/Afghan government officials increased the ethnic polarization and dissent under Ghani. A leaked 
document from president Ghani’s office “set off a storm of criticism” which stated that “jobs being awarded 
with an eye to keeping control in the hands of Pashtuns” and that non-Pashtuns “should be appointed 
symbolically so that people think every ethnicity is represented here”75. It is difficult to measure to what 
extent the leading team (the president) versus the institution is responsible for this ethnic divide, among 
other possible factors such as history. However, even if it is largely the leader’s fault, it still is an 
institutional defect that it cannot protect against such actions or worse, it facilitates it through the centralized 
power under the president. It is a problem rooted in the existing ethnic politics and the system designed 
around it. For one, the political game is played on the ethnic ground for fairer participation, and then the 
system does not have provisions for a fair play, when, as the example just discussed, the leading team 
resorts to authoritarianism and discriminate against other ethnic groups, the centralized system and the 
incompatible institution cannot protect the victims, and thus further inequality, fragmentation and conflict.  
Unsurprisingly, each ethnic group in Afghanistan exaggerates its population share (maybe out of genuine 
belief about its population share, or exaggerate for political gain), especially when population share became 
the basis for each ethnicity’s share in the (postwar) government and that nobody knows what the actual 
numbers are. The massive frauds in general elections has also roots the same issue, although frauds can 
have other reasons too and is not uncommon in other countries. But in Afghanistan elections have been 
predominantly based on ethnic alliances and ethnic voting. As quoted earlier, Dubow described ethnic 
fragmentation in Afghanistan as “staggering” 76 . The centralized institution in Afghanistan is neither 
designed to bring the divided people close together in order to increase interaction, cooperation, power-
sharing and provide equal/fair participation between different ethnic groups, nor is it an institution 
delegating power out to the fragmentated groups (in a decentralized fashion).  We may call it the paradox 
of having a highly centralized system to govern a highly fragmented society, failing to regulate working 
together, refusing to let work separately.  
Given above, the relatively increased participation of ethnic groups in socioeconomic and political lives in 
postwar period is a cause to celebrate, however, the postwar institution model which was originally 
designed for one-ethnic-rule and with limited to no participation of other ethnicities in prewar period, is a 
major concern. Needless to repeat the details, the postwar development failure in multitudes of ways as the 
level of poverty, instability, ethnic polarization and refugee crisis kept rising in the past decade. Ethnic 
fragmentation and the policy of using different ethnic groups against one another would further complicate 
the already severe level of challenges in Afghanistan. The institution model and government policies 
applied in the multiethnic country of Afghanistan are thus far different from what the studies suggested that  
ethnically diverse countries should opt for “designing policies and institutions that promote successful 
cooperation across ethnic groups” (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005, p. 2362) because “cultural and ethnic 
heterogeneity tend to hamper the early stages of nationbuilding and growth’’ (Adelman and Morris, 1967 
in (Easterly W. , 2001, p. 687)). Afghanistan has had the ethnically diverse and fragmented society but it 
lacked such institutions in prewar period. The government system in postwar period, arguably a copy of the 
previous system, has also been such that it could not create and uphold an environment for “successful 
                                                          
2. Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/political-storm-brews-in-afghanistan-as-
officials-from-ethnic-minorities-break-with-president-call-for-reforms-and-protests/2017/07/01/ab9419ea-5e6f-
11e7-aa69-3964a7d55207_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e3ba2a8e44c9  
75 The original document was in Pashtu language, the English citation is included in a report in NY Post in here: 
https://nypost.com/2017/09/21/afghan-government-accused-of-ethnic-bias/  
76 “the crisis which presents itself when a population is so divided that 90% of one region will vote against 90% of 
another is staggering. But it reflects Afghanistan’s history. The electoral partition fell along ethnic lines.” (Dubow, 
2009, p. I). 
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cooperation” and economic activities. Just as reported in the case of prewar period that the reforms and 
modernization by the governments were not really meant to be implemented but rather aimed at political 
manipulation and to create a good impression and good image internationally specially before the donor 
communities, for obvious reasons, this cannot be truer in postwar governments which is more aid-dependent 
than prewar governments as statistics showed.  
Borrowing the words of Schetter (2016) the “politicization of ethnicity” in Afghanistan particularly in 
postwar era aimed at resolving the ethnic fragmentation of the country but it went to the opposite direction. 
Ethnicity became an overt and central factor of politics and participation, however, just as discussed in 
previous paragraphs, the institution or the mechanism to govern this politics and participation proved 
incompatible and handicapped. Ethnic divide and discrimination, therefore, increased and became even 
greater of an issue. Because, ethnic politics became the rule of the game (as cited above, the postwar 
government was established on ethnic basis) and therefore the demand for equality and fare participation 
increased on the one hand, on the other hand, the system and political tradition (historically) are everything 
but inclusive and compatible with those growing demands and aspirations. The difference in postwar and 
prewar socio-economic structure is, thus, the change in the players and time period more than a change in 
institution or reality of the ethnic issue in Afghanistan.  
To conclude this chapter, some important points about why and how development in Afghanistan failed 
may include the following. The structure of Afghanistan society and government which remained somewhat 
the same in the past century, poverty and underdevelopment in Afghanistan may largely be related to, 
among other things, the ethnic realities of the country on the one hand, and the incompatible institution on 
the other. Many of the great issues in Afghanistan are better understandable in the light of such explanation 
such as the illiteracy, unbalanced access to wealth and power, poverty, war, ethnic tensions and 
underdevelopment. The most precious and important resource of any country is its people; therefore, a 
government system should be more inclusive of greater number of its citizens beyond a particular ethnicity 
or powerful people. To converge and catchup with more developed countries, as Keefer and Knack argue 
“the natural advantages that poor countries have in growing faster than wealthier countries – higher returns 
to capital and lower cost access to technological advances already developed in more developed countries 
– are less likely to be realized when institutions are poor” (Keefer & Knack, 1998, p. 145). An 
overwhelming majority of development studies, some of which are covered in this paper, place institutions 
as a primary and significant factor in economic development, especially for countries like Afghanistan 
which has extra challenges of ethnic diversity and fragmentation and lack of experience in cooperation, 
power-sharing and institution-building. The following chapter is specifically dedicated to the institutional 
development studies of Afghanistan in the light of the foregoing discussion. 
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Chapter Three: 
 
Institutional Barriers to Economic Development in Afghanistan 
Institutionalized ethnoreligious barriers to reforms and economic development both in the prewar and the 
postwar era, an alternative description of development failure in Afghanistan 
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Introduction 
Afghanistan is a Less Developed Country devasted by decades of wars and high levels of poverty and 
instability. The postwar reconstruction and development since 2001 has largely failed as poverty and 
unemployment rose to more than 50%77 in recent years and conflicts have also been on the rise. At a first 
sight, the relationship between wars and poverty seems somewhat obvious. However, a more important 
factor in Afghanistan’s development failure, beyond the popular78 notions that poverty resulted from the 
wars, foreign interventions and illiteracy, is the institutions governing the country over the past century. It 
is important to draw the relationship between Afghanistan’s political instability, poverty, illiteracy and the 
divided society on the one hand, and the country’s weak government/institutions on the other hand. The 
central element in this relationship is ethnic diversity and ethnic politics in Afghanistan that had significant 
weight on that relationship. In other words, this paper proposes a rather sensitive argument placing ethnic 
politics as a major determinant for the country’s choice of institutions and therefore, its (lack of) economic 
development. 
Contrary to the popular view of largely seeing Afghanistan’s issues in the context of developments/wars of 
the last three decades79, a deeper look at Afghanistan in the decades before the wars shows that it had 
already fallen behind other developing countries in major development areas. Studying the prewar (1880-
1978) developments in Afghanistan reveals a persistent and large-scale poverty, illiteracy, and 
underdevelopment throughout the period. As late as 1960s a staggering 98%80 of the total population used 
to live a subsistence level life in isolated rural areas without access to public services such as schools, 
electricity, hospital and rule of law. The question is why didn’t Afghanistan invest in its public goods and 
services? This is a central question for this study and the answer seems to lie in the country’s ethnic politics 
and the institutions evolving around that politics. There are three specific elements in this discussion namely 
ethnic diversity, institution building and economic development. In economics terms, this paper studies the 
institutional development in Afghanistan from ethnic diversity perspective. The vicious circle forming 
around Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity, weak institutions, and poverty trapped Afghanistan over the past 
century, contributing to the wars and further fragmentation which the postwar government inherited and it 
too got stuck with. This proposition is based on institutional development theory particularly on the findings 
of the following studies conducted on other heterogenous countries. 
The relationship between ethnic diversity, institutions and economic development, according to the 
following studies, is such that from one side “ethnic diversity has a more adverse effect on economic policy 
and growth when institutions are poor” (Easterly W. , 2001, p. 703) and from a another side “cultural and 
ethnic heterogeneity tend to hamper the early stages of nation building and growth” (Adelman and Morris 
                                                          
77 Central Statistics Office stated that poverty and unemployment rose to more than fifty percent in 2018 (CSO, 2018) 
as reported here at Tolo News website: https://www.tolonews.com/business/54-percent-afghans-live-below-poverty-
line-survey    
78 Many articles discuss the failure in Afghanistan in terms of wars, foreign intervention etc. such as in, 
Foreign Policy: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/10/why-did-we-fail-in-the-afghan-war-because-we-didnt-
understand-the-place-2/ 
Brookings: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/08/22/why-are-we-losing-in-afghanistan/  
Forbes: https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2017/03/01/the-nation-building-experiment-that-failed-time-for-
u-s-to-leave-afghanistan/#3873f1d365b2  
79 Since the Soviet invasion (1978) and the following wars ever since. 
80 “Due to high levels of illiteracy (98% according to Gregorian 1969:184), the central state could not establish links 
with its rural society and, yet, continued taxing rural people for urban reforms that targeted merely the Kabuli 
population which constituted 1.8% of the total population even as far as the 1960s” (Gregorian,1969, p. 357, in (Sungur, 
2016, p. 451)). That number was 70% in 2017 (CSO, 2018), which is still the highest in the region. 
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1967 in (Easterly W. , 2001, p. 687)). And as importantly, Alesina and La Ferrara “found overwhelming 
evidence supporting” the argument that “public good provisions was lower in fragmented societies” 
(Alesina & Ferrara, 2005, p. 796). The negative feedback loop among these three elements as found by 
many studies such as these, may better explain how the vicious circle is created and this paper would like 
to study Afghanistan in that context.  
The literature review will start with the primary role of institutions in economic development. Given the 
significant role of institutions in economic development, as also cited in previous chapter, the effect of 
ethnic diversity in institution building and economic development is particularly important, especially in 
the country under study, Afghanistan. The answer to the earlier question regarding the reason for 
Afghanistan’s underinvestment in public goods which contributed to the country’s illiteracy, poverty and 
conflicts as well as its particular choice of institution, will be difficult to explain without introducing the 
prevalent ethnic politics in Afghanistan. However, this does not mean that ethnic politics is the sole reason 
for all of those issues, but it has been a dominant factor in developments in Afghanistan as this paper will 
discuss in details. 
Afghanistan is country of ethnic minorities but no one ethnicity forms an absolute majority. As the statistics 
showed earlier the four biggest ethnic groups are Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara and Pashtun. However, ethnic 
Pashtuns (used interchangeably with Afghans) have been traditionally in power since the founding of 
modern81  Afghanistan in 1880. According to Kakar, after Abdurrahman Khan and the British Indian 
government signed the (new) border agreement known as the Durand Line Agreement, Abdurrahman 
started a nation-building campaign under a centralized government in Kabul (Kakar, 1979, p. 10). Since 
this date marks the establishment of modern Afghanistan and the most important institutional change in the 
past century, the period before 1880s is therefore not significant for the purpose of this paper. Following 
on the role of ethnic politics in modern Afghanistan, the different ethnic groups lived with a high degree of 
autonomy under their local regulations until Abdurrahman started his campaign to establish the Afghan 
state by subjugating ethnic and tribal leaders. The concept of nation-state based on Afghan identity started 
from this period making Abdurrahman “the first Afghan ruler to make deliberate attempts to build an 
Afghan nation” (Kakar, 1979, p. 10). The reason for choosing Abdurrahman Khan’s period as the starting 
point for studying the history of institutional change and development in Afghanistan is thus because it 
marks the beginning of modern Afghanistan with major changes in its institutions which then remained 
relatively constant ever since. The most persistent elements of the Afghan governments which remained 
important parts of the institution and government policies starting from Abdurrahman’s period all the way 
to the postwar government may consist of the following four: 1. Afghan nationalism and ethnic conflict 2. 
Authoritarian and centralized government 3. Political Islam and 4. Reliance on foreign assistance.  
The choice of these four elements of the Afghan governments are based on identifying the most important 
principles, characteristics, and grand policies and values which dominated the Afghan governments since 
Abdurrahman Khan. These are drawn from studying the history of governance and institutional 
development (including the role of religion, ethnicities, socioeconomic conditions, regime changes, and 
conflicts) since 1880s. These are drawn from numerous studies on the last hundred years of governance and 
development and other related topics in Afghanistan, such as (Kakar, 1979), (Dubow, 2009), (Farhadi, 
2014), (Giustozzi, 2008), (Gregorian V. , 1969), (Schetter, 2016), (Ali, 2015), (Shahrani, 2013) and (Sungur, 
2016) among other sources which this paper regularly refers to.  
                                                          
81 Modern Afghanistan in this paper refers to Afghanistan post-1880s, as the country with the current boundary and 
government system did not exist before this date.  
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The broad theoretical framework and literature support for this paper are based on institutional development 
theories such in (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012), (Amiri, 2014), (Dani, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2002), 
(Kuran, Aoki, & Roland, 2012), (1990), and (Przeworski, 2003) among others. This theoretical foundation 
is a general discussion on the importance of institutions in long-term growth. The real focus of this paper 
is on the challenges of institutional development in developing countries particularly understanding the 
reasons for the failure of development in Afghanistan. This group of studies suggest that development 
failure in most of the countries under study have strong relationship with (ethnocultural) heterogeneity of 
the population and weakness of their institutions to effectively govern. This research aims at studying 
Afghanistan from this particular perspective. The authors in this category who are regularly cited are 
(Alesina & Ferrara, 2005), (Ali, 2015), (Collier, 2011), (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2001), (Miguel & Gugerty, 
2005), (Schetter, 2016), and (Sungur, 2016) among others.  
In other words, this research is structured such that it starts with a broad foundation on institutional 
development theories and then picks a narrow topic of ethnic-diversity aspect of institutional development 
and then studies Afghanistan in this particular context. To narrow it down to two questions, this study seeks 
to answer, 
1. How did ethnic diversity influence the choice of particular institutions in Afghanistan?  
2. And how did that particular institutions prevent economic development both in prewar and postwar 
periods? 
Afghanistan is the least developed country in the region (figure 1.) with high rate of poverty, illiteracy, 
political instability and conflict (table 1.). The many ethnicities in country (table 2.) mostly live in 
fragmented localities and regions82. Ethnic Afghan leaders who ruled the country in the past century chose 
a highly centralized form of governance with limited to no effective participation of non-Afghan ethnicities. 
Abdurrahman established the modern Afghan state in 1880s through, as stated by Sungur, concentration of 
power and centralization of authority, crushing the existing powerhouses, and “recruitment of a new state 
elite loyal to the state…” (Sungur, 2016, p. 442). The three important governance reforms to note are 
centralization of power, establishment of Afghan elites under the king, and crushing of all oppositions. The 
other two fundamental reforms were political Islam which Abdurrahman effectively used to declare “jihad” 
against the Hazaras, and his religious justification of power and use of force as Kakar stated that 
Abdurrahman became “the first Afghan ruler to invoke the concept of the divine right of kings” (Kakar, 
1979, p. 8) and as also stated by Sungur “making stable basis of legitimacy for his rule” (Sungur, 2016, p. 
442). The history of Afghan monarchs has numerous instances of religious justification of power and rule. 
Claiming that the king is “vicars of the prophet”, “shadow of god”, “shield against unbelievers and 
rebellions”, “safeguard of the religion” and the king gets his authority from Allah and “those who 
challenged his [king’s] authority intended to commit anti-Islamic acts and so deserved the hardest 
punishment” (Kakar, 1979, p. 8). And finally, the most important of all the “Afghan” aspect of the 
government. Not only the Afghan governments became monarchies passed on to succeeding family and 
tribe members, but the government structure and policies shifted towards “Pashtunization” of the country 
by expropriating fertile and strategic lands from non-Pashtuns to Pashtuns (as described in case of Uruzgan 
and the Pashtun’s northwards migration towards the border territories) and that “no reliance can be placed 
on any other tribe than on the Afghans” and the “the internal policy was based on tribal and religious lines 
and favored the Sunnis against the Shias and the Pashtuns over non-Pashtuns” (Kakar, 1979, p. 10). 
                                                          
82 Until 1960s the illiteracy in Afghanistan was 98% and 98.2% of the population used to live in isolated rural areas. 
(Gregorian,1969, p. 184 and p. 357, in (Sungur, 2016, p. 451)) 
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Based on conclusions of related studies and Afghanistan’s experience, Afghanistan’s choice of institutions 
and ethnic politics behavior are not entirely outlandish and unexpected. Ignoring investment in public good 
(we are particularly interested in education) and building inegalitarian and less-inclusive institutions are 
particularly prevalent in (ethnically) diverse countries. As shown by Easterly, Alesina and La Ferrara and 
other authors, ethnic diversity, weak institutions, and poor economic performance are most common 
attributes of many LDCs. The negative impact of ethnic diversity decreases as institutional quality improves. 
In words of Easterly “in countries with sufficiently good institutions, ethnic diversity does not lower growth 
or worsen economic policies” (Easterly W. , 2001, p. 703) therefore, he suggests building “goods 
institutions” for “peace and prosperity” in those countries. Because otherwise when institutions are poor, 
ethnically diverse countries bear the risks of “ethnic fractionalization”, and “wars and genocides” (Easterly 
W. , 2001, p. 703).  
The literature on the relationship between ethnic diversity and economic growth broadly agrees that greater 
diversity is negatively correlated with economic growth. However, there are conditions such as the strength 
of institutions, the power of elites, income inequality and more, which, according to the literature and 
empirical studies on the subject, may significantly change the real impact of ethnic diversity on economic 
growth. Two famous authors who conducted empirical studies and talk extensively on the subject are 
Easterly and Alesina et a. the channels through which diversity may indirectly impact economic growth are 
“trade, investment, public expenditure”, and indirectly through “social cohesion and its characteristics such 
as generalized trust and collective action” (Staveren & Pervaiz, 2017, p. n/a). Easterly (2001) put emphasis 
on quality of institutions, according to him the negative impact of ethnic diversity is even greater when 
institutions are weak (Easterly W. , 2001, p. 703) which may further polarize and fragment the society along 
ethnic lines. According to Alesina and Ferrara “public goods provisions are lower in fragmented societies” 
(Alesina & Ferrara, 2005, p. 796) if they work in such fashion they may create a vicious circle such that a 
poor country with weak institutions and diverse population, according to the above results, may suffer from 
lower investment in public goods and get stuck with elite control at the top leading to poverty and 
fragmentation and thus a vicious circle is created.  
Sokoloff and Engerman (2001) found that the rise of powerful elite group is more likely in more diverse 
countries and that they use their power to influence the institutions for their own sake and at the cost of the 
rest of the population. Staveren and Pervaiz criticize this view on the ground that it “is not so much diversity 
itself but powerful elites, excluding others from certain benefits, which matter” (Staveren & Pervaiz, 2017, 
p. n/a). Although Staveren and Pervaiz do not clarify the reasons for the rise of powerful elite as Sokoloff 
and Engerman stated that diversity itself is correlated with the rise of elites, nevertheless, they both agree 
on the negative impact of diversity either through elite control of institutions, as the former argument, or 
through exclusion of the other groups, as in the latter argument. Stavern and Pervaiz expand the ‘exclusion’ 
concept and add a new and important dimension to the discussion in terms of ‘social cohesion’, ‘social 
exclusion’ and ‘inequality’. They “argue that diversity as such, with its potential economic benefits, must 
be distinguished from the social exclusion that may very well go together with an increase in groups of 
different ethnic, religious, or linguistic background”. Their conclusion is that “vertical inequality concerns 
unequal earning” not based ethnicity or religious group, but this vertical inequality in earning exist within 
every ethnic and religious groups. It is not ethnically-based inequality but rather earning inequality with a 
large gap between small rich class at the top and large poor class at the bottom. However, “horizontal 
inequality is different” it refers to exclusion of “complete groups of people” based on their “identities, rights, 
opportunities, capabilities and voice”. They conclude that “social exclusion from important parts of the 
economy, which is more fundamental” has significant effect on “social cohesion and in turn economic 
growth” (Staveren & Pervaiz, 2017, p. n/a). 
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Notable points from the above studies on ethnic diversity, institutions and economic development are, thus, 
greater diversity poses greater challenges for economic growth either directly or indirectly. The channels 
and mechanisms through which ethnic diversity influences economic growth may be through institution-
building, income distribution, social exclusion, ethnic fragmentation, elite control or possible combination 
of them. At this point, the interest is to discuss and extract the most important concepts and findings from 
the literature in order to study Afghanistan in that context later. 
Afghanistan is no stranger to ethnic politics and fractionalization, and the correlated wars and genocides in 
the past one century, much similar to the findings and conclusions stated above but also with unique 
differences. The level of ethnic division in Afghanistan is still dangerously high and the popular ethnic 
politics failed to increase “interethnic cooperation” and lead to more equitable provision of public goods 
and access to opportunities83. Underinvestment or completely ignoring (as was the case in prewar rural 
Afghanistan) investment in public goods is another contributor to poverty and instability in ethnically 
diverse countries with poor institutions. Alesina and La Ferrara found that “public good provisions was 
lower in fragmented societies” and “more realistic institutional features” is required to benefit from “variety 
in production” (Alesina & Ferrara, 2005, p. 796). Other studies confirming the positive and robust 
association between higher degrees of diversity with lower “redistribution by government” are Desmet, 
Ortuo, and Weber (2009) included in (Baldwin & Huber, 2010, p. 644). Baldwin and Huber conclude that 
“we find a strong and robust relationship between the level of public goods provision and between-group 
inequality” (Baldwin & Huber, 2010, p. 659).   
In addition to the 1. Centralized government and 2. Afghan nationalism (ethnic politics), the other two 
important elements of Afghan institutions are political Islam or Islamic justification of power and reliance 
on foreign assistance. Authoritarianist approach to politics may also be correlated with political Islam which 
attributes absolute authority to almighty Allah to whom everyone must “believe”, “submit” to its orders 
and it is he who makes the right judgement for its “slaves”84. The use of religious justification of authority 
existed in all of the Afghan governments, even secularist Amanullah and communist presidents applied it 
as will be discussed later, some of them took it to the extreme such as religious fundamentalists like the 
Taliban. For example, Abdurrahman openly declared himself as “shadow of Allah” with a “divine mandate” 
to rule, and disobeying his orders is disobeying Islam and therefore “deserve the hardest punishment” 
(Kakar, 1979, p. 8). Barfield quotes a similar story about the central role of Afghan and Islam in the Afghan 
governments. According to him, Abdurrahman Khan “linked elements of Islamic belief with Afghan tribal 
customs in ways that convinced his largely illiterate population that the two were identical” (Barfield 
2010:158–59, in ( (Sungur, 2016, p. 442)). Discussion of Islamic institution and development is beyond the 
capacity of this paper, however, so far as necessary this paper will include topics such as above for sake of 
understanding the institutional development in Afghanistan. In this particular topic, the intention is to show 
possible reasons for the authoritarianism and the issue of legitimacy of and trust in government by the 
public in Afghanistan. Along the same line, dependence on foreign assistance, which meant lesser 
dependence on tax and lesser investment (in public goods) and lack of accountability to the public is another 
factor in public-government relationship and accountability. Since these four elements 1. Afghan 
nationalistic ambitions, 2. Centralized and authoritarian governments, 3. Political Islam and 4. Aid-
                                                          
83 Referring to the criticisms against the Afghan governments discriminatory policy in appointments and budget 
allocation as discussed in this paper. 
84 These terms and concepts are direct translation of Islamic (Arabic) words of “نامیا”, “ملسم - ملاسا”, and “دبع” literally 
translate into “Iman = belief, faith”, “Islam = surrender, submit and Muslim=surrendered, submitted”, “Abd = slave, 
servant, subordinate”, respectively, which are key concepts in Islamic laws. Online translation services. 
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dependence are intertwined and necessary to explain (institutional) development failure in multiethnic 
Afghanistan, this paper will study them in details.  
This research will seek possibilities of understanding underinvestment in public goods, ethnic 
fractionalization, and poverty in Afghanistan. The biggest drawback of this study, however, is lack of 
reliable data (numbers) and established research base on this topic which this study could build on. Working 
with what is available, this paper aims at studying the development failure of Afghanistan from institutional 
development perspective particularly the dominant role of ethnic politics in institutional building and 
economic development in the past century including the postwar period.  
The time period under consideration starts from 1880s as the founding date of Afghanistan until present 
(2018). This time period is divided in three parts, the first is the prewar period which marks the start and 
end of the Afghan governments (monarchies) starting from 1880s to 197885 which ended with the Soviet 
invasion and communist revolutions. The war period in this paper refers to 1978-2001, the first decade 
(1979-1989) marks the war against the soviet invasion followed by Mujahedin infightings and civil wars 
which lasted until 2001. The postwar era starts from 2001 to the present when the United States and allies 
invaded Afghanistan, ended the Taliban government and established the postwar government. Thus, the 
three periods are prewar (1880-1978), war (1978-2001) and postwar (2001-2018)86.   
The next chapters will study government and economic development in Afghanistan both under pre-war 
and postwar governments and seek their similarities and differences. The construction of this chapter is 
such that after the foregoing introduction, the following section will discuss the literature on the importance 
of institutions (governance) in economic development and study governance and economic development in 
Afghanistan in the following sections which includes reasons for the delay in economic development in 
Afghanistan, comparative study of prewar and postwar governments and economic development followed 
identification of key issues, policy suggestions and conclusion  
Literature review on the importance of institutions in economic development 
The role of institutions particularly the choice of government type in economic development is crucial. The 
literature on development studies show an increasing trend in considering institutions as primary and the 
most important factor for long-term economic development. This branch of economic development is 
known as institutional development or “new institutionalism”. According to North, who greatly contributed 
to theoretical development of this field, “the primary source of economic growth is the 
institutional/organizational structure of a political economy....” (Przeworski, 2003, p. 2). As defined by 
North, “initiations are rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of behavior that structure 
repeated human interaction” (North D. , 1989, p. 1321). In a modern society the authority of law making 
and its enforcement is the monopoly of governments, therefore government is the most influential 
institution. However, in countries like Afghanistan where government and formal institutions are weak, 
local laws and practices fill the void and function as alternative institutions of which religion and traditions 
are the most dominant.  
The role of institutions in economic development based on institutional development argument, is important 
because development and modernization require laws and effective law enforcement in order to prepare the 
conditions for people to engage in productive economic activities. The more institutions are effective in 
                                                          
85 The end of Afghan monarchy was actually 1974 making Zahir Shah (1934-1974) the last Afghan monarch, but 1978 
marks the beginning of communist revolution and the following decade of wars until 2001. 
86 A timeline of major events (government changes), including the information used in this section, is available at 
BBC website: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12024253 
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facilitating economic activities, the more productive those activities will become. Because “impersonal” 
nature of interaction and “transaction cost” in a modern society will require effective regulations in order 
for economic activities to be productive. This relationship between institutions and productive economic 
activity is largely due to institutions’ role in shaping the “incentive structure” by the incorporated reward 
and punishment characteristics of the institutions, in North’s words “payoffs” to activities. In countries 
where this system of payoffs does not function for greater part of the society, or suffers from misallocation 
of rewards and punishments, economic progress is difficult. As North states about institutions in poor 
countries where “…institutional constraints define a set of payoffs to political/economic activity that do not 
encourage productive activity” (North D. , 1990, p. 110).  
The legal and systemic framework which defines conditions of participation and rules of engagement will 
shape the type of activities and development in an economy. Overtime, the laws and systems evolve and 
run their roots deep into the psyche, belief and behavior of a society, changing of which becomes difficult. 
For example, the government of Afghanistan after the First World War in 1920s introduced reforms87 to 
the traditional ‘institutional constraints’ and took steps to establish a new legal system and modernize the 
country, however, the deep roots of and the vested interests in the existing system proved stronger than the 
king’s ambitions and therefore the king and his reforms failed88.  
Productivity of economic activities rises with greater specialization as stated by Smith in terms of “division 
of labor”. With increased division of labor and specialization dependence and interaction between economic 
agents increase and get more complicated which shall require well-developed institutions to function 
efficiently. The dilemma about establishing sophisticated institutions or “institutional change” is hard to 
explain as Przeworsky (2003) and other institutional economists point at the “circular” relationship between 
the conditions in which an institution evolve and the condition it produces cannot produce a different 
institution therefore. At least theoretically it is difficult to explain the mechanics of institutional change.  
Nonetheless, institutional development or NIE better explains some of the shortcomings of economic 
growth theories such as latter’s strong assumptions of “perfect information”, “rational behavior”, “zero 
transaction cost” among others89. Unfortunately, a detailed discussion of each one is beyond the scope of 
this paper; however, the mainstream growth theories could not reasonably account for major different 
development patterns in different countries. As stated by Evans, growth theories, which he calls “capital 
fundamentalism”, prediction of resource flow from rich countries to poor countries based on the difference 
on rate of returns and accumulation of capital in poor countries would result in greater growth rate and 
accelerate their “catchup” process, did not materialize. He further asserts that “capital fundamentalism did 
not work either theoretically or empirically” (Evans, 2005, p. 90). However, although NIE better explains 
some of the issues resting in the neo-classical growth models such as the ones noted above and the “market 
imperfections”, and “transaction costs”. Institutions in NIE’s term “are broadly defined as means of 
reducing these information and transactions costs” (North D. , 1990, p. 37). Institutional development 
theories too suffer from criticism, as the neo-classical theory, in its “lack of empirical applicability”, and 
also “theoretical inconsistency”. A detailed discussion of such criticism is available (Hahn 1987), (Bates, 
                                                          
87 Referring to the Amanullah Khan’s reforms to modernize the legal and education system which led to uprisings and 
ultimately to the collapsing of his government in 1929. A detailed discussion of this period is included in this paper. 
88 Although critics also point at major flaws in the reforms and the king’s (mis)understanding of modernization, which 
will be discussed later. 
89 A more detailed discussion of these “strong assumptions” are given in (Harriss, Hutner and Lewis, 1995) titled: 
“The new institutional economics and third world development”. 
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2014), and (Harriss, Hutner, Lewis,1995) which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the ‘mental 
model’ proposition by North has key conceptual implications for the interest of this topic. 
An important part of NIE theory is the explanation it provides for “mental models” and “cognitive capacity” 
of individuals. This topic is interesting to this paper for two important reasons. The first reason is to explain 
why “rational behavior” of economic agents and individuals as assumed in neo-classical models is a strong 
and somewhat unrealistic assumption. As North asserted that “individuals make choices on the basis of 
their mental models… these are culturally derived, differ wildly, are not easily changed and give rise not 
the one determinate position of general equilibrium theory but potentially to multiple equilibria” (North D. , 
1990, p. 37). The second reason is with respect to education, specifically the importance of education in 
institution building and economic development in Afghanistan. To our justification of including education90 
in the discussion of ethnic diversity, institution building and economic development in Afghanistan, the 
topic of education enters our argument in two important fashions. As just cited from North that ‘mental 
models’ of individuals are wildly different, influenced by culture, and resistant to change, this is arguably 
stronger in societies with higher rate of illiteracy, ethnic and cultural diversity, and strict religiosity than 
otherwise. The challenges of institutional development in Afghanistan in terms of resistance to change by 
rigid religious and cultural values and conflicting ethnic interests are particularly strong. The strength of 
these challenges has certainly been significant-enough to deter reforms and evolution of better institutions. 
The resistance to change or fear of reforms in Afghanistan, as discussed in prewar governments, primarily 
feed on the prevalent ethnoreligious beliefs that dominate the society. Needless to mention the ethnically-
diverse and fragmented society of Afghanistan is also highly religious and traditional-minded society.  
The circular relationship and reinforcement of these elements (mental models and institutions) is a complex 
challenge. Since the ‘mental model’ is given in terms of the existing culture, worldview, environment and 
other relevant factors shaping individual’s mindset and behavior, as stated above, education is the (only) 
tool which can lower the differences (universal education teaching standard curriculum to all) and 
strengthen individual’s cognitive and reasoning power. This would lower the level of rigidity and variation 
of the mental models among individuals, especially in ethnoculturally diverse country like Afghanistan. It 
is difficult to think of any effective alternative to education in reducing the differences and rigidity of that 
mental models. The mental models of educated population may have more streamlined thought process as 
standard universal education enhances individuals’ bases of comprehension and reasoning than fragmented 
and less-educated population. Therefore, in addition to the known benefits of education in economic 
development, it is uniquely useful tool for institutional building in this particular context.  
Economic growth models are useful tools to measure economic performance and optimum use of factors 
of production. However, the concern in Afghanistan with respect to development is the absence of 
institutional framework under which capital accumulation could take place. The framework needed for 
making the right plans and policies for optimum use of factors of production are malfunctioning. In other 
words, the issue of goods institutions come a step before the question of capital accumulation, hence 
institution is a prerequisite for productive economic activities. Becomes the existence of a functioning 
system is necessary for preparing the conditions for the application of those economic growth models. 
Institutionalists regard institutions as primary and accumulation of capital as secondary/ “proximate” 
sources of economic development. As Subramanian et al (2002, p. 2) argue that “growth theory has 
traditionally focused on physical or human capital accumulation, and, in its endogenous growth variant, on 
technological change. But accumulation and technological change are at best proximate causes of economic 
growth”. In Acemoglu’s words (Acemoglu, 2003, p. 27) “proximate causes of poverty” are low human 
                                                          
90 Education (knowledge accumulation, human capital formation) and economic development in Afghanistan is the 
research topic of chapter four of this paper. 
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capital, obsolete machinery and technology and absence of “functioning markets”.  Accumulation of capital 
and acquiring new technology are fundamental elements of economic growth, and from institutional 
economists’ point of view those are “proximate causes” of growth and to them institutions hold the primacy. 
The reason for taking institutions as primary over factors of production is that “lack of institutions and 
instruments to facilitate production and exchange in factor and product markets (as well as the existence of 
instructions designed to raise the costs of transacting) resulted in predominantly personalized (and 
localized) production and trade” (North D. , 1989, p. 1324). Thus, higher cost of transition makes economic 
activities, unattractive, unprofitable and unsustainable.   
The primary role of institutions in economic development on the basis of the foregoing arguments made by 
North and Acemoglu and other “institutionalists” represent one side of the story, the other side is regarding 
the sources of institutional change and the process of its evolution. As briefly discussed in the puzzle of 
‘circular’ nature of institutional development, the topic about the sources of institutional change further 
complicates the matter. Even institutionalists themselves have diverging and uncertain opinions. The issue 
starts with the philosophy of “… government policies and other institutions tend to reproduce the conditions 
that gave rise to them” (Sokoloff, 2000, p. 5), therefore, “no alternative institutions can emerge from the 
existing system” (Przeworski, 2003, p. 178). If current institutions reproduce the conditions that gave rise 
to them, then these institutions will sustain and do not allow the growth of conditions for evolution of 
diverging or different institutions. “The initial institutions shaped the evolution of the conditions under 
which subsequent development would occur, so that some conditions became endogenous with regard to 
institutions. Even when legal inequality was abolished [when colonial governments ended], it left as a 
legacy a high degree of income inequality” (Przeworski, 2003, p. 171) (Text in [-] inserted). The 
continuation of colonial governments in former colonies long after colonialism ended is also stated by 
Young that “although we commonly described the independent polities as 'new states,' in reality they were 
successors to the colonial regime, inheriting its structures, its quotidian routines and practices, and its more 
hidden normative theories of governance" (Crawford, 1994, p. 283) and by (Acemoglu, Johnson, & 
Robinson, 2001, p. 1376) that the “extractive institutions” which were established by European colonial 
rulers outside Europe (in Africa, Asia and South America) persisted after independence, the end of colonial 
government and independence did not change the established (extractive) institutions. A more detailed 
description of how the “extractive institutions” persist and trapped countries in a “vicious cycle” of poverty 
is provided in (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). The issue of ‘institutional change’ as described by many 
authors thus remains a puzzle and a debated topic. Despite the knowledge about the need for institutional 
change for economic growth, many countries in the developing world are stuck in poverty. Until this 
mystery is solved with more definitive answers, the existing institutional development theory does provide 
important lessons in the world of development. Perhaps it is up to each country to work out its own 
institutional-change and development plans based on its own strengths and weaknesses. This paper seeks 
to take a small step in that direction for Afghanistan by evaluating its shortcomings and potentials for 
growth. 
A general note from the previous paragraph may be that the legacy of past institutions become the condition 
that shape future development and the type of institutions that will evolve as a result. And the puzzle that 
if initial institutions create the condition for development of future institutions, can a (poor) country (ever) 
break away from this cycle and change its institutions (or the conditions) to allow for the evolution of 
different intuitions? We might not have a theoretical explanation to this question, yet, however, the real-
world example of institutional change and economic development is not only the poverty trap, there are 
incredible success stories of “miraculous” development, not far away from Afghanistan, in China, South 
Korea, Singapore, Turkey, and Malaysia among other rapidly growing economies of Asia.  
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The institutionalists provide compelling arguments and detailed discussions regarding the choice of 
institutions and its impact on economic development, as stated earlier in terms of institutions that reduce 
costs of transactions and encourage productive activities, protects property rights, and more. But the part 
of the theory about “self-reproduction” and “path-dependence” characteristics of institutions do not offer 
much explanation with regards to understanding the initiation and the process of transitioning from ‘bad’ 
institutions to ‘good’ institutions. A point of break-away from the vicious circle might be changing policy 
choices, as proposed by Acemoglu, however, Przeworski thinks the Acemoglu’s conclusion is not sufficient. 
The standard story is that institutions “reproduce” themselves, “persist,” and the like 
because maintaining them is in the interest of the institutional incumbents. Even 
Acemoglou (2003b) does not draw sufficient conclusions from his correct observation that 
“political regimes matter precisely because they regulate conflicts of interests between 
different groups.” If there are conflicts, why should we expect the same side to always win? 
Those currently powerful may be more likely to prevail and maintain the institutions that 
serve their interests. But they do not win always and sometimes, as in Acemoglou and 
Robinson (2000), they may have to transform institutions to thwart the threat of losing. 
(Przeworski, 2003, p. 18) 
Drawing from this discussion on the challenges of institutional change discussed so far, despite the debate 
on some aspects of institutional change, a general agreement does exist among them. The theory offers 
explanations for the persistence of poverty in poor countries in terms of the institutions in these countries 
fail to reduce costs of transaction, protect property rights, and encourage productive activities for greater 
number of citizens but for the controlling group at the top. In these countries, the elite who benefit from the 
inegalitarian institutions grow powerful and protect the existing system by disallowing reforms and changes 
which may the existing order. The controlling group introduces only those reforms which strengthen their 
grip on power or “thwart the threat of losing” it, as cited above.  
Studying the challenges of development in Afghanistan through this particular point of view can provide 
general explanations. Broadly speaking, the notions stated above such as ‘maintaining institutions that serve 
their interests’ and the difficulty of reforming the existing institutions are familiar issues in Afghanistan. 
The persistence of the existing centralized government initially established in 188091s around two main 
interests of Pashtun rule and pollical/Sunni Islam92. Although it could be argued that the former was the 
primary objective and the latter was a means rather than an end to itself, nonetheless, they both remained 
inseparable parts of the Afghan institutions throughout the period. This was discussed earlier in terms of 
the hundred years of the Afghan government and the key role of political Islam in it. The interests created 
around them proved resilient and resistant to any major reforms thus maintaining the original structure 
somewhat steady and unchanged93. In the general discussion of institutional development theory discussed 
above, adding Afghanistan and specifically the vital role of Afghan ethnicity as the grand ‘interest’ that 
needed to be preserved, makes it easier to understand the concept of persistence and the vicious circle of 
the Afghan institutions. The motive behind restriction of access to power, blocking new technologies, 
restricting access to education and information, and to preserve the interests of the kings will be discussed 
                                                          
91 Abdurrahman Khan was the founder of modern Afghanistan and its centralized in 1880s as cited earlier from (Kakar, 
1979). 
92 Earlier pages covered the details. 
93 The hundred-year rule of the ethnic Afghans in Afghanistan continued from 1880-1978. The postwar government 
starting from 2001 too was established on the prewar model, similar to the continuation of the colonial-type 
government after independence. Similarities of postwar and prewar governments is discussed in details in this paper. 
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in the same context, which will also help explaining the country’s one century of stagnation in education, 
income, urbanization, infrastructure and other development matters.  
Contrary to the vicious cycle, ‘good’ institutions create ‘virtuous cycle’ and reproduce the conditions for 
further improvement in institutions and sustainable growth, another institution-related concept of the NIE. 
Under egalitarian institutions which promote/guarantee equality and access to opportunities for all, “greater 
equality provides support, if not impetus, to self-sustaining processes whereby expanding markets induce, 
and in turn are induced by, more effective or intensified use of resources, the realization of scale economies, 
higher rates of inventive activity and other forms of human capital accumulation, as well as increases 
specialization by factors of production” (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2001, p. 35). Although the introduction of 
institutional change is not entirely clear, however, understanding the virtuous cycle is as important 
especially in studying the “rise of Asia” and the “miraculous” economic growth in successful Asian 
economies, as well as showing what could be the potential alternative to the vicious circle.  
In introduction of institutional change, some other possibilities are also evaluated in the literature. For 
example, introduction of institutional change by outside forces or through exogenous factors have not been 
successful. For instance, a government engineered and supported by a foreign country and imposed on a 
poor country, or, a poor country mimics institution of a successful country by transplanting it in the home 
country, are debated propositions as it is theoretically undeveloped and historically a successful example 
of such transforming or institutional change are not particularly available for consideration. Engineering 
regime-change in a country even with good intentions (often not the case) have not produced a successful 
example to mention (no shortage of examples of such countries) as compared to the home-grown examples. 
A study by Berkovits, Pistor and Richard (2003) as reported by Przeworski regarding transplanted 
institutions conclude that “transplanted legal systems do not take root and have weaker effects than home-
grown ones” (Przeworski, 2003, p. 168). Therefore, imposed or transplanted governments may not be the 
optimal path towards institutional change. Homegrown institutions, as also proposed earlier that each 
country should develop its own unique institutional development plan, is again the model to study for future 
develop of Afghanistan. it is not certain whether Amanullah Khan’s swift secularization in 1920s fits in to 
the ‘transplantation’ category, or if the communists and the Islamists of 1980s and 1990s do, they certainly 
were not homegrown institutions as they all started and ended within one decade (details discussed earlier).  
Afghanistan itself has precious, although costly, experiences in (the failure of) non-homegrown institutional 
changes such as Amanullah’s transplanting secularism in 1920s, communists in 1980s, Islamists in 1990s 
and to some extent the postwar “democracy” (yet to be tested), their roots, effectiveness and popularity did 
not reach a threshold level for each one to establish, function and sustain. An important lesson for the entire 
institutional discussion for Afghanistan may be to explain its century-long vicious circle and institutional 
development failure and more importantly to reassert the importance of homegrown institutions designed 
particularly for its needs and realities. The postwar development plans in Afghanistan where long and 
persistent inegalitarian institutions created distrust, poverty and political instability should seriously 
consider the causes of conflicts at their origin, not just the process and the result of Afghanistan’s failure. 
The discussion of causes of poverty and conflict which have roots in prewar institutional failure have been 
completely ignored in postwar Afghanistan. The reason for ignoring or suppressing may lie in the fact that 
the criticism of the past government is very sensitive. The two fundamental elements of the Afghan 
governments, as discussed earlier, have been Afghan and Islam, the discussions involving ethnicity (Afghan 
government) and Islam (the dominant religion) is more than sensitive, the Afghans being traditionally in 
power suppressed the information about the inegalitarian and authoritarian past regimes as the formal 
version of the history does not include much of what this paper covers. Critical study of Islam in 
Afghanistan is beyond discussion for obvious reasons. 
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Methodology 
One common methodology in measuring the quality of governance and institutions in general is quantitative 
analysis of data on quality of governance (rule of law, corruption, political stability…)94,  and GDP (per 
capita) growth. This paper initially applied a similar quantitative method using the data collected for 
Afghanistan and twenty-five other developing countries in Asia for a period of thirty years. However, there 
were serious issues with availability and quality of the data, especially in case of Afghanistan, so much so 
that it was determined that the data is unreliable, and therefore, this research had to change from empirical 
to qualitative analysis. For example, by including Afghanistan in the analysis, it would significantly reduce 
the number of observations and impact the magnitude and signs for some of the control variables, while 
running regression on the same dataset without Afghanistan would significantly change the result. 
Excluding Afghanistan from the analysis improved the results, however, that was not an attractive option 
because this research is all about Afghanistan and excluding it from the data analysis was against the whole 
purpose of this paper, and also that there already are similar researches done on the other countries and 
producing just one more analysis was not a priority to the author.  
Therefore, the alternative methodology is qualitative analysis of the four fundamental factors identified 
concerning the economic development failures in Afghanistan, which are; 1. centralized government 
structure, 2. political Islam, 3. national versus ethnic identity crisis, and 4. dependence on foreign 
assistance. Contrary to common narrative on development failure in Afghanistan which largely focus on 
war related issues of the past three decades (as discussed earlier), this research argues that studying 
Afghanistan without considering the central role of ethnic politics in its institution-building and 
development is incomplete and misleading. And that, wars, illiteracy, underdevelopment were/are largely 
products of the institutions and policies of the Afghan government which revolved around ethnic-Afghan 
interest using those four factors. Theoretical and empirical foundation of this research is based on the studies 
covered in the literature such as (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005), (Adelman and Morris, 1967), (Easterly W. , 
2001), (Keefer & Knack, 1998), (Dubow, 2009), (Giustozzi, 2008), (Sungur, 2016, p. 451), and (Schetter, 
2016) among others. There is a broad agreement in the literature that heterogeneity (of population) has a 
negative and significant impact on economic growth when institutions are weak. Since empirical 
(quantitative) analysis of the subject matter is not possible, this paper relies on studying the role of ethnic 
politics in prewar and postwar governments in Afghanistan using the following methods. 
The concept of qawm which is the Dari name for ethnic group (tribe, clan, people of the same race, 
language) is what the people in Afghanistan identify themselves with. As Sungur stated that in Afghanistan 
qawm is “the primary unit of belonging – not the state” (Sungur, 2016, p. 451)95. However, not only the 
foundation of Afghanistan in 1880s was laid on Pashtun/Afghan qawm, the Afghan government in the past 
century was a qawmi government in all important respects, evident from the lack of participation of non-
Afghan ethnicities (and their marginalization and forced migration, as already discussed) in the government 
throughout the past century96. This concept of qawm did not finish but became the basis of participation 
                                                          
94 World Governance Indicator is one of the commonly used index which includes 1. Voice and ccountability 2. Rule 
of Law 3. Regulatory Quality 4. Political Stability and Absence of Violence 5. Control of Corruption and 6. 
Government Effectiveness, a detailed definition of them is added in the appendix. 
95 “Afghans even perceived the government per se to be a hostile factor that intervened in their social life by force 
rather than as a key for access to resources (such as offices or land rights) of which they could have taken control” 
(Schetter, 2016, p. 462). 
96 Chapter one and two already covered some details of the qawmi government, the following sections will also discuss 
the ethnic/qawmi structure of the society and government/politics in Afghanistan 
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and mainstream politics in the postwar period97. This ethnic/qawmi division existed in Afghanistan well 
before the wars as discussed under Abdurrahman’s policy of ethnic and tribal division and subjugation. 
However, this long history of ethnic division left the country bitterly fragmented, primarily along ethnic 
lines and the wars of 1980-2001 also took ethnic turn and further deteriorated the situation. In order for the 
postwar government in Afghanistan to ease the ethnic tensions and establish peace, they decided to 
recognize the “ethnic identity” and establish a “well-balanced representation of the ethnic groups” in the 
government post-2001. But this postwar ethnic politics too did not help but “unintentionally opened 
Pandora’s Box” as Schetter calls it (Schetter, 2016, pp. 465-466). This is to (re)emphasize on the fact that 
ethnicity is at the center of most (if not all) of the issues in Afghanistan and it in no way should be 
overlooked or excluded from important discussions such as governance and economic development, as this 
particular viewpoint is not popular because of the sensitivity of qawm/ethnicity for social and political 
reasons and Islam for religious and political reasons in the country. 
In addition to the foregoing account of the ethnic reality in Afghanistan, development studies too point at 
the significant relationship between ethnic diversity, institutional building and economic development as 
discussed in detail. The ground reality of ethnic politics in Afghanistan and the study of ethnic diversity 
with respect to institutional development in academia provide a strong reason and the needed ingredients 
to conduct a study of development issues in Afghanistan from institutional development point of view 
particularly with respect to prevalent ethnic diversity and ethnic politics in the country. To do that, this 
paper identified at least four important elements on the basis of their significance in the Afghan institutions 
and their persistence over the period under study (1880-2018). Each of the four elements was then studied 
in the postwar governments in comparison to the prewar governments.  
The central claim of this paper is that the real challenges of development in Afghanistan lie in those four 
factors (ethnic-based institutions) which started before the wars of 1980-2001 (contrary to the popular 
believe that war resulted in ethnic tensions, poverty and underdevelopment) and actually became the 
reasons for the outbreak of the wars. These four factors started in 1880s with the first true Afghan 
government98 which essentially established the new country on the basis of these four fundamental factors. 
These four factors continued throughout the following century (1880-1980) in varying but significant 
degrees, and together continued with them were stagnant poverty, inequality, illiteracy and economic 
underdevelopment in general. The real argument is that these same four factors (centralized government of 
elites, political Islam, national identity crisis and aid-dependency) continued to the postwar era and in fact 
have become the fundamental characteristics of postwar governments, even stronger than the prewar 
governments. Therefore, development failure in postwar era is correlated to the same factors in prewar and 
postwar governments, more than other commonly accepted factors of the past three decades. This paper 
compares those four factors of centralized government of elites, political Islam, national identity crisis and 
aid-dependency between prewar, war, and postwar governments in terms of the extent of their influence on 
economic and political decision making in the country over the past century.  
The rise of ethnic politics and the type of institutions around it is not uncommon in other ethnically-diverse 
countries. As the literature showed, ethnic diversity has a negative and significant relationship with 
economic growth either directly through ‘social exclusion’, rise of powerful elite and their control over 
                                                          
97 In 2004 presidential elections “Panjshir province, runner-up Yunis Qanooni (a Tajik) received 95% of the vote. In 
Paktia province, incumbent Hamid Karzai (a Pashtun/Afghan) received 96.9%”. according to Dubow “the crisis which 
presents itself when a population is so divided that 90% of one region will vote against 90% of another is staggering. 
But it reflects Afghanistan’s history. The electoral partition fell along ethnic lines.” (Dubow, 2009, p. I). 
98 The concept of nation-state based on Afghan identity started by Abdurrahman (1880s) making him “the first Afghan 
ruler” of modern Afghanistan (Kakar, 1979, p. 10) 
42 
institutions, restriction of access, or indirectly through investment, provision of public goods, trade and so 
on. This paper will study them in the case of Afghanistan and evaluate the role of ethnic diversity in the 
rise of elites of Kabul who in prewar period were the royal Afghan family, and the so called ‘new elites of 
Kabul’ in the postwar period. The direct and indirect ways in which ethnic diversity influenced economic 
growth may be studied in terms of the following four factors. It has been a great challenge to categorize the 
many related topics, however, the following four bullet points cover a great deal of the related issues, 
nonetheless, as each of these topics will be expanded, the following pages will add some other (related) 
topics as well. The four fundamental elements chosen for comparison in prewar, war, and postwar 
governments based on their importance in shaping the events and developments, and their persistence over 
the period under study are presented in the following points, 
• Centralized government of Kabul elites:  
o The power of the government leaders in appointment and firing of public officials such as 
ministers, ambassadors and provincial and district governors and the discussion of chances 
of employment for people from powerful class versus others 
o The control of and access to economic power in terms of budget allocation, wealth 
distribution, business ownership by the people at the top 
o The degree of equality, justice and law enforcement on powerful people and their influence 
over the system 
• Political Islam in Afghanistan: 
o The discussion of Islam is obviously beyond the scope of this paper; however, this paper 
picks a narrow case in terms of the role of political Islam in prewar as compared to postwar 
development in Afghanistan 
o The extent of influence of religion on politics and vice versa 
o The influence of Islamic laws in preventing change and reforms 
o The degree of impact of Islamic laws and traditions in socio-economic lives of the people 
• Ethnic identity versus Afghan nationalism:  
o The ethnic politics’ impact in the choice of the type of institutions and development matters 
(the literature particularly emphasizes ethnic diversity’s impact on under-provision of 
public goods, corruption, and ethnic polarization) 
o Afghan national identity as a force of unity or disunity among Afghan and non-Afghan 
ethnicities and how it compares in prewar versus postwar era 
o Significance of the debate over Afghan national identity in political issues and ethnic 
fractionalization in prewar and postwar periods 
o Afghan nationalism’s push for unification of Afghan/Pashtun tribes of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan and its impact on internal politics and on Afghan-Pakistan relationship in 
prewar and postwar era 
• Dependence on foreign aid: 
o Afghanistan’s (heavy) dependence on foreign assistance in prewar and postwar era a means 
or end of the ethnic-based institutions and politics 
o The impact of foreign assistance on quality of governance in terms of corruption, 
accountability, and economic development compared in prewar and postwar periods 
o Distortionary impact of foreign assistance on people-government linkages and interaction 
in terms of people’s provision of tax and trust and government’s provision of public 
goods/services – aid and legitimacy issue. 
o The role of foreign aid in funding government expenses and development projects in 
prewar as compared to postwar era and the degree and prospect of the aid-dependence 
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Before giving more details about the qualitative analysis applied in this paper, this paragraph shortly 
highlights a couple of the major issues with empirical data analysis for Afghanistan. The first issue was 
about the quality of data which is limited mostly to estimates and are available only for postwar period. 
Additionally, the data suffers from inconsistency and unreliability, for example, the data on quality of 
governance collected in 2015, 2017, and 2018 for the same variables were compared and these datasets 
showed inconsistency and mismatches. This should not surprising since there has not been any census 
conducted in Afghanistan and the collected data showing annual statistics is obviously not based on any 
census or surveys and therefore are unreliable estimates and estimates from different sources show different 
numbers for the same variables. The second problem with the data on Afghanistan is the fact that a great 
portion of GDP of Afghanistan (even if accepting the inconsistent statistics) comes from foreign aid and 
opium trade. Foreign aid makes over thirty percent of the GDP (Graph 3) and illicit drug and black market 
make another fifteen to twenty percent of the GDP which are not recorded. Graph (3) shows that wild 
fluctuations of the GDP growth jumping between zero percent to twenty four percent over a few years is 
obviously not because of economic activities but rather because of the fluctuation in the foreign aid flow 
and the black market. This makes it almost impossible to quantitively measure the relationship between 
quality of governance (or institutions in general) and economic development with some acceptable level of 
confidence and accuracy. Therefore, this paper changed its approach from quantitative to qualitative 
analysis. 
Qualitative analysis  
The qualitative analysis applied in this paper involves comparison between government structure, level and 
impact of foreign assistance, national identity crisis, and religious barriers to development in modern history 
of Afghanistan, or the four fundamental elements of the Afghan government in the past century. We divide 
the period under study in three distinct periods namely prewar99 (1880-1978), war (1978-2001), and postwar 
(2001-2018/current) periods. Despite changes in the governments multiple times100 in the past century by 
means of succession, or coups in prewar monarchies, or ‘elections’ in the case of postwar governments, the 
core structure of the governments did not change significantly. The governments remained centralized and 
led by a group of elites in Kabul who control the institutions in the center as well as in provinces and 
provincial districts. This centralized control is applied on every important aspect of governance such as 
appointments and budget allocation in which the provincial or district governments or the people do not 
have effective control. To understand why Afghanistan chose this particular type of government this paper 
focuses on the ethnic composition and structure of the society. Ethnocultural diversity in Afghanistan is 
high (as seen in table 2.) making Afghanistan the only country of its type in the region (perhaps in the 
world) which is made of ethnicities whose principle population live in independent countries of their own 
in the neighborhood. Except for the Hazara population who predominantly live in central regions of 
Hazaristan (also known as Hazarajat) all other major ethnicities reside along the borderlines which carved 
them out of their main population such as the Tajik people largely living near the Tajikistan-Afghanistan 
borders, Uzbeks near Uzbekistan border, Turkmens near Turkmenistan border, Baluch near Baluchistan (of 
Iran and Pakistan) borders and the Pashtuns near Pakistan borders. This tells much about the reasons for 
existence of ethnic diversity and its related challenges in the country. 
                                                          
99 War refers to the civil wars following the Soviet invasion of 1980s.  
100 A timeline of the Afghan governments and major events since 1840s is available at this link to the BBC website: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12024253 
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Since no ethnic group forms a clear majority alone as (table 2.) shows, and the concept of interethnic 
cooperation and alliance for political participation did not exist (except when fighting against foreigners)101, 
it is not easy to establish a state with such diverse population and history. However, in making a unified 
country and a state the approach taken by Abdurrahman was anything but real unification. If unification is 
meant to be one country, one government and one identity (Muslim Afghan) then he did achieve that but 
by suppressing and rejecting the diversity. This unification lasts as long as the suppressing force is in effect 
and may break any time in its absence. To bring different ethnic groups under one government rule, 
Abdurrahman did not choose establishing institutions to facilitate participation and cooperation among 
different ethnic groups, which Miguel et al. found that “designing policies and institutions that promote 
successful cooperation across ethnic groups” is particularly important for peace and growth in ethnically 
diverse countries (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005, p. 2362). Abdurrahman instead chose coercion and exclusion 
and build institutions on that model. On the one hand the population is made of ethnic minorities with no 
effective experience in cooperation and nation-building, and on the other hand Abdurrahman wanted to 
establish ‘the first Afghan state’ which by definition and design did not include other ethnicities, 
establishing an Afghan state needed the different Afghan tribes to unite and rally behind him. This holds a 
key to understanding the birth of Afghan nationalism and the centralized government at this period.  
The factors and the environment shaping this particular development under Abdurrahman Khan may 
include the following. From the history of this period as covered earlier, it is known that Afghanistan was 
surrounded by two powers blocking the traditional path for ambitious kings to expand territories and control 
more people. Instead, Abdurrahman signed the Durand Line agreement which left him with a smaller 
country (majority of the Pashtun tribal areas remained under British India as per the Durand Line) and with 
disobedient ethnic and tribal leaders. For Abdurrahman’s dream of establishing a strong centralized 
government he needed the power to act for which he resorted to combining three forces together i.e. uniting 
people around two causes Afghan and Islam102, and getting military and financial support from the British 
which was part of the Durand Line agreement between them. This was the environment and the factors 
which gave rise to the four elements of concern in this paper. This unique period in history which was 
largely a result of rivalry between the Russians and the British shaped the borders dividing apart ethnicities 
and creating a country out of it. Thus, creating a source of ever-present conflict between these heterogenous 
groups of people which the country’s institutions was not able to resolve. The institutional and economic 
development aspect of the Afghan governments in the past century, like most other things, has been under 
the influence of that ethnic heterogeneity. “Cultural and ethnic heterogeneity tend to hamper the early stages 
of nationbuilding and growth’’ (Adelman and Morris, 1967 in (Easterly W. , 2001, p. 687)). Thus, from the 
beginning Afghanistan’s choice of institutions on the basis of Afghan and Islam did not incorporate the 
existing diversity beyond Afghan and (Sunni) Islam. The incompatibility of the uniform and centralized 
institution with the highly diverse and increasingly fragmented society would lead to clashes. The 
institutions established without regards to the reality of the population diversity and their varying interests 
was a recipe for confrontation. Establishing of one nation-state with these two incompatible and conflicting 
ingredients would naturally mean that either the government use force to suppress the interests not 
recognized by the institutions on the hand, or the varying interests and excluded ethnicity would constantly 
rise up and oppose the system. The history of Afghanistan in the past century since the establishment of 
this institution has always been exactly that. Only during Abdurrahman “(1881-1996) about 40 revolts and 
                                                          
101 For example, In the wars against the British as well as the Russians all ethnic groups joined forces and fought side-
by-side. 
102 “the internal policy was based on tribal and religious lines and favored the Sunnis against the Shias and the 
Pashtuns over non-Pashtuns” (Kakar, 1979, p. 10). 
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civil wars were recorded” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 6). These revolts and civil wars did not finish with 
Abdurrahman, although his violent suppression of dissidents and “Pashtunization”103 of the country did 
establish the Afghan state, but it never meant the contradictions and conflicting interests to go away. The 
period after Abdurrahman Khan enjoyed a relative stability (thanks to his campaigns) until the institutional 
contradictions to reach another critical level in 1920s. The series of confrontation between the interest and 
nature of the diverse society and the institutions based on ‘Afghan and Islam’ kept happening throughout 
the period and this paper will discuss them. Understanding and recognizing the challenges of ethnic 
diversity and the incompatibility of its current institutions is a first step towards progress in Afghanistan. 
since the problem is between the ethnic diversity and the institutions, the solution may also lie in solving 
the diversity or the intuitions problem. Solving the diversity problem is beyond the scope of this paper 
although there is a great enthusiasm for seeking the potentials of how to solve the diversity issue such as 
de-politicization of ethnicity, re-establishment of autonomy, redrawing the borders, and other non-
institutional possibilities. This paper discusses intuitional aspects of growth in ethnically-diverse country 
of Afghanistan. For Afghanistan a “more realistic institutional features that would distinguish cases in 
which the economy manages to actually take advantage more or less well of the potential benefits of variety 
in production” (Alesina & Ferrara, 2005, p. 796). Because “good institutions also lower the risk of wars 
and genocides that might otherwise result from ethnic fractionalization. Ethnically diverse nations that wish 
to endure in peace and prosperity must build good institutions” (Easterly W. , 2001, p. 703). The following 
section will discuss the four key institutional aspects of the Afghan government which this paper identified 
as problematic elements in the Afghan institutions that hinder development.  
Four fundamental factors in Afghan institutions 
1. Afghan nationalism and ethnic identity crisis 
The negative effect of ethnic diversity on economic development, as the literature suggested, is significant 
when the institutions of the country fail to promote power-sharing and cooperation among different ethnic 
groups. If institutions in a diverse country cannot secure fair participation and opportunities for its ethnic 
groups, it can lead to further polarization and fragmentation in which case, empirical studies (as discussed 
in (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012), (Alesina & Ferrara, 2005), (Dani, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2002), and 
(Easterly W. , 2001)) show that ethnic diversity in absence of good institutions has a negative and significant 
effect on economic development and this institutional failure explains the situation in many of the third 
world countries. The Afghan government was established and run by ethnic Afghans in the past century 
which effectively excluded non-Afghan ethnicities from participation and rights. The following paragraphs 
will explain this exclusion, however, ethnic polarization and exclusion in Afghanistan continued for over a 
century perhaps the longest anywhere in the world and this became a hot issue in the postwar government 
once again as the postwar government was based on the prewar government model which basically does 
not provide and define the ethnic participation mechanism much like the prewar governments104. This 
“Afghan approach”, borrowing Schetter’s term, which is primarily concerned about giving the Pashtuns an 
upper hand and leverage to remain in power and yet again the Afghan demand and interests superseded a 
                                                          
103 “it is proper that as the king is an Afghan, his tribesmen, the Afghan should guard the frontier (Kakar 1979, p 132)” 
and Abdurrahman Khan “initiated a project of Pashtunizing northern Afghanistan through voluntary or forced Pashtun 
migrations to the north” (Sungur, 2016, pp. 443-444). 
104 Schetter has an excellent paper on this subject, he believes that postwar “politicization of ethnicity” in Afghanistan 
initially aimed solving the ethnic problem with “well-balanced representation of ethnic groups” however this became 
like opening the Pandora Box. According to him, the reestablishment of “exceptionally strong president”, despite the 
opposition by non-Pashtuns “a Pashtun approach… was asserted, which had its historical model in the 1964 
Constitution of the Afghan monarchy”. (Schetter, 2016, pp. 465-467) 
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true national interest around which non-Afghan ethnicities would also see themselves fairly represented. 
Thus, the ethnic conflict in Afghanistan in prewar and postwar era is the failure of its institutions to define 
interaction and participation by different ethnic groups and that issues common with that failure as 
discussed earlier are ‘social exclusion’, fragmentation, underinvestment in public goods, corruption and 
favoritism, rise of powerful elite groups and most important of all poverty for the people at the bottom.  
How did Afghan institutions and ethnic conflict begin? The first and most important element of the Afghan 
institution is the rise of the Afghans among other ethnic groups in the country. The unique history and 
environment of 1880s facilitated the creation of modern Afghanistan with its diverse population and the 
type of government the Afghan leaders chose. This environment was heavily under the influence of rivalry 
between the Russians and the British in Turkestan region in what is known as The Great Game which 
according to Sergeev officially came to an end when the Russians abandoned their plan to attack the British 
India. However, the Russians kept ‘their strategic position in Central Asia’.  A 'fragile equilibrium' was 
reached when they agreed on “boundaries and spheres of influence in Afghanistan and Persia which were 
finalized in 1887” (Weller, 2018)105.  This was the first demarcation of boundaries and initial steps in 
formation of modern Afghanistan. Abdurrahman Khan was leading the country around this time (1880-
1901) he started the next steps in establishing an Afghan state. Like other ethnic groups in the region, the 
Afghan ethnic groups living around the border areas between Afghanistan and the British India (now 
Pakistan) had a sense of nationalism and xenophobia106, however, the British and Abdurrahman Khan 
reached an agreement to divide the Pashtun territories between Afghanistan and India (the Durand Line 
Agreement). Abdurrahman surrounded by two superpowers (‘two infidels’107  the British and Russian 
empires) at his doorsteps, turned the traditionally outward quest108 inwards.  
The country born at this time consisted of ethnic and tribal communities living “autonomous” lives (Kakar, 
1979, p. 23) in separate localities largely disconnected from one another. The degree of diversity in the 
population was high as the new border cut communities of the same ethnicity into two countries. As table 
1. no ethnicity makes up a clear majority, however, the British Indian government supported109 the Afghan 
leaders in the first four decades (1800-1919) with weapons and financial support in exchange for the Durand 
Line border agreement and control of the foreign affairs of Afghanistan by the British Indian government 
which continued until independence in 1919. In such an environment, Abdurrahman Khan established the 
Afghan nation in its modern boundaries. The two main driver of Afghan nationalism were to unite the 
Afghans against the threat of the ‘infidels’ in the neighborhood, and to bring the ethnic and tribal leaders 
under his control. Abdurrahman Khan was the first Afghan ruler who “resigned from the notion of a khan 
at the head of a tribal confederacy and based his authority, instead, on Islam” (Sungur, 2016, p. 442). With 
these preparations, i.e. agreement with the British (borders and aid), rallying of Afghans behind him, 
political Islam, Abdurrahman was set for establishing the Afghan state 110 . As discussed earlier, 
                                                          
105 The original book is written by Evgeny Sergeev (2013) titled: The Great Game, 1856-1907, Russo-British 
Relations in Central and East Asia. Weller’s review of the book is available at Reviews in History website: 
http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1611  
106  “The sense of nationalism reinforced with religion has traditionally existed among Afghans” (Rasanayagam 
2005:10) in (Sungur, 2016, p. 445) 
107 “What Abdurrahman did for the first time was to present himself deriving power from Islam for protecting the 
Afghan state stuck between two ‘infidel’ powers” (Sungur, 2016, p. 442) 
108 The rulers in this part of the world traditionally marched outward towards, for example India (Ghaznavid and 
Moghul empires), and Iran (Ghaznavid and Seljuk empire).  
109 Details included under the Durand Line agreement later. 
110 Abdurrahman Khan “was the first Afghan ruler to make deliberate attempts to build an Afghan nation” (Kakar, 
1979, p. 10) 
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Abdurrahman Khan succeeded in his campaign and established the first Afghan government under a 
centralized system.  
Afghanistan is a multiethnic country with over a dozen different ethnolinguistic groups. The four biggest 
ethnic groups are Uzbek, Tajik, Hazara and Afghan/Pashtun. The exact share of each group of the total 
population is unknown. Depending on various estimates, the percentage of each of the four ethnic groups 
may be anywhere between ten to sixty percent of the total. The Afghan governments in the past did not 
produce population statistics, the secrecy of population statistics might be because of possible repercussions 
on the part of ethnic groups demanding proportional representation and power sharing, knowing that 
Afghan government has been traditionally led by ethnic Afghans. Unless the true statistics reveal the truth, 
various estimates available now show Pashtun population between 30-50, Tajiks between 20-30, Hazaras 
between 15-35, Uzbeks between 5-15 percent111. In the absence of true statistics, unreliability of these 
estimates is high for two reasons. The obvious reason is that it is an estimate not an actual census or even a 
credible sample-based estimate. The second reason is that the situation in the past century was such that 
some ethnic groups had to change their ethnic identity and live under disguise to escape persecution. For 
example, knowing from earlier paragraphs about Abdurrahman’s war on the Hazaras, the share of 
population may significantly change when those people return to their real identities, as recently happened 
in the case of some Sunni and Ismaili Hazaras who used to live under Tajik or Pashtun names. This story 
needs further explanation as it relates to the biggest events in the making of modern Afghanistan. 
The Hazara people predominantly lived autonomously in central highland region known as Hazarajat. 
Similar to Uruzgan war between Abdurrahman’s army and local Hazara, expropriation of Hazara land and 
heavy taxes by Abdurrahman led to series of uprising in many parts of the Hazara land. The “Afghan 
soldiers frequently travelled through their [Hazara] land, forcing them to pay extortionate taxes and supply 
them with material objects” (Creasy, 2009, p. 33) the resistance by the Hazara locals against heavy taxes, 
and persecution by the Afghan soldiers led to wars which Abdurrahman took advantage of and sent troops 
to massacre and force the Hazaras out their homeland. “According to Poladi in the war against Amir Abdul 
Rahman more than half of the Hazara population in Afghanistan were killed, or forced into exile” (Creasy, 
2009, p. 32). Creasy further writes about the devastation of the Afghan (Abdurrahman) government’s war 
on the Hazaras which left them “disposed of a large proportion of their land and much of what they had left 
had been left to ruin and was uninhabitable” (Creasy, 2009, p. 32). This war led to massacre of more than 
half of the Hazara people and their migration to neighboring Pakistan and Iran where Hazara communities 
live to this day. Massacre, forced migration and expropriation of properties of the local people by the 
Afghan government devasted their source of livelihood and government tax income. In addition to the 
creation of ethnic hatred and fragmentation, the direct economic impact of such devastation was also 
significant.  
The cost of establishing this system has been heavy right from the beginning, despite that the issue of ethnic 
diversity and the incompatible institutions in Afghanistan remained a challenge and became even greater 
in the postwar period. As part of the Afghan nation-building, the Pashtunization process of the country 
costed both the Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns dearly. The massacres, forced migrations, and all other attempts 
for establishing the Afghan state did not ultimately win over the ethnic and historical realities of the country. 
The basis for this claim is the constant ethnic/political conflicts, massive poverty and underdevelopment. 
The findings of the studies discussed above about the challenges of institutions-building in multiethnic 
country have many implications in the case Afghanistan. Particularly notable are exclusion of non-Afghans 
                                                          
111 Based on Bonn agreement in 2001 the new government was agreed with participation of ethnic groups as 33% 
Pashtun, 24% Tajik, 19% Hazara and 13% Uzbek, also present in table 1. 
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(horizontal exclusion) and the rise of elite group and exclusion of the lower class (vertical exclusion). The 
one-ethnic policy of the government hit a full circle over a hundred-year period (1880-1980) as ethnic 
political parties and powerful warlords rose to power, this time however, the government collapsed in the 
civil wars and each ethnic group was in control of their own territory. This is the story of the ethnic political 
parties stated earlier, who after the war period formed the postwar government, hence a different turn than 
during Abdurrahman Khan who defeated ethnic and tribal powers. Despite the participation of ethnic groups 
in the postwar government, the conflicting interests of different ethnic groups on the one hand, and on the 
hand incompatible and incapable institutions to facilitate collective decision making, uniting people around 
national causes, and preventing ethnic clashes remain a serious challenge. As noted earlier, the government 
system for the postwar era was based on the prewar government, hence neither the ethnic diversity nor the 
government system change, in fact politicization of ethnicity in postwar government increased, since ethnic-
politics became the rule of the game in postwar era. This issue of ethnic politics (ethnic political parties) 
was already discussed and will discuss other aspects later. 
National identity and nationalism are concepts which form collective identity and representation of people 
of a country under which they identify as “us” versus “them” for those outside this identity. Nationalism 
and national identity is less problematic in countries which are less heterogenous specially in terms of 
ethnolinguistic and cultural differences. When the institutions in a diverse country fail to effectively 
promote fair participation and interethnic trust and cooperation, collective decision making and action on 
any public matter become harder. For example in economic development, as shown earlier, economic 
development in countries with greater ethnolinguistic diversity has been slower and more problematic than 
in countries with lesser racially fragmented (Easterly & Levine, 1997), (Collier & Gunning, 1999), and 
(Laitin, 1994). These studies argue that racial and linguistic fragmentation particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa impeded decision making and policy adoption on important development matters such as social 
capital formation, and productive public goods. 
Lijphart’s suggestion for such societies is that power sharing should include a proportional representation, 
“mutual veto”, and “federalist structure” assuring balance of power and equality for all significant groups 
of the society which he calls a “consociational democracy” (Lijphart, 1977, p. 25). Power sharing and 
dialogue among ethnic groups in Afghanistan is a recent and rare phenomenon and historically interethnic 
cooperation happened only when fighting a foreign enemy. According to Spears (2002) this type of power 
sharing is unstable and hard to apply, the chances of failure of power sharing is even greater when an 
internal threat to state exists like recent failures in Angola and Rwanda. The same author also discusses two 
relatively successful schemes of power sharing in Africa in case of South Africa and Somaliland. However, 
the author states that the success of Somaliland in power sharing may be because of the deep-rooted 
traditions and cooperative attitude of power sharing between ethnic groups. (Spears, 2002, pp. 123-136). 
Inter-ethnic cooperation and mixing in Afghanistan has been weak in the past as the tradition of power 
sharing did not exist in prewar era, and as a society, the interactions and mixing have been limited to within-
ethnic much more than inter-ethnic, which makes the case of power sharing and cooperation even more 
difficult. Based on the foregoing studies and the ethnically fragmented realities of Afghanistan, the success 
of development in Afghanistan largely depends on the success of proportional representation and 
distribution (decentralization) of power. The likelihood of failure of concentration of power is greater than 
distribution of power and autonomy to ethnic groups, as unequal distribution fragments and polarize 
communities and increases distrust and noncooperative attitude towards the government and towards the 
overrepresented ethnic group. Alesina and Ferrara take the argument beyond the previous suggestions of 
power sharing and federalism, they argue that in the globalized world of today, if “… small countries can 
prosper in a world of free trade, then peaceful separatism of certain minorities should not be viewed as 
threatening, at least from an economic point of view” (2004, p. 29).  
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Multiethnic countries where no single ethnicity makes a majority often face identity and representation 
issues if power sharing and opportunities are not fairly distributed among different ethnic groups. The 
strength of a national identity may depend on the extent of its appeal to the public around which they unite 
and feel represented. National identity crisis in Afghanistan stems from the fact that the name Afghan 
historically referred to the Pashtun (even as cited earlier from Abdurrahman and official government 
documents in the past, Afghan is used to refer to the Pashtuns and not to the other ethnicities) people and 
the other dozens of non-Afghan ethnic groups do not identify as Afghans although officially it refers to all 
citizens. Hence the national identity ‘Afghan’ does not create the sense of belonging and unity among 
majority of them112. In this paper Afghan and Pashtun tribes are used interchangeably unless described in 
terms of Afghan citizens which include non-Pashtuns too (more in the footnote). Despite the government’s 
downplaying of the issue, this crisis has been a hot topic in national and subnational level especially in the 
postwar era.  
Going back to the national identity crisis in Afghanistan, the postwar governments’ plan to issue national 
identity cards has been challenged by non-Afghan/Pashtun people disagreeing with the term “Afghan” to 
be printed on the national identity113 cards. The constitution states that the term Afghan represents citizens 
of the country (not only the Afghan tribes) and therefore the Afghan leaders argue that it should remain as 
the national identity. Disagreements on both sides of the discussion remain strong and this is the main 
reason for not issuing of the Tazkira, the national identity card114. For the time being, the Afghan identity 
remains a disputed topic and it seems unlikely for the country to get over the issue any time soon. The push 
for Afghanization/Pashtunization in prewar period may have played a major role in the fight for identity 
and representation as in the decades of war. This ethnic polarization in the country is a failure of the 
institution which does not define the rule of participation of each ethnic group such that not everything in 
the country would automatically take ethnic interpretation and stir conflicts. Almost all political parties in 
the country are primarily ethnically motivated (since the institutions do not effectively define ethnic 
participation) despite legally and formally proclaiming to be non-ethnic115.  
The fight for identity is not unique to Afghanistan, in fact there are many other countries/ethnicities 
struggling with identity crisis, albeit in varying degrees, including some well-known issues in the world 
such as in Ireland, Kurdistan, Rwanda, Balkan, Catalonia, Tibet, (East Turkistan) Uygur, Pashtunistan, 
Chechenia, Baluchistan, Azerbaijan (of Iran) and many more. Even in relatively stable and developed 
countries, ethnic diversity can pose challenges for stability and growth. Obviously, nationalism and identity 
crisis are not the only reason for wars and conflicts in the examples mentioned above as every war involves 
multitude of factors such economy, history, religion and so forth. Nonetheless, (ethnic) diversity is a key 
                                                          
112 Recent political unrest in Afghanistan over ‘Afghan’ as national identity has become a serious threat to the country, 
as this paper (like many others) war of Balkanization of Afghanistan over ethnic versus national identity crisis: 
Huffington Post:  
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/national-identity-crisis-threatens-afghan-
peace_us_5a53a19de4b0ee59d41c0ccb  
113 The legislation proposed in the parliament as well as presidential decrees with regards to adding ‘Afghan’ on the 
national identity card (Tazkira) have been debated in the past seventeen years of the postwar governments, as a result 
the proposed law/decree remain in the air and debated. (a report on this issue is provided in the previous footnote). 
114 As of May 2018, the people of Afghan do not have national identity card, the citizens hold a full paper with personal 
information hand-written on it as identity paper. A recent political row over Tazkira and the term Afghan as national 
identity became a hot topic and ethnic confrontation, a report on the e-Tazkira issue is here at Reuters: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-politics/who-is-an-afghan-row-over-id-cards-fuels-ethnic-tension-
idUSKBN1FS1Y0  
115 The discussion on ethnic base of major political parties and links to more details were covered earlier. 
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source of issues in many diverse countries which for Afghanistan means that this issue cannot be taken 
lightly.  
One important case for Afghan nationalism has been the idea of ‘greater Afghanistan or Pashtunistan’ which 
involves unification of Pashtun tribes of Pakistan and Afghanistan. After Abdurrahman Khan, his 
successors Habibullah and Amanullah introduced reforms and aimed at modernization of the state but this 
came to a premature end with ethnic Tajik Habibullah Kalakani led an uprising against the Amanullah and 
subdued him in 1929, according to Schetter this first non-Pashtun ruler jeopardized the Pashtun monarchy 
and Afghan nationalism gained momentum to reestablish the Pashtun rule. “consequently, Pashtu became 
the only national language, Afghan history was written from a Pashtun point of view, and Pashtunistan 
issue emerged as a matter of contestation between Afghanistan and the 1947-founded Pakistan. From then 
onwards, the government pronounced that Afghanistan was the country of Pashtuns by emphasizing that 
‘Afghan’ is the Persian synonym for Pashtun” (Schetter, 2016, p. 461). The issue of Pashtunistan and that 
Afghanistan is the country of Pashtuns (of Pakistan and Afghanistan, does not include non-Afghan 
ethnicities in the country) remained high under Nadir Khan and his successor and son Zahir Khan and 
Daoud Khan who ousted Zahir Khan was particularly ambitious in Afghan nationalism and Pashtunistan. 
Daoud Khan “ordered the armed forces to shut down the border with Pakistan and sent units of the army 
into Pakistani territory to support tribal unrest against Islamabad. Although Pakistan had all the winning 
cards in this game and successfully retaliated with an economic blockade of landlocked Afghanistan, Daoud 
was still able to cast himself as the defender of the cause of Pashtunistan and as the defender of the rights 
of his Pashtun brethren across the border” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 13).  
In the years following Tajik Habibullah Kalakani116, the Pashtun-biased policies and ethno-nationalistic 
feeling grew in the Afghan government throughout the period (1930-1978). Pashtun-biased policies of the 
ethnicity played a key role in access to public services, employment, military and investment (Schetter, 
2016, p. 461). The Afghan government post-Amanullah became more hostile towards non-Afghan 
ethnicities who already were excluded from public services such as education and military, but this was 
particularly a retaliation for the Tajiks who supported Habibullah Kalakani who subdued Amanullah Khan 
and the Hazara Abdul Khaliq who shot Nadir Khan. As already talked about abuses by Abdurrahman’s 
army, Giustozzi writes that “the Kohdaman revolt of 1930 had been caused by the abuses of the government 
functionaries, who wanted to punish locals who supported Habibullah II [Kalakani]” (Azimi 1998 p. 35). 
“The ‘peasant’ revolt of Hazarajat in 1952 has also been attributed to the abuses of the state administration” 
(Davydov 1967 p 162). The ethnic uprising against the Afghan government abuses and exclusion of the 
non-Afghans never ended, unsurprisingly. However, this situation is could not continue forever the dissent 
and awareness on the part of persecuted ethnicities grew stronger towards the end of the century and the 
tipping point was around the Soviet invasion of 1979-1989. Although the war started against the Soviet 
invasion it soon turned into ethnic conflict and state collapse during the civil wars of 1989-2001.  
Thus, a century of Afghan nation-building effort around ethnic Afghan identity and interest ended with 
civil wars and left the country ethnically-fragmented and polarized 117 . This was how institutions in 
                                                          
116 Habibullah Kalakani also called Habibullah II (1929-1930) should not be confused with Habibullah Khan (1901-
1919), especially important in this history is their ethnic background, Habibullah II was a Tajik and Habibullah Khan 
was an Afghan. 
117 For instance, participation in the government although through election, is predominantly ethnic, political parties, 
elections, etc. are based on ethnicity. In the words of Dubow, there is a staggering ethnic divide in Afghanistan that 
more than 95% of Tajik vote (in Panjshir) went to Tajik candidate and 96.9% of Pashtun vote (Paktia) went to Pashtun 
candidate in the 2004 presidential election (Dubow, 2009, p. I) and the same story is true about the Hazara and Uzbek 
and this is not only in elections but in employment, budget etc. all matters related to public get ethnic turn. 
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Afghanistan failed to properly manage the delicate affairs of its ethnically-diverse society. Following 
sections will expand on the three other elements of the Afghan institutions which acted as supports and 
means of establishing the Afghan state. They are directly related to the ethnic diversity topic as the choice 
of these elements in the Afghanistan institution was the alternative to the otherwise inclusive and modern 
institutions. in other words, the Afghan governments’ choice of institution which did not include a fair 
participation of other ethnicities and was defined for “Afghanistan is the country of Afghans/Pashtuns” to 
a great extent, the exclusion of non-Afghan ethnicities from access to public goods and participation led to 
a society with underinvestment in education and infrastructure (among other things) which in turn made 
the country poor, illiterate and backward as statistics (table 1.) show that Afghanistan is the least developed 
country in Asia. Therefore, the following three elements of the Afghan institutions are important to 
understand other aspects of development failure in Afghanistan.   
2. Centralized government of elites 
The second element is the highly centralized government of Kabul in the hands of powerful ‘elite’. In order 
to understand this particular choice of government it is important to go back in history and find out what 
was the condition and the environment which shaped the creation of such style of government. Before doing 
that, the reason for discussion this topic is that the rule of institution (government in here) in economic 
development is significant. Ethnically diverse countries are particularly vulnerable to conflicts when 
institutions fail to function for all not just for one group. The literature for example Easterly’s conclusion 
summarizes the reason for studying this section that the challenges of development in many developing 
countries (in Africa) are the result of their institutions failing to promote cooperation among ethnic groups 
and that good institutions are needed to protect against one of the most common issues of such countries 
i.e. underinvestment in public goods, which in Afghanistan may include lack of investment in education 
and infrastructure, for example. “Good institutions also lower the risk of wars and genocides that might 
otherwise result from ethnic fractionalization. Ethnically diverse nations that wish to endure in peace and 
prosperity must build good institutions” (Easterly W. , 2001, p. 703). The sections so far already covered 
the importance of institutions and economic development, in this section the focus is to study how and why 
Afghanistan chose centralized government system. 
The establishment of highly centralized government in Afghanistan goes back to Abdurrahman Khan, the 
founder of modern Afghanistan in 1880s. After he became the ‘Amir of Kabul’ his country within its new 
borders was a collection of ethnic and tribal communities living in rural areas of the country as discussed 
earlier. For the Amir to establish his government he started to build “(1) a stable basis of legitimacy for his 
rule” which his used political Islam and the cause of Afghan, and “(2) reforms for centralization”, this 
centralization of power was the Amir’s initiative which he needed for his plan of unifying the whole country 
and “(3) the destruction of all alternative centers of power” until his time the many ethnic groups used to 
live independently118, the Hazara mirs (‘secular’ lords as Kakar called them) were strong and traditionally 
led the communities. With stable basis of legitimacy, and central command system, Abdurrahman needed 
trustable and loyal personnel for which he started “(4) the recruitment of a new state elite loyal to the state 
and not to their tribal following” (Sungur, 2016, p. 442) and he was set to start his campaign and establish 
‘the first Afghan’ state under him. After “about 40 revolts and civil wars” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 6) the Amir 
of Kabul crushed all major oppositions and became the Amir of Afghanistan. This unprecedent level of 
concentration of power119 in the history of Afghanistan in the institutions governing this system was Amir 
                                                          
118 “up to 1889 the Hazaras were partially or wholly independent… enjoyed a relatively high degree of autonomy 
until the Amir’s accession” (Kakar, 1979, p. 23) 
119  “Amir Abd Al Rahman [Abdurrahman] concentrated power in his hands to the extent that no Afghan ruler had 
done either before or after him” (Kakar, 1979, p. 21). 
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Abdurrahman’s legacy for his son Habibullah Khan and all Afghan monarchs who followed him. The 
concentration of power under the Afghan monarchs started with that intensity, with some insignificant ease 
of concentration of power after him, previous section noted the concerns about exceptionally powerful 
president120 in postwar period. The point is to show that the Afghan governments in the past century have 
always been exceptionally centralized under the monarchs (the president in postwar) or better say under the 
elite group in Kabul. The choice of such a government system in the beginning is clear from Abdurrahman’s 
plans as just stated that concentration of power, religious and Afghan basis of legitimacy were two of his 
top priorities in order to eliminate alternate sources of power and establish ‘the first Afghan state’.  
Needless to repeat the dangers of such system in a diverse country. As Afghanistan’s experience and the 
studies on the subject proved that “centralization without power-sharing at the center in ethnically divided 
societies has the potential to alienate ethnic communities, especially if they are territorially concentrated 
and a minority in the state as a whole. This is a very real danger in Afghanistan, particularly in regard to 
the Hazaras and Uzbeks” (Adeney, 2008, p. 554). Alienation of ethnic communities in this study is similar 
to the concept of ‘social exclusion’ of an entire ethnic group both which resemble the realities of 
Afghanistan, both in prewar and postwar governments, obviously the government system did not change 
from highly concentrated to less concentration and as importantly the undefined structure and mechanism 
of power sharing and cooperation between ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The Afghan constitution of 
postwar government which was drafted in 2004 was actually based on the prewar constitution from 1964121. 
Despite some reforms, the issue of interest to this section is concentration of power on the one hand and 
lack of provision on fair participation of many different ethnicities. “The 2004 Constitution rejected formal 
ethnic representation in state institutions. This Constitution, therefore, provides no defense against 
perceived or actual domination of the state by any one particular ethnic community. This could lead to 
increased ethnic resentment and conflicts” (Adeney, 2008, p. 535). Therefore, the risk of ethnic conflict is 
real (it is actually happening everyday as noted in the issues around e-Tazkira (national identity card), and 
‘Afghan’ as national identity, for instance) in the face of Afghanistan’s highly politicized and sensitized 
ethnic identity on the one hand, and lack of protection and provisions for ethnic rights and participations in 
the constitution/institutions on the other hand.  
In addition to the ethnic structure of the country and the historical events that shaped the establishment of 
concentrated government as already discussed, there are at least two other possible reasons for 
centralization of power in Afghanistan. The first is personal characteristics of a leader like Abdurrahman 
who was fanatic about control and power. However, on a deeper level, the reason for the leaders resorting 
to concentration of power and authoritarianism might be beyond just personal characteristics, it might be 
ethnic and institutional structure of the country. in the case of Abdurrahman his exceptional thirst for power 
and control might make his personal characteristics a bigger factor in concentration of power and 
authoritarianism. However, it is a little different in the case of Amanullah Khan (1919-1929), Daoud Khan 
(1974-1978) and Ashraf Ghani (2016-present). As discussed earlier among the most ambitious and reform-
minded Afghan leaders in the past were Amanullah Khan and Daoud Khan122. The interesting fact common 
between them is that when their plan for reforms and change did not succeed they became increasingly 
authoritarian taking control of many ministries at the same time, shunning away intellectuals and critics, 
                                                          
120 Referring to the concentration of power under the president in postwar government model quoted from Schetter 
about the reestablishment of “exceptional strong president” as was in prewar model of 1964 (Schetter, 2016, p. 466). 
121 As cited in the previous footnote that postwar government was based on the prewar model of 1964. 
122 Amanullah Khan’s secular movement and Daoud Khan’s ‘five-year economic plan’ and the Pashtunistan cause as 
discussed. 
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and surrounding themselves with poor advisors and yes sayers123. For example, Amanullah distanced those 
who had different opinion than him and became more and more “autocratic” and dictatorial by handling 
“the smallest details” by himself, and that “freedom of opinion and discussion virtually disappeared” 
(Giustozzi, 2008, p. 6). Similarly, the exceptionally authoritarian behavior is narrated about Daoud Khan, 
this behavior became increasingly strong when implementation of their plan faced greater challenge. Their 
frustration is understandable in that situation; however, a bigger concern is institutions’ incapability to 
provide checks and balance against authoritarianism, and also perhaps a more important question is why 
did their development plans fail? The answer to this question is again the institutions which was 
incompatible with reforms and development. this incompatibility has three sources, on the one hand it is 
Afghan-only institution introduction of reforms which come to contradiction with this core principle of the 
Afghan institutions, such as investing in public goods and allowing all ethnic groups to equally participate 
which is important for economic development of the entire country. But empowerment and equality of non-
Afghans and Afghans were not acceptable under an institution defined and established otherwise. 
The second reason for the challenges against reforms was/is Islam. The famous revolt against Amanullah 
Khan is a good example of Islamic laws preventing reforms and modernizations, no matter how much 
Amanullah attended mosques and tried to justify his reforms as Islamic and permissible under Islamic laws, 
among other people, the Islamists stood firmly against his reforms and forced him to a permanent exile.124 
An extreme example of political Islam is the Taliban and other Islamic fundamentalist groups in 
Afghanistan which need no explanation of how much they love reforms and modernization. The discussion 
of political Islam and development in Afghanistan will follow next. As far as Islam and concentration of 
power is concerned, religious beliefs may also play a part in authoritarianism. Since Islam is the religion of 
97% of the people Islamic principles and mindset is dominant in the society. The Islamic faith in the 
‘absolute authority’ and that everyone is answerable to that authority not the other way around is a key 
point. Religious justification of power and the use of political Islam as discussed so far was common in the 
Afghan politics, so it quite possible that authoritarian leaders were influenced by their belief in Islamic laws. 
As famously quoted from Abdurrahman Khan that authority belongs to Allah alone and that he is “shadow 
of Allah” with a “divine mandate” to rule, and disobeying his orders is disobeying Islam and therefore 
“deserve the hardest punishment” (Kakar, 1979, p. 8). These are striking examples of such statements and 
actions by Afghan leaders. The other side of the story is that the same belief in Islamic laws shapes the 
common people’s religion. The Islamic justification of ‘taqdir’ or predestination for what happens in life 
is redecided, and that ‘without Allah’s will no leaf will fall from a tree’. And last but not least, the Islamic 
belief that Allah will do justice to every single thing in the world and there will be nothing left unjudged 
and there will rewards and punishment for every action people do in this world. and many more examples 
of deep belief in such principles among the Muslims. Of course, there will be counter arguments that this 
is a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Islamic laws, regardless, it is hardly controversial to say that 
Muslims belief in Islamic laws and that influence their behavior and worldview. Although there is abundant 
evidence of Abdurrahman’s (and others in Afghanistan such as the Taliban) open declaration about the 
‘divine mandate’ and ‘jihad’ which this paper discussed and unfortunately cannot go into more details. The 
reason for bringing Islamic principles in the Afghan politics is that belief in these principles may deeply 
influence the behavior of the believers, both the rulers and ruled. This may be a good research area in the 
future.  
                                                          
123 Historians described Amanullah as ‘a reformer…[but] impulsive and tactless and tended to surround himself with 
poor advisors’ (Britannica, 2016). 
124 Details of the revolt against Amanullah Khan is also discussed in Education and political Islam sections. 
54 
In the literature however, an important issue in (ethnically) diverse societies the rise of elites and their 
manipulation/control of institutions at the cost of vast majority of the population. Sokoloff and Engerman’s 
(2001) proposition that it is more likely for powerful elite group to rise in a diverse society and when they 
are in power they use the institution to their own benefit at the cost of the population. This view that less 
diverse societies are less prone to the rise of elites is criticized by Staveren and Pervaiz on the ground that 
the rise of powerful elite is more because of their power not because of the diversity, according to them that 
is an important difference, what they suggest instead is that “social exclusion from important parts of the 
economy, which is more fundamental [than inequal horizontal earning]” is significant in its impact on 
“social cohesion and in turn economic growth” (Staveren & Pervaiz, 2017, p. n/a). Considering all 
arguments with respect to the rise of powerful elite group and concentration of power in their hands, 
Afghanistan is a striking example of concentration of power and elite control of the institutions for a long 
time. It is extremely difficult to separate the extent of influence of ethnic diversity, Islam, and personal 
characteristics of the rulers and other possible reasons for example history, on the making of centralized 
government of elites in Kabul. However, as this study covered so far, there are traces of ethnic diversity, 
Islam and personability factors in the concentration of power in Afghanistan therefore each one deserves 
due attention and further research.  
As for the Afghan leaders resorting to authoritarianism in the face of challenges to their development plans, 
a more recent and interesting case is Ashraf Ghani the current president of the country (2016-present). 
Much like Amanullah Khan and Daoud Khan, Ashraf Ghani is getting increasingly tribalistic and 
authoritarian. He is criticized for dictating to the smallest details the works of ministers and surrounded 
himself with Pashtun nationalists and distanced himself from people who would object his views, 
particularly the non-Pashtuns. The media coverage of these criticism was wide and the footnote below 
provides the links to some important ones125.  The strongest influence on leaders becoming authoritarian 
may then be the powerful position of the president as provided by the constitution giving the sense of power 
and ambitions. And when faced with the challenges of institutional incompatibility/incapability and ethnic 
realities of the country, it leads to frustrations and taking the matters in his own hands. In short, beside 
possible personal and religious (discussed below) factor contributing to authoritarianism in position of 
power, a more interesting and reasonable factor might be the institutional shortcomings and the ethnic 
realities of the country which are incompatible for reforms and change. To emphasize the role of 
institutional reforms in ethnically diverse country of Afghanistan this conclusion in Adeney’s study on this 
topic in Afghanistan says it nicely that “in the absence of formal institutional arrangements for ethnic 
coalitions, this may prove ominous for the future of ethnic relations in Afghanistan” (Adeney, 2008, p. 557).  
3. Political Islam and development in Afghanistan 
The third important element of Afghan institution is political Islam. The study of political Islam in 
Afghanistan in this section considers two important aspects. The powerful position of Islam in the Afghan 
politics as in jihad and mass-mobilization. The second aspect of political Islam in this section is the 
challenges of introduction of reforms and modernization versus Islamic laws. A full discussion of Islam 
and development is beyond the capacity of this paper. It will mainly focus on political Islam in Afghanistan 
in the context of institutional development. Despite the fact that Afghanistan is overwhelmingly Muslim 
                                                          
125 The article is available here at New York Times website: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/21/world/asia/ghani-
afghanistan-unity-government-plan.html and another similar report is available below. The link to the Tolo News 
webpage is here: https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/mps-split-over-ghani%E2%80%99s-ability-fix-national-
issues 
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majority country (99.7% Muslim)126 Islam could not become a uniting force for all the population to get 
over their ethnic and cultural differences. “Islamic reservations prevented open debates fueled by ethnicity” 
(Schetter, 2016, pp. 472-473) however, the prevalent ethnic politics and the conservative Islam in 
Afghanistan sometimes blur the picture. As will be shown in the following pages, it is unmistakably clear 
that political Islam in Afghanistan often got used as a political means particularly at higher levels.  
Abdurrahman Khan became the first Afghan king, as cited earlier, to claim “divine mandate” rule and that 
he was “Allah’s shadow” on earth to implement his orders according to Islam (Kakar, 1979, p. 8). His 
declaration of jihad on the Hazara and Nuristani population was unprecedented (like many other things 
under him). To rally his people behind on this ‘divine mandate’ he needed the basis for legitimacy and 
support and ‘Afghan and Islam’ were the two readily available means to that end for him, and he did utilize 
the full potential of both and he succeeded in establishing the government he had planned. Abdurrahman 
Khan “linked elements of Islamic belief with Afghan tribal customs in ways that convinced his largely 
illiterate population that the two were identical” (Barfield 2010 pp. 158–59, in (Sungur, 2016, p. 442)). The 
Islamic principles of ‘authority belongs to Allah alone’, and ‘total submission to the supreme authority’ by 
the believers, in addition to the ones already quoted, introduction and use of Islam by the Afghan kings may 
have been based on their belief in Islam, however, as we will see later, history suggests political power as 
number priority followed by ethnic and tribal belonging and then Islam and the Afghan common. In other 
words, a more accurate description would be that political Islam reinforced the Afghan nationalism which 
the rulers used to consolidate power and fight rivals and enemies. 
The use of political Islam by Amir in this war was important. As argued before, despite the Afghan leaders 
claim of serving Islam and Allah’s command, it is clear that political Islam was just a tool, a useful one 
indeed, to serve the Afghan government. Abdurrahman before the war against the Hazaras stated that “I 
consider the Hazaras and the Afghans the same, as both are the followers of the same Qaaba [Mecca] and 
the same prophet”. But when the Hazaras refused Abdurrahman’s demand, “he ordered the ulema to issue 
a fatwa against them, ordered them to be massacred” (Creasy, 2009, p. 35). Thus, the Muslim Hazara 
became infidels when disobeyed the Afghan leader showing the use of political Islam. This was powerful 
enough to gather “hundreds of thousands of Afghans from all over Afghanistan, and the Pashtuns belt of 
present Pakistan, sided with their brothers” to perform jihad on Hazaras “and when they were annihilated 
completely, their properties were to be distributed amongst the fighters as war booty” as stated by Nasir 
Hussain (2004) in (Creasy, 2009, p. 35)). Kakar’s assertion of this event is similar, “the Amir now 
repeatedly asserted that because the Hazaras were infidels, the army and tribal levies were free to act as 
they pleased with regards to the Hazaras and their property when their land was occupied” (Kakar, 1979, p. 
6). Political Islam entered the Afghan institution as an effective means for political ends and it remained as 
inseparable part of the Afghan institution.  
The discussions so far on the two important elements of the Afghan institutions in the past century namely 
Afghan and Islam reveal that it started dramatically under Abdurrahman Khan and they both remained as 
significant in the Afghan state throughout the period, judging from how Afghan nationalism grew (costing 
exclusion of non-Afghans) and it together with Islam challenged reforms and development as discussed. 
Deviation from either of the two were either not on the agenda or the governments deviation were corrected 
and brought back to Afghan and Islam as the reforms or lack of reforms in different governments were 
explained above. This section focuses on political Islam aspect of the Afghan institutions. Abdurrahman 
                                                          
126 This estimate of religion percentage in Afghanistan is reported as “(Muslim 99.7%, Sunni 84.7-89.7%, Shia 10-
15%, other 0.3% (2009 est.)) in the CIA World Factbook available here: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html  
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Khan was the first true user of internal jihad127 and the tradition of Islamic justification of authority by him 
in modern Afghanistan, which grew stronger in successive governments both because of the initial 
usefulness of it for political gains (power consolidation and crushing oppositions) as well as in later years 
because of revival of political Islam throughout the Islamic world after the fall of colonialism and the 
Ottoman empire. The story of Islamic-nationalism and modernization came to Afghanistan primarily when 
former exiled Afghans returned from the land of the Ottomans of whom Mahmud Tarzi was the most 
influential figure. According to Gregorian, upon his return from exile Mahmud Tarzi started the famous 
‘Saraj-ol-Akhbar’ newspaper. Saraj-ol-Akhbar as “the first successful news medium in modern Afghanistan 
history (published from 1911 to 1918), helped formulate the basic tenets of Afghan nationalism and 
modernization” (Gregorian V. , 1967, p. 345). The idea of modernization and Afghan nationalism which 
Mahmud Tarzi and the Afghan kings had to face the challenges of religious leaders ‘the ulama’, and the 
monarchs fear of losing political power, among other challenges such as high illiteracy and other 
ethnoreligious issues. Tarzi’s approach to deal with these issues were “to redefine the term ‘Afghan’ on a 
geographic and religious, rather than merely ethnic, basis, implying the equality of all the inhabitants of the 
country” and assure the monarch that his modernization plans will not jeopardize the monarch’s power 
(Gregorian V. , 1967, p. 349). Tarzi had an immensely difficult task of convincing both the king and the 
ulema about the need for modernization and education in Afghanistan and in the Muslim world. In Saraj-
ol-Akhbar periodical “hundreds of short items and poems on the nature of literature and the history of 
science were carried, all of them exalting modernity and progress, stressing the immense power of scientific 
knowledge and the possibilities it offered to the Afghans”. The periodical covered various other modern 
ideas such as “railways, automobiles, the telephone, photography and airplane” and women’s rights, and 
topics on natural science, law, governance et cetera (Gregorian V. , 1967, p. 356).  
Gregorian’s conclusion on the modernization effort in Afghanistan is that all three powerful classes of 
Afghan society namely the monarchs, tribal chieftains and the ulema (Islamists) feared that modernization 
threatens their power and prestige. However, Habibullah and Amanullah both supported modernization 
however, Habibullah Khan appreciated those modernization schemes that “expanded his legitimacy of the 
monarchy and made it an integral part of Afghan nationalism and Islam and justified the attempts of the 
monarchy to centralize political power and initiate some modernization scheme” but he too had the fear 
that large scale reforms might under- mine this absolute rule and raise (as it did, only to meet with immediate 
suppression) the issue of constitutional monarchy”. The monarch still believed that for his kingdom he “had 
to rely chiefly on the Afghan tribes, which necessitated a basic commitment on the part of the monarchy to 
maintain the overall tribal-feudal structure of the Kingdom”. As for Tarzi’s role in the whole modernization 
and nationalism movement in Afghanistan, he really was the bearer of many modernization and nationalism 
ideas and the achievements he made in his period as well as “a prime force in shaping the subsequent course 
in character of modernization in Afghanistan” (Gregorian V. , 1967, p. 368). As in previous sections, 
Afghan and Islam remained the forces challenging reforms. This period was exceptionally dynamic and 
having the leaders, such as Habibullah Khan, Tarzi and Amanullah Khan to support reforms and actually 
take initiatives and put serious effort for modernization and change. However, the Afghan leaders never 
wholeheartedly supported true reforms as just described above that the monarch did not cross the tribal 
boundaries (the gridlock of ethnic diversity and Afghan ethnonationalism hampering reforms as in many 
other instances in the past century, which is the point this paper wants to raise). The role of Islam also 
remained significant both the political Islam at higher levels such as the ulema and the government’s 
emphasis on Islamic identity of the state, as well as Islam for laymen at lower levels.  
                                                          
127 Jihad used to be against foreign enemies, ‘the infidels’, but Abdurrahman “he ordered the ulema to issue a fatwa 
[of jihad] against them [Hazara], ordered them to be massacred” (Creasy, 2009, p. 35). 
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Political Islam in the three periods of prewar, war and postwar remained strong and actually evolved 
stronger in later years when Islamic Republics of Iran and Pakistan got established in the neighborhood.  
The Islamist groups in Afghanistan were inspired by the formation of new Islamic countries and they 
struggled for a (more) Islamic Afghanistan. This part relates to the Mujahedin and the Taliban struggle for 
power and other sections will talk more about it. As for conclusion to this section, there are two important 
points to note in political Islam in Afghanistan. Political Islam in the Afghan government predominantly 
served the government policies and perhaps that makes the term ‘Political Islam’ more appropriate to use. 
However, it still remained strong enough to challenge reforms even if that reforms were supported by the 
government. Therefore, political Islam remained an integral part of the Afghan government, acting both as 
useful means for the government as well as a deterrent to reforms and changes perceived as non-Islamic. 
Furthermore, in its first role as political Islam (in the hands of the Afghan government) it served as a source 
of legitimacy for the government and for political purposes, but it failed to unite the 97% Muslim population 
of the country above ethnic differences, which shows that ethnicity has been a more dominant factor. In its 
second role, Islam as deterrent force against change and modernization although it played a secondary role 
(to the first role as political Islam in the government) nonetheless, it remained strong enough and grew 
stronger to a level that perceived or real non-Islamic reforms could not enter the country.  
It is an endless debate that what is Islamic and permissible under Islamic law and what is not. The issue of 
religion and modernization is far too complicated and debated which this paper cannot cover, however, it 
is hardly controversial that Islamic laws dominate the institutions in Afghanistan be it government policies, 
contents of school textbooks, women hijab, or business law, for example. Islamic laws are fundamental part 
of the institutions in Afghanistan and since institutions are the most important factor in economic 
development, as institutional development theory states, it is inevitable for Islamic laws to have played a 
role in the development issues in Afghanistan. In a religious country such as Afghanistan, not only 
government laws are Islamic (cannot contradict) but also Islamic laws shape the behavior and interactions 
of the people in everyday life. Economic development in Afghanistan in prewar period as well as in postwar 
period has been poor, if institutions are the primary factors of development and Islam is a key element of 
the Afghan institutions, then this correlation deserves serious thought. The following section will expand 
on this topic in some fundamental concepts of Islam and development, however, a topic with such 
magnitude requires much more than a few pages of this research.  
4. Aid-dependence and economic development in Afghanistan 
The fourth and last element in the Afghan institutions has been dependence on foreign assistance, also 
called foreign aid or Official Development Assistance (ODA) (all used interchangeably). Aid-dependence 
has been a major factor in the Afghan governments both in prewar and postwar periods. Aid consisted 
between 20-50 percent of government expenditure in prewar period and more than 70 percent in the postwar 
period (data below). The positive impact of foreign aid on development is highly debated and doubtful 
particularly in countries with poor institutions. An extensive research of ODA on over a hundred countries 
for forty years by Djankov et al. concluded that aid-dependence has a negative impact on (democratic) 
institutions (Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2008, p. 194). There seems to be a negative correlation 
between quality of governance and the level of aid-dependency. This paper will discuss them with a focus 
on aid and governance in Afghanistan. ODA formally refers to aid “provided by official agencies, including 
state and local governments, or by their executive agencies” to a developing country, the full form of this 
definition by OECD128 is provided at the footnote. This paper studies ODA not much in terms of what ODA 
                                                          
128 The organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines ODA as aid “i. provided by official 
agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. Each transaction of which: a) 
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stand for but from a different perspective. This too is related to the former topics of institutional 
development and ethnic diversity in Afghanistan in relation to its impact on quality of governance 
(corruption, funding the warlords and powerful government elites, and poor quality of aid-funded projects). 
Secondly, it covers the distortionary impact of foreign aid on the legitimacy of institutions and on the public-
government relationships and trust.  
ODA or simply aid has been the biggest source of government expenditure in Afghanistan in postwar period, 
and it was a major contributor to the prewar governments as well (figure 2. And 3.). Today around seventy 
percent of the government expenditure and thirty percent of GDP of Afghanistan come from foreign aid 
(table 1.). The level of aid-dependency has never been so high as in the postwar governments, however, it 
was still significantly high in prewar governments. Rubin (1995) stated that the sources of government 
expenditure in Afghanistan between the 1952 to 1988 consisted of domestic and foreign aid. Foreign aid 
was the highest in the year 1960 at 53% and reduced to 23% in 1970 and increased to 32% in 1988 
(Giustozzi, 2008, p. 18) which is still significantly high in prewar period as well. There are no quantitative 
data on ODA in Afghanistan for dates before 1952, however, there are important bits of information on the 
overall level of dependence on foreign assistance starting from Abdurrahman Khan.   
Starting with Abdurrahman Khan whom the British India supported financially (also militarily as noted 
under the Durand Line agreement129) foreign assistance remained a major source of government expenditure 
and almost all major development projects in the country. Dependence on foreign assistance (negatively) 
impacts the recipient county’s policy-making, national interests, even sovereignty (Durand Line also 
included giving control of Afghan foreign affairs to the British government130). However, this paper strictly 
focusses on two important channels of negative impact of ODA on governance and development. The first 
one is its impact on the quality of governance, for example corruption and ODA show a positive correlation, 
and secondly, perhaps more importantly the distortionary impact of foreign aid on the linkages between the 
government and the people which means less taxes, less accountability, less provision of public goods, and 
lower legitimacy and trust. Detailed discussion of these topics will follow below.   
Usually foreign aid refers to the flow of monetary, technical and other types of assistance from richer to 
poorer countries to help them develop their economy as well as in coping with other challenges that may 
exist. Since foreign aid often is part of government budget and policy it involves politics and may not be 
purely humanitarian or just friendly assistance. Aid recipient countries are often the ones recovering from 
periods of crisis such was wars and natural disasters; war-torn Afghanistan is one such country. The biggest 
aid providers to Afghanistan in the past two decades included the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and other similar 
organizations for other countries such as Germany’s (GTZ), and the United Kingdom’s (DFID). There are 
also other NGOs and international organizations such the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and other 
UN agencies. The figure below shows Afghanistan’s high level of aid dependence in the postwar period. 
The effectiveness of foreign aid is highly debated by economists and statesmen, the case against ODA 
seems to draw more attention as recipient countries complain about negative impact of foreign aid on quality 
                                                          
is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate 
of discount of 10 per cent)” and is available at the OECD website here:  
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm  
129 This link to Afghanic website has information on the Durand Line Agreement: 
http://afghanic.de/images/Docs/Durand%20Line%20Agreement.pdf  
130 Afghanistan remained a British protectorate for forty years (1879–1919), during which its foreign affairs were 
controlled by the British (Sungur, 2016, p. 440) 
59 
of governance, sovereignty and long-term development as reflected in the following studies. The concern 
over ‘counterproductivity’ of aid in Afghanistan has also been raised as the postwar government of 
Afghanistan continues to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world and critics131 point at the role of 
foreign aid in deterioration of quality of governance in the country among other factors.  
The literature on foreign aid is relatively rich with many papers and books written on it. A great number of 
these papers point at the negative effect of foreign aid on the host nation’s governance quality. Some critics 
like Moyo calls for a halt to aid flows to Africa. Moyo (2009) believes that foreign aid undermines 
government authority and it damages, among other things, the quality of governance of the recipient country. 
In her book titled Dead Aid she wrote that “in the past fifty years, more than $1 trillion in development-
related aid has been transferred from rich countries to Africa. Has this assistance improved the lives of 
Africans? No. In fact, across the continent, the recipients of this aid are not better off as a result of it, but 
worse—much worse”132. Authors with critical view of aid-dependency are Djankov et al. (2008) and Rajan 
and Subramanian (2005), for example. Djankov et al. did an extensive study of foreign aid they covered 
over a hundred countries over forty years period. Their conclusion is clear that “being dependent on foreign 
aid seems to result in worsening democratic institutions” (Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2008, p. 
194) they find that the impact of foreign aid as similar to rent seeking problem in the “curse of natural 
resources”. Majority of these papers particularly criticize the negative impact of foreign aid on quality of 
governance directly of indiscreetly. For example, Rajan and Subramanian studied the impact of foreign aid 
in terms of its impact on manufacturing sector and they assert that “we find that aid inflows have systematic 
adverse effects on a country's competitiveness, as reflected in a decline in the share of labor intensive and 
tradable industries in the manufacturing sector. We find evidence suggesting that these effects stem from 
the real exchange rate overvaluation caused by aid inflow” (Rajan & Subramanian, 2005, p. 1).  
Knack and Brautigam studied the institutional impact of foreign aid in thirty-six Sub-Saharan African 
countries they too found a similar result that higher levels of foreign aid inflows over long period negatively 
impact the quality of governance and tax revenue (Knack & Brautigam, 2004, p. 256). Their study points 
at the same challenges as was ethnic diversity studies pointed earlier, it is the weakness of institutions and 
poor governance in these countries which fail “solving significant collective action problems, among them 
the tragedy of the commons, moral hazard, and more mundane free rider problems” (Knack & Brautigam, 
2004, p. 256). Their conclusion is that 1. “there is a robust statistical relationship between high aid levels 
in Africa and deteriorations in governance” and 2. it lowers tax share of GDP. As foreign aid leaves negative 
impact on governance and economic growth, their third conclusion states that while “increases in GDP per 
capita tend to be associated with improvements in governance, while political violence is associated with 
declines in governance and in the tax share of GDP. Yet when we control for per capita GDP and violence, 
aid still has an independent, and negative, effect” (Knack & Brautigam, 2004, p. 276).  
The study of relationship between foreign aid and governance and economic growth and the study of ethnic 
diversity, governance and economic growth both of them meet around the same point, the institutional 
quality. The impact of foreign aid and ethnic diversity on economic growth is negative when the institutions 
are not strong enough to solve collective action problem, the tragedy of the commons, and therefore the 
solution suggested by both group of studies (among others) is improving the quality of institutions. The 
mode of effect of ethnic diversity on provision of public goods is not entirely similar to that of foreign aid, 
                                                          
131  This article by Mohammad Samim titled “Afghanistan’s addiction to Foreign Aid: Foreign aid has been 
counterproductive for the country. it’s time for Kabul to wean itself off.” It discusses aid failure in Afghanistan, full 
article is posted on The Diplomat website at: https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/afghanistans-addiction-to-foreign-aid/  
132 Dead Aid is the title of Moyo’s book, the link to her website (containing information and videos on the book) is 
here: http://dambisamoyo.com/publications-articles-videos/books/dead-aid/   
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but they both have similar effects on institutional develop. The issue of ethnic diversity is largely due to 
institutions’ failure in power-sharing, provision of public goods, and protecting rights and interests of 
different ethnic groups. While dependence on foreign aid effects a country’s quality of governance, tax 
generation, and government’s legitimacy (in that it is an aid organization that provides services not the 
government) among others, not exactly concerning the issues of ethnic diversity. As if they are two arrows 
hitting the same target board, i.e. the governance quality and economic growth, but they originate from two 
different bows ethnic diversity and foreign aid. However, there are some common issues between the two 
as far as institutional development is concerned of which creation of vested interests and powerful elite 
control are noteworthy among other common issues such rent seeking, corruption, and quality of 
governance in general. The negative impacts of foreign are generally studied under two specific areas. The 
first area of the negative impact of foreign aid is on the functions and relationships within government 
departments and the second area is between the government and the public, which is similar to earlier 
approach introduced by this paper about the study of aid in Afghanistan in terms of its impact on quality of 
governance and in terms of government legitimacy and trust before the people.  
The impact of foreign aid within government is deterioration of rule of law, regulatory quality, political 
stability, accountability, governance effectiveness, and corruption, which are referred to as the six indicators 
of quality of governance133. Afghanistan in the past two decades of postwar government became one of the 
most aid-dependent countries and it still remains so. The country’s dependence on foreign aid is so 
significant that it still constitutes around seventy percent of all government expenses as the Afghan 
president himself said that his government may collapse134 in months without foreign assistance. ODA also 
makes more than thirty percent of the country’s GDP. Part of the reason for this paper not to conduct 
quantitative analysis (besides lack of data) was that with this level of influence of aid (and black money) 
on Afghanistan’s GDP it is hard to trace impact of economic activities on GDP. The fluctuations in 
Afghanistan’s GDP are mostly because of foreign aid, therefore cannot sufficiently detect the impact of 
other factors such as education, employment, trade et cetera. For instance, the GDP growth figures for 
Afghanistan in the past decade wildly fluctuated between 21% in 2009, 6% in 2011, 14% in 2012 and fell 
to 1.1 % in 2015. As seen in the graph below, this fluctuation is largely correlated to foreign aid flows in 
the country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
133 It includes six indicators of governance according to World Governance Indicator and a full definition of these 
terms are given at the appendix  
134 President Ashraf Ghani told Lara Logan of CNBC news in an interview that his government can collapse in six 
months without foreign (US) support. The interview is available on CNBC website at 
www.cnbcnews.com/amp/news/kabul-afghanistan-capital-under-siege-while-americas-longest-war-rages-on/  
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Figure 3. foreign aid and GDP growth relationship 
 
Source: The World Bank Group, country data 2018 
Between the years 2002-2009 Afghanistan received a total of USD 26.7 billion (Poole, January 2011). This 
foreign aid funded various programs and projects, however, the biggest chunk of it were spent on 
government expenses. Aid-funded projects in Afghanistan suffer from low quality, high cost, lack of 
coordination, and their degree of success various from project to project. Generally, aid-funded projects in 
health and education sectors are reported as relatively more successful ones whereas, funds spent on 
construction, logistics, and government expenses are among least successful ones as will be studied below. 
For example, in education sector more than 13,000 new schools were built between 2002 to 2013 which 
increased the number of students from less than one million to around eight million in that period (USAID 
Afghanistan, 2016). Similar story is true in higher education and healthcare, as will be discussed later.  
Criticism of aid-funded projects on their poor quality and lack of transparency is all too common in 
Afghanistan. Majority of the aid-funded projects in Afghanistan had multiple layers of contracts which 
significantly reduced the actual amount of money spent on projects. The paragraphs below will discuss 
some of these projects. These projects were often implemented under minim to no oversight and 
coordination with the government, or the government officials were part of the corruption. Extreme cases 
of corruption and mishandling of aid funds in Afghanistan are the projects that never actually existed, 
nonetheless, they received millions of dollars in funding like what become known as the “ghost schools135” 
under ministry of education, for instance. To get a good understanding of aid spending in Afghanistan, 
below are some examples of real projects. 
The two power projects in Kandahar province supported by the US State Department, Army Corps of 
Engineers and USAID were Kajaki hydro power plant and Shurandam diesel generators. A full report of 
these power plant projects as well as other similar corruption cases with aid-funded projects in Afghanistan 
are provided in the footnotes. According to this report, the contractor for the powerplant project was a US-
based company called Luis Berger Group which sub-contracted the project to another US company called 
                                                          
135 The “Ghost Schools” refers to the schools and teachers which Ministry of Education spent millions of dollars one 
but they actually never existed, the money was taken by corrupt officials. This report in Buzz Feed website covers 
the story: https://www.buzzfeed.com/azmatkhan/the-big-lie-that-helped-justify-americas-war-in-
afghanistan?utm_term=.eyGlN3MqB0#.rw17pw8VDK 
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Black and Veatch. The Chinese company (CMIC) which sub-contracted the turbine for Kajaki plant 
cancelled the contract for security reasons. The project remained in the air for some times until the US and 
Afghan army dispatched forces to provide security for project implementation. The multiple layers of 
contract and dispatching army to construct a project significantly increased the cost of project, or lower the 
initial amount allocated for the project. The second powerplant for Kandahar which was a diesel generator 
at Shurandam costed $106 million dollars to finish, and the estimated cost of annual operation of the project 
was $100 million136. This obviously unsustainable project failed as the diesel power generation cannot run 
with $100 million operation cost. A similar diesel generator power project was funded in east of Kabul, and 
there are many more such examples, such as in road construction. The story of aid-funded projects in 
construction sector is not better either. A sixty-four miles road between provinces of Khost and Gardiz in 
eastern Afghanistan is a good example. The first contractor was a US-based company (LBG) which 
subcontracted it to another US-based company (Black and Veatch). The third layer of subcontractors were 
two Indian joint-venture companies, named BSC and C&C Constructions and a South African security 
company (ISS-Safenet) to provide security for the project. The report137 on this road project shows that it 
costed $121 million for partial completion of the 64-mile road and according to the report the cost may go 
as high as $176 million to complete the project, which means every mile of the road costs 4.64 million 
dollar. The problem with aid-dependency, as far as this paper is concerned, is deterioration of governance. 
Corruption in Afghanistan often involves top government officials whom the government cannot or do not 
want to control. The US government audit agency called Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR)138 conducts investigations and they publish their report on their website which 
reveal some of the corruption cases (they are mainly concerned with the US-funded projects) often 
involving people in the government. Their report also stated that in addition to corruption the government 
is unable to finance, manage, and maintain these projects (Donati, 2014)139. Provision of public goods as 
discussed under ethnic diversity, is also a problem with aid-funded project, corruption is particularly a big 
challenge. Afghanistan kept its position in the top three most countries in the world for most of the postwar 
period140. 
Afghanistan is not the only aid-recipient country facing such problems, other major aid receiving countries 
are in Africa. According to Moyo, Africa received more than one trillion dollars in aid in the past fifty years, 
she believes that foreign aid did not help economic development in the recipient African countries, being a 
strong critic of foreign aid, she calls for a complete shut-off of aid flows to Africa (Moyo, 2009). In her 
book she criticizes foreign aid in Africa for undermining the legitimacy of government as the NGOs 
providing aid often bypass the government proceedings, and the people go to the NGOs to give their 
proposals and ask for services rather than their government. This bypassing of the government offices and 
procedures distorts the interaction, legitimacy and trust between government and people. Foreign aid in 
Afghanistan created a similar problem of NGOs effectively replacing/undermining the government 
organizations in funding and implementing projects. The level of presence and influence of NGOs and 
                                                          
136  Full report on the powerplant projects is available here at Spectrum IEEE organization’s website: 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/the-smarter-grid/reengineering-afghanistan  
137  This information on Khost-Gardiz road is taken from a report in New York Times, the full report is here: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/world/asia/01road.html?_r=2  
138 SIGAR releases their audit report which contains important information on corruption and transparency issues in 
Afghanistan. SIGAR audit reports are posted here:  
https://www.sigar.mil/audits/auditreports/index.aspx?SSR=2&SubSSR=11&WP=Audit%20Reports  
139 This report in Reuters cover success and failure stories of aid in Afghanistan:  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/24/us-afghanistan-aid-insight-idUSKBN0K11VO20141224  
140 Afghanistan’s transparency score for 2012-2017 was around 177/180 or world’s third most corrupt country, it is 
available at Transparency International’s website here: https://www.transparency.org/country/AFG  
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foreign military units (funding projects) in Kabul as well as in provinces and districts were often stronger 
than the government. That was part of the reason for the former president Hamid Karzai to complain about 
what he called a “the parallel government”141. The government’s influence on these projects remained weak 
and that was why the government started asking for ODA funds and project proposals to go through 
government channels where the government has greater control and oversight over the funds. The 
government and donor organizations introduced some schemes to improve aid funding and government 
finances such as Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The donor countries convene conferences 
on Afghanistan every few years and update the funding schemes (like ARTF) such as London conference 
on Afghanistan in 2010142. The ARTF became the new channel through which thirty-four major donor 
organizations coordinated their ODA for Afghanistan. A major focus of the Tokyo conference was on the 
high rates of corruption and lack of coordination of aid-funded projects, and more importantly, to have the 
government of Afghanistan take a leading role in managing and overseeing the funding, the government 
and donor countries introduced the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF)143 with specific 
targets to increase the government’s accountability and efficiency, and also to fund those projects identified 
as National Priority Programs (NPP). As of 2013, the World Bank who manages the ARTF reported that 
only half of the audit reports were received. From the total funds under ARTF, around 56% of cash balance 
in the pipeline was not allocated (ARTF Management Committee (World Bank), 2013). The success of 
these efforts to improve governance quality, reduce corruption and work towards balanced development in 
Afghanistan is debatable given the growing corruption, poverty, unemployment and instability (as 
discussed earlier) in the country. A report about how aid money was spent in Afghanistan by Patrick 
Cockburn titled “Kabul's new elite live high on West's largesse” stated that “in 2006, Jean Mazurelle, the 
then country director of the World Bank, calculated that between 35 per cent and 40 per cent of aid was 
"badly spent". "The wastage of aid is sky-high," he said. "There is real looting going on, mainly by private 
enterprises. It is a scandal."144 
Judging from the quality of governance, economic performance and provision of services in Afghanistan 
today after seventeen years suggests that even after the implementation of programs to increase 
transparency, government efficiency, and reduce corruption those issues remained high. The real 
beneficiaries of foreign aid in Afghanistan were the first contractors (NGOs) and then the powerful people 
in the government, who own contracting companies and have connections to secure contracts (like in the 
report by Cockburn in the footnote). The situation for majority of the people at the bottom did not improve 
as a result of billions of aid dollars to Afghanistan. The current system which works fine for the people at 
high levels effectively blocks distribution of wealth and power to more people at lower levels. Thus, the 
reform plan must aim at limiting the existing unfair and unbalanced control of power by the group at the 
top and disperse economic and political power to reach greater number of people at the bottom. This reform 
would increase wealth and power distribution and strengthen the linkages between people and government 
as they engage more. This again turns to the problem of poor institutions and institutional reforms are 
difficult but it is more difficult otherwise. Knack and Brautigam believe that the difficulty of reforming the 
institutions is like the difficulty facing any other public goods. "… reforms require solving significant 
collective action problems, among them the tragedy of the commons, moral hazard, and more mundane free 
                                                          
141 Hamid Karzai criticized what he called a "parallel" government being created by foreign security and aid agencies" 
This reported is available at Wallstreet Journal website:  http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122770123014359399   
142 ARTF financing strategy detail is available on its website: http://www.artf.af/ and  
http://www.artf.af/images/uploads/ARTF_Financing_Strategy_1394-1396.pdf  
143 TMAF details available at government of Afghanistan’s website: 
http://mof.gov.af/Content/files/TMAF_SOM_Report_Final_English.pdf  
144 Full report is available at Independent’s website: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/kabuls-new-
elite-live-high-on-wests-largesse-1677116.html  
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rider problems.” The already weak institutions weakness in developing countries get extra pressure when 
foreign aid fuels these problems. Improving the quality of governance is important, however as Knack and 
Brautigam say “like public goods anywhere, improvements in governance benefit everyone, but since these 
benefits are nonselective, there is little incentive to sacrifice to provide them”. The weakness of institutions 
in Afghanistan poses the same problem although the Afghan government’s hesitance to introduce reforms 
has had other reasons too as discussed under ethnic diversity section which mainly concerned the ‘Afghan 
and Islam’ factors. This long tradition of resistance against change and development in Afghanistan 
(basically throughout the past century as covered previously) has roots in those two factors, the biggest 
concern is that the deeper roots of such resistance go the more difficult it will be to change. “When patterns 
of poor governance deepen over time and become institutionalized, the political difficulties of reform 
become even more challenging. Governance reforms do happen, and they can happen in poor countries. 
Aid can contribute. Yet despite what we believe to be generally good intentions, the foreign aid system also 
poses problems for governance in aid-dependent states” (Knack & Brautigam, 2004, p. 256).  
The wealth and power circulation in Afghanistan accrued from foreign aid, opium trade, property and 
mining, and government employment and expenditure has become an exclusive business of Kabul elites145. 
The rise of powerful elite and their control of institutions and opportunities further complicates the matter. 
As other studies showed earlier, ethnically diverse countries and in this case when foreign aid supports this 
rise, the prospects of change and development gets gloomier.  The rise of powerful elites in Afghanistan 
has a long history as discussed before that the prewar elites of Kabul were the monarchs and their associates 
who ruled over the country through a highly centralized and authoritarian system for over a century. The 
postwar elitism in Kabul has an extra element to it, foreign aid fueling the power of Kabul elites who happen 
to benefit from the centralized government system as well. The similarity of this elitism in prewar and 
postwar era on the one hand, and on the other hand the persistent poverty, unemployment and political 
instability for overwhelming majority of the population, have rather a long history in Afghanistan. The 
solution to such a deep-rooted and institutionalized tradition in the country must never underestimate the 
magnitude of the problem, because it goes far beyond foreign aid, it involves ethnic and religious deterrents 
to reforms and institutional change. However, at least it is certain that studies like this help to understand 
and expose the real issues which are often overlooked, as in this case the many different schemes to improve 
governance and fight corruption see the issues from a narrow and superficial viewpoint of postwar 
governance and foreign aid issues, and maybe that explains part of reason for the failure.  
…extractive political institutions lead to extractive economic institutions, which enrich 
a few at the expense of many. Those who benefit from extractive institutions thus have 
the resources to build their (private) armies and mercenaries, to buy their judges, and to 
rig their elections in order to remain in power. They also have every interest in defending 
the system. Therefore, extractive economic institutions create the platform for extractive 
political institutions to persist. Power is valuable in regimes with extractive political 
institutions, because power is unchecked and brings economic riches.  
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 171) 
‘extractive political institutions’ used by Acemoglu and Robinson may be a different label for the same 
issue, a government controlled by powerful elite. In postwar Afghanistan a complete new network and setup 
formed around these sources of wealth which limits the money and power circulation mostly inside their 
                                                          
145 This report by Cockburn discusses the issue of aid and powerful elites of Kabul, it is available at Independent’s 
website: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/kabuls-new-elite-live-high-on-wests-largesse-
1677116.html 
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network. For people to enter this network, for example to become a minister or secure a contract, there is 
only one path the one that goes through these people, one must have good connections to get funding, 
employment, or run a company and must share the benefits with them. Foreign aid was one of the funding 
sources going into this network either through private companies or public sector, as both of the sectors are 
essentially in hands of the same people. Ben Hieneman’s (2012) article touch on the issue of corruption his 
article “Afghanistan’s corruption imperils its future – and American interests”146. The issue of corruption 
in high government offices (powerful elite) is a topic of numerous articles and studies such as the ones 
mentioned. The powerful elite in the country are the same people who have strong political and economic 
power. Majority of these people became rich in the past seventeen years of the government and their grip 
on institutions grew with their political power. Examples include the top government officials including the 
president, ministers and parliament members who own the country’s private banks such the Kabul Bank, 
security companies, property (real estate), logistics (private and government supplies), mining (precious 
stones and gas and coal), televisions, projects and contracts, airlines, import and export companies. In these 
sectors there are government officials who also own or partner businesses (the reports and studies included 
in the footnotes and cited sources have more details on corruption). This list of corruption goes further from 
employment opportunities to even scholarships and stamping a student’s school marksheet. Covering more 
cases of corruption is beyond the limits of this paper, the reports and studies cited or referred to in this paper 
and the fact that Afghanistan remained third most corrupt country in the world suffice to understand the 
level of corruption in the country.  
Foreign aid in Afghanistan funded construction of schools, hospitals, government office buildings and other 
important projects and programs such as election and civil society organizations. The positive impact of 
these project seems obvious and as discussed earlier some of these aid-funded projects indeed improved 
the situation (for example the rapid increase in education). However, the overall positive impact of foreign 
is highly debated, at least in case of Afghanistan the reports and studies show strong cases of the negative 
impact of foreign aid. Even if the reports are not very accurate, there are few facts which can help 
understanding the situation in Afghanistan. The first fact is Afghanistan’s receiving of hundreds of billions 
of dollars in the postwar period and remaining aid-dependent. The second fact is Afghanistan’s persistent 
position as the third most corrupt country in the world in the past decade. The third fact is that the over fifty 
percent of the population live under poverty line and a similar number unemployed. The fourth fact is, the 
rising ethnic conflict and political instability (making Afghanistan the biggest refugee sources in the world 
over many decades, even before the wars). The data and reports on these facts were included in various 
sections as in (Table 1., Figure 1., Figure 2. and Figure 14.) and numerous external links in the footnotes.  
In the absence of good data, it is difficult to measure the extent of the impact of foreign aid on economic 
development (or governance) in Afghanistan. To conclude this section on foreign aid and economic 
development, the following paragraphs draw key points and conclusion from the studies (in the literature 
covered here and also aid studies in Afghanistan) covered in this section:  
First, the standard of living and income in a poor country are generally low and as such the salary paid to 
government employees is also low. NGOs with (windfall) funds usually pay higher salary than the 
government and therefore attracts the skilled employees from public sector and reduce their capacity. 
                                                          
146 Ben Heineman Jr. is a senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, in Harvard's Kennedy 
School of Government, and at the Harvard Law School's Program on Corporate Governance and this article of him 
titled “Afghanistan’s corruption imperils its future – and American interests: The U.S. is preparing to withdraw from 
Afghanistan over the next year, but may leave a corrupt and highly dysfunctional country in its wake” is posted here 
at The Atlantic: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/afghanistans-corruption-imperils-its-
future-and-american-interests/260178/   
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Additionally, the incentive created around this relatively higher NGO salary also harms the morals of 
government staff and leave them less motivated to work hard and in order to make up the income differences 
they are tempted to bribery and corruption.  
Second, aid-funded projects are usually implemented by NGOs and subcontractors whose main objective 
is to finish the project and file the completion report for funding. Being a short-term and probably a one-
time contract the partners do not expect next contract with the same partners or long-term partnership, they 
do not have strong incentive to improve the quality and sustainability of the projects which would increase 
their cost and reduce profits. 
Third, donors usually prefer contractors from their country of origin with generous and overpriced contracts 
and subsequently the multiple layers of subcontracts reduce the original budget significantly. Taylor found 
that forty percent of aid funds never actually leave the home country (Norton-Taylor, 2008) and that 
administrative costs and salaries of the multiple contracts reduce the final funds to a small percentage of 
the initial funds147. 
Fourth, a government is legitimate and relevant before its people if it provides basic services to them, if it 
is the NGOs providing those service then it damages the government’s credibility and its linkages with the 
public. As Moyo (2009) stated in her book, people in poor countries approach donor NGOs (Gates 
Foundation in her example) more than approaching their own government to ask for basic services. This 
hurts government’s reputation, authority and capacity building, among other things. 
Fifth, in poor countries there are often powerful people who have ties in government, and NGOs also work 
with them because they need their approval and support for successful implementation of projects. This 
approval and support involves paying bribes and/or giving them contracts with favorable terms as they are 
the ones who have construction companies, logistics, security, and power. Aid funds create ‘vested interests’ 
for these warlords or powerful people. Gopal (2010) 148  also confirms that contracting and security 
companies are often owned by such government officials. This, on the one hand, gives them upper hand to 
secure contracts, on the other hand, increase the stake for them to lose aid projects.  
Sixth, worse cases of aid misuse happened in Afghanistan when aid funds were actually paid to the Taliban 
so that they allow project supplies to pass and get implemented in areas they control. When groups such as 
the Taliban have an upper hand in the game, they often make any demands the like, as Gopal wrote that the 
Taliban even ask for their share from transported goods (Gopal, 2010). Aid money funding the Taliban is 
bad enough, even worse cases happened when such sources of income actually encouraged recruits from 
poor families to join the Talibanii.  
Seventh, getting relatively easier money from foreign aid, the governments in poor countries do not have 
strong incentive to improve provision of services to the public and increase tax revenues. Additionally, for 
remaining aid-dependent, fundamental responsibilities of the government towards its citizen in provision 
of government services, transparency and accountability are weakened which have adverse impacts on 
democracy, trust, and as a result on political stability and economic development.  
 
                                                          
147 The report on this topic is posted on the Guardian:  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/25/afghanistan.internationalaidanddevelopment1    
148 Gopal’s article is posted here: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/middle-
east/article24598297.html  
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In addition to earlier reasons for challenges of state-building in Afghanistan, heavy aid-dependence and its 
related issues contributed to deterioration of governance and economic development failure. The literature 
on foreign aid and economic development to a large extent agree that aid-dependence has a negative impact 
on (democratic) institutions (Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2008, p. 194) and that “aid inflows 
have systematic adverse effects on a country's competitiveness” (Rajan & Subramanian, 2005, p. 1) and to 
Knack and Braugtigam found “a robust statistical relationship between high aid levels in Africa and 
deteriorations in governance” and decrease in tax share of GDP. Their study also found a positive 
correlation between good governance and GDP growth (Knack & Brautigam, 2004, p. 276). While foreign 
aid in Afghanistan helped school and hospital constructions among other things, the country’s notorious 
corruption (and rise of the corrupt and powerful elites), unemployment and poverty make the positive 
impact of aid highly doubtful. When an NGO (aid fund) replaces the government in provision of public 
services, as also pointed by Moyo, it hurts the authority and legitimacy of the government. The interactions 
between government and people, which constitute fundamental element of modern states, did not evolve 
normally around taxes on the one hand, and provision of public services and public accountability on the 
other. The ODA did not strengthen domestic economy (in terms of jobs and income growth, for example) 
which would improve domestic sources of revenue for the government as well as provision of basic services 
to the public. This leaves a negative impact on the entire concept of people-government relationships and 
evolution of government (experience and capacity building).  
Nevertheless, the real intention of studying aid in Afghanistan is more than exposing corruption and poverty, 
aid and corruption is not a priority topic at all, the real reason is to link corruption, aid-dependence, poverty 
and failure of economic development in general to the source of these problems, i.e. the institutions of 
Afghanistan failing the country not in the postwar era but for the past century of the Afghan institutions. 
This institution carried these problems with it right from the beginning a century ago, when the Afghan 
leaders started building a monoethnic system in its multiethnic country where no ethnic group forms a clear 
majority. In order to establish this inappropriate model foreign aid has been a means of survival for many 
of the past governments or at least no major development project in Afghanistan was laid without foreign 
assistance or with domestic revenue. The study of foreign aid and economic development in Afghanistan 
in itself is important research area, however, a more important research area is not to research a problem 
(aid and development failure) but the source of such problem i.e. a long history of institutional reforms and 
development failure in Afghanistan, which will keep producing these issues (corruption, elite control…). 
Unless the challenges of institutional reforms and development is solved, it would be difficult to fight 
corruption and make aid work for the country.  
Conclusion 
It is extremely difficult to explain the complex situation in Afghanistan particularly the reasons for its 
economic underdevelopment, not only because of lack of reliable data but also because it involves so many 
different domestic and international factors. Not having the luxury of data for quantitative analysis, this 
research chose a qualitative approach to study the development failure in Afghanistan in terms of challenges 
of ethnic diversity and institutional development. Afghanistan as a diverse country of ethnic minorities 
unsurprisingly faces diversity-related issues such as underinvestment in public goods, the tragedy of the 
commons, power-sharing and cooperation issues, and ethnic polarization and conflicts, among other things. 
Can ethnic diversity explain the issues of development in Afghanistan? Different from the popular beliefs 
which looks at Afghanistan’s issues in the context of the past three decades of war and foreign intervention 
and blame them for poverty, illiteracy, and conflicts, this paper looks at development and governance 
history before the wars and find a different interpretation for the issues of Afghanistan. Before explaining 
that, the two possible reasons for seeing the problems of Afghanistan in the context of the last three decades 
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of wars might be 1. Majority of the studies on the topic are done by foreigners particularly in the countries 
which have been engaged in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The primary focus of this group has been on how 
Afghanistan is doing in postwar and whether their countries engagement in Afghanistan is making a 
difference, which can be seen on many articles written on Afghanistan. Lack of good data on prewar 
Afghanistan could also be a factor there. 2. the second reason may be the Afghan governments’ 
unwillingness to let the reason and the failure of past governments get exposed. The reason for this 
possibility on the first sight is the tribal structure of the Afghan society, it is too risky for the Afghan 
government if everyone finds out that the Afghan government system and policies were the reason for the 
country’s poverty and devastation. The two highly sensitive foundations of the Afghan government 
throughout the past century i.e. Afghan and Islam remained a taboo to criticize even to this day. But this 
taboo will have to break sooner than later for scientific studies and criticism, that is what this paper seeks 
do. 
This paper relies on theoretical and empirical studies and their findings on ethnic diversity, institutional 
development and economic growth, and studies the role of ethnic diversity in institution-building and 
economic growth in Afghanistan. “Ethnic diversity has a more adverse effect on economic policy and 
growth when institutions are poor” (Easterly W. , 2001, p. 703). Alesina and La Ferrara “found 
overwhelming evidence supporting” the argument that “public good provisions was lower in [ethnically] 
fragmented societies” (Alesina & Ferrara, 2005, p. 796) and Staveren and Pervaiz found “social exclusion 
from important parts of the economy” of a group of people based on their identity, rights, opportunism, 
capabilities and rights” has significant effect on “social cohesion and in turn economic growth” (Staveren 
& Pervaiz, 2017, p. n/a). Majority of the papers covered in this paper point at the negative impact of ethnic 
diversity on economic development when institutions fail to protect against inequality (of income, rights, 
opportunities), and against the rise of powerful elites and their manipulation of institutions at the cost of the 
rest of the population. Thus, “ethnically diverse nations that wish to endure in peace and prosperity must 
build good institutions” (Easterly W. , 2001, p. 703).  
This paper studied the role of ethnic diversity and Afghanistan’s poverty, illiteracy and conflict, and it 
believes that Afghanistan’s failure is largely because of the failure of its institutions which we believe to be 
incompatible with ethnic realities on the one hand, and with reform and modernization on the other hand. 
This incompatibility of the Afghan institutions was in the form of establishing a highly centralized 
government in Kabul in order to establish and sustain an Afghan state (Afghan not including non-Afghan 
ethnicities in the country). In order to establish an Afghan state, the Afghan governments since 
establishment in 1880s relied on Afghan nationalism to rally the Afghan tribes behind the government, and 
political Islam by brining religious leaders under government control to justify and legitimize the kings’ 
use of power and right to rule. The third element was centralized government of elites which the Afghan 
leaders needed to control the diverse population with strict control of power and blocking access to non-
Afghans in particular. The fourth element of the Afghan government was foreign assistance which started 
in the beginning by Abdurrahman Khan in exchange for the Durand Line agreement on borders and 
remaining protectorate of the British India, for which the Amir of Kabul received military and financial 
assistance which he used to establish the Afghan state with the above four characteristics.  
Amir Abdurrahman (1880-1901) as the founder modern Afghanistan introduced and successfully applied 
these four fundamental factors in establishing ‘the first Afghan state’ and passed on his legacy to his 
successors. Since Afghan state was founded on Afghan and Islam identity and despite the Afghan’s 
successful control of political power for one century (1880-1978) the four principles of the Afghan 
government became deterrents to reforms and modernization. The attempts by the Afghan monarchs to 
introduce reforms and modernize the country (although there are doubts if they really wanted it) the reforms 
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were perceived as threat or contradiction to the core principles of Afghan and Islam. The governments thus 
either had to stick to the principles (promote Afghan nationalism and keep the ulema happy or controlled, 
as Abdurrhman Khan, Zahir Khan, and Daoud Khan) or had to face rejection by Islamists Afghans (as the 
collapse of secularist Amanullah in 1929 and communist Najibullah in 1989).  
The conclusion is that ethnic diversity was a main reason for the Afghan government to choose this 
particular type of government in the past century, besides other important factors such as political and 
historical situation in the region such as The British and Russian empires interest and influence in 
Afghanistan. The ethnic diversity effect on the choice of institution and the associated challenges of such 
institutions prevented reforms as well as investment in public goods (education is of particular interest to 
this paper) and inclusion of non-Afghans in lower level Afghans to participation and access to political and 
economic opportunities. These factors contributed to the countries high level of illiteracy, poverty, ethnic 
fragmentation and overall economic underdevelopment in Afghanistan. contrary to the view that 
development failure in postwar government is because of the decades of wars, this paper argues that the 
level of poverty and illiteracy before the wars was already far behind any country in Asia (as late as 1960 
98% of the population was illiterate, living in rural areas (Gregorian,1969, p. 357) on subsistence 
agriculture) which was mainly due to the prewar institutions and which in turn was largely due to the ethnic 
diversity. The same argument goes for the postwar government’s failure as the same four factors define the 
postwar government/institutions149, albeit with some variation, if this proposition is correct the failure of 
the postwar government is likely to follow the prewar governments’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
149 postwar “politicization of ethnicity” in Afghanistan initially aimed solving the ethnic problem with “well-balanced 
representation of ethnic groups” however this became like opening the Pandora Box. According to him, the 
reestablishment of “exceptionally strong president” [centralized government model of prewar], despite the opposition 
by non-Pashtuns “a Pashtun approach… was asserted, which had its historical model in the 1964 Constitution of the 
Afghan monarchy”. (Schetter, 2016, pp. 465-467). [inserted text] 
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Introduction 
The definition of knowledge according to Bell (1973) is “a set of organized statements of facts or ideas, 
presenting a reasoned judgment or an experimental result, which is transmitted to others through some 
communication medium in some systematic form”. (Bell, 1973) 150 . Knowledge and human capital 
formation are fundamental factors of economic development both in terms of increasing productivity and 
efficiency, as well as decreasing chances of violence. Two central hypotheses in human capital theory are 
“first, education and training increase individual cognitive capacity and therefore augment productivity. 
Second, increased productivity leads to increased individual earnings, and these increased earnings are a 
measure of the value of human capital” (Marginson, 1993, p. 38), and according to Lipset (1960) “human 
capital accumulation contributes to shape efficient policies, less violence and more political stability” (Dias 
& Tebaldi, 2012, p. 300). Despite a broad agreement in the literature on the positive effect of relationship 
between education and economic growth, not all researchers agree on the mechanics of this relationship. 
For example, different from cognitive skills improvement stated above, the role of education in 
institutionalists’ view is secondary to institutional quality. Institutionalists’ view of factors effecting 
economic growth is different in that more than education they emphasize on the quality of political 
institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) state that in countries where institutions cannot effectively 
apply checks and balances of power, the powerful elite will rise and manipulate the institutions to control 
economic and political power at the cost of the rest of the population, once this system is established it is 
hard to get out of the vicious circle created (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 171). Nonetheless, considering 
education either a contributor to improving institutional quality as also confirmed by Glaeser et al. (2004, 
p. 282) that the impact of human capital on economic growth is through improving political institutions, or 
education’s role in increasing cognitive skills and productivity of individuals, the role of education in 
development and modernization remains significant. An emerging new concept in economic growth is the 
‘knowledge society’ or ‘knowledge-based economy’ theory referring to “economies which are directly 
based on the production, distribution and use of knowledge and information” 151.  
This research aims at studying education and economic development in Afghanistan, to do that, first it is 
important to study the reasons behind Afghanistan’s lack of investment in education in the past hundred 
years which left the population illiterate (98% illiteracy rate in 1960s, 70% in 2016)152. After studying (lack 
of) education in prewar period (1878-1980), it will discuss the status of education in postwar Afghanistan 
(post-2001) and compare it with other countries in the region such as Turkey, Kazakhstan, India, Malaysia, 
and South Korea among others. Despite recent improvements in education level (Figure 12.) in postwar 
period, the overall status of education in Afghanistan is low, in fact the lowest in Asia (Figure 14.) part of 
the reason is the legacy of massive illiteracy rate from before 2001, other reasons include, but not limited 
to inadequate capacity, ongoing conflict, and religious and traditional barriers. However, just as in previous 
chapter and also for similar reasons, ethnic diversity and institutional challenges (as discussed in terms of 
Afghan nationalism and political Islam) seem to dominate the reasons for lack of investment in education 
(as a public good). The reasons for Afghanistan’s stagnation in human capital formation and economic 
development in the prewar period is thus primarily institutional and that in turn is correlated with the 
                                                          
150 This definition of knowledge was written by Bell (1973) in his book “The coming of post-industrial society: A 
venture in social forecasting” it is cited by many other writers such as Fei Gao, Meng Li, Steve Clarke, (2008, p. 4) 
available online in here: https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/13673270810859479  
151 “the Knowledge-based economy” is the title of a paper produced by OECD discussing the issues related to 
Knowledge-based economy in OECD countries, full article is posted here: https://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-
tech/1913021.pdf  
152 As late as 1960s, 98% of the population in Afghanistan was illiterate (Gregorian 1969, p. 184), and adult illiteracy 
rate now is around 31% (Table 14.) 
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country’s ethnic diversity. To bridge this chapter with previous chapters, the stagnation of education in 
Afghanistan or more generally underinvestment in public goods is a major challenge in countries with 
ethnic diversity and poor institutions (based on the literature and conclusion from chapter four).  
In addition to the aforementioned reasons for studying the importance of education in economic 
development, the importance of education is not only in strengthening the reasoning and judgment power 
of individuals (similar to the cognitive capacity argument by (Marginson, 1993, p. 38)) but also thinking of 
it as a smoothening and easing force of ethnic and cultural diversity. Since education is uniform and 
standard, ethnically and culturally diverse population educated with the same standard education and 
reasoning methods, reduces the otherwise different basis of judgment and thinking. The ‘mental model’ 
proposition by North which stated that “individuals make choices on the basis of their mental models… 
these are culturally derived, differ wildly, are not easily changed and give rise not the one determinate 
position of general equilibrium theory but potentially to multiple equilibria” (North D. , 1990, p. 37) 
provides hints to our proposition of education’s role in streamlining and reducing differences of thoughts, 
believes and judgement which are major sources of difference in a (ethnically and culturally) diverse 
country of Afghanistan. It may be possible that higher illiteracy in ethnically-diverse countries contribute 
to fragmentation, more specifically, illiteracy making cooperation and consensus more difficult due to wide 
variety of ‘mental models’ and reasoning. It may be an interesting case to study if the increasing level of 
education is reducing ethnic fragmentation in Afghanistan (among educated population as compared to 
illiterate). This proposition needs further work to determine how exactly it may relate, if at all. Nevertheless, 
theoretically it seems to present a good case to consider for future research. This paper is interested to first 
review the literature on the relationship between education and economic development and then study the 
reasons and implications of high rate of illiteracy in Afghanistan with regards to its economic development. 
A great body of literature emphasizes on the significance of human capital formation in a modern economy,  
and researches such as (Dias & Tebaldi, 2012), Glaeser et al. (2004), (Ahsan & Haque, 2017), (Lucas, 
1988), (Pelinescu, 2015), and (Marginson, 1993) among others, are such studies which this paper will cover.  
Humna and Haque argue that the impact of human capital can only be felt when an economy passes a 
“threshold level of development” human capital formation below that threshold may not help in economic 
development (Ahsan & Haque, 2017, p. 51). However, there are many studies with stronger voice on the 
positive effect of education on economic growth such as (Lucas, 1988), (Riley, 2010), (Marginson, 1993) 
and (Pelinescu, 2015). Pelinescues found a “positive and statically significant relationship between 
economic growth (GDP per capita) and innovative capacity of human capital (evidenced by the number of 
patents) and qualification of employees (secondary education) as expected according to economic theory” 
(Pelinescu, 2015, p. 189). Human capital with advanced knowledge and training is more productive and 
can better adapt to new technology and skillset. As Marginson (1993) describes that knowledge increases 
productivity and therefore increases income and welfare, “first, education and training increase individual 
cognitive capacity and therefore augment productivity. Second, increased productivity leads to increased 
individual earnings, and these increased earnings are a measure of the value of human capital” (Marginson, 
1993, p. 38). Thus, the literature on education emphasizes on the importance of education in economic 
growth. Neo-classical economic growth theories contain human capital and/or knowledge as an integral 
part of theory, signifying the central role of accumulation of knowledge and technology in modern 
economic development.  
This paper focuses on human capital and economic development in Afghanistan. Unavailability of good 
data is a major challenge in conducting analysis, as was shown in previous chapters, the GDP statistics in 
Afghanistan do not show a meaningful relationship with either quality of institutions or education. The 
reason is that Afghanistan economy has been heavily dependent on foreign aid and black market (opium 
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economy) therefore, the increase and decrease in GDP are because of fluctuations in the amount of aid or 
other factors making it difficult to measure its relationship with accumulation of human capital. Another 
limitations with data analysis in this study is that, after decades of wars in Afghanistan, the postwar period 
since 2001 is not long enough to measure the impact of education on the economy. Taking 2001 as the base 
year when schools reopened after the wars, it takes twelve years for the first graders to finish high school 
and another four years to finish university and some more years to join the workforce and gain experience, 
only then it will be possible to measure the impact of education on productivity and economic development. 
For this reason, this paper cannot apply econometric means of data analysis for Afghanistan at this point. 
The alternate way to discuss human capital formation in Afghanistan is to study the background and current 
status of education in the country, identify its strength and weaknesses and recommend policy suggestions.  
Modern education in Afghanistan started in 1920s153 relatively early in the region, but the progress of 
education stagnated in Kabul and did not expand beyond few cities, this stagnation kept the level of literacy 
in the country around 2% up until 1960s (Gregorian 1969, p. 184). Afghanistan’s literacy rate has been the 
lowest in the region in the past several decades and at the same time the level of poverty, political instability, 
and economic underdevelopment have also been among the poorest in the region (Figures 1. 4. and Table 
1.) In the absence of reliable data and the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan, it is extremely difficult 
to measure the impact of education and economic development in the country. Nonetheless, this paper will 
conduct qualitative analysis and compare the descriptive data on education in different regions/provinces 
inside Afghanistan to identify possible patterns and relationships. One such patterns identified in the data, 
for example, is that southern provinces of Zabul, Kandahar and Helmand where religious groups (the 
Taliban) have greater influence show smaller number of female students and higher rate of female school 
dropouts as compared to central Hazaristan area and the city centers such as Kabul, Herat, Mazari Sharif, 
and Jalalabad. The provinces with higher school dropout ratio, unsurprisingly, have smaller share in higher 
education as well, but some provinces like Panjshir and Khost fill the gap with relatively higher number of 
male students. The number of university students as percentage of population for each province shows that 
provinces with highest number are Bamyan, Panjsher, Balkh, Nangerhar and Kabul, whereas provinces 
with smallest share of university students are Zabul, Nooristan, Uruzgan, Paktia and Helmand, which again 
is in line with the previous finding about the more religious and traditional south has smaller per capita 
share in higher education, especially for women (the statistics are provided the tables below). 
Data analysis also includes comparison of gross enrolment ratio of primary, secondary and tertiary schools 
in Afghanistan with other countries in the region like Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, India, China, Kazakhstan, 
Iran and South Korea. Public formal education in Afghanistan started in 1920s but in the period between 
1930-2000 the progress was extremely slow, rather stagnant, as compared to other countries during the 
same period (Figure 14.). In post-World War II period the countries under study undertook major 
educational reforms (discussed later) especially with regards to adopting universal education programs, 
increasing literacy to around ninety percent over in 1990s and many of them reached near hundred percent 
literacy rate by the end of the century (Figure 14. and 15.), whereas, Afghanistan’s literacy rate in 2016 was 
only thirty-four percent (Table 1.). Access to education and information has been rapidly increasing in 
postwar Afghanistan (over a hundred percent for most of the past decade), the rapid increase in annual 
school enrolment ratio in postwar Afghanistan was mainly due to the initial low levels of education at the 
baseline year (2001), and the post-Taliban (re)opening of schools all over the country (beyond Kabul, many 
areas for the first time), nevertheless, despite this rapid increase in Afghanistan’s school enrolment ratio, it 
                                                          
153 The first modern school ‘Habibia High School’ was built in 1904 in Kabul, but it was in 1920s that many schools 
(also the first girls school) opened as a result of Amanullah Khan’s modernization plan. This information is derived 
from Public Library website at: http://www.publiclibrary.ws/world/afghanistan/introduction-afghanistan/education  
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has a long way ahead before its investment in education will produce professionals and skilled workforce 
to truly benefit its economic development. 
Like everything else in Afghanistan, education sector too was affected by the decades of wars. The decades 
of wars brought further down the already low level of education and number of schools in Afghanistan 
reducing them effectively to primary schools and madrasas in rural areas. Postwar/post-Taliban period 
experienced a surge in school enrolment, most importantly education opportunities became available for 
all people from different ethnicities and women like never before. However, the anti-education elements 
(wars, religious extremists) also increasingly grew strong in postwar era (2001) leading to banning of 
schools and girls’ education in some parts of the country. Nonetheless, the overall number of students 
rapidly increased in schools and universities over the postwar period, despite the continued the wars and 
other challenges. The important foundations of the Afghan institution, Afghan and Islam, deserve due 
attention in this chapter, the following section will start with a background study on Islam and education 
and discuss the decline of knowledge in the Muslim world specially after the so called ‘golden age of Islam 
800-1200). School enrollment ratio sharply reduced in the war period (1978-2001) as Figure 12. shows. 
However, the same figure also shows that school enrolment ratio before the war was not good either. The 
gap in literacy rate between Afghanistan and other developing countries had already a high level before the 
war, as Figure 15. shows primary school enrolment ratio for Afghanistan was only 20 percent in 2000, 
while almost all other countries under study had reached around hundred percent level by that time. Based 
on arguments and findings of researches (like the ones stated above) that education has a positive correlation 
with economic development, then Afghanistan’s poor economic performance and development may then 
be correlated with its low level of human capital formation over the past several decades, among other 
factors. The question is why Afghanistan stagnated in education despite a relatively good start in 1920s? 
The answer to this question lies in political events during that time particularly after Amanullah Khan 
between 1929-1978. In short, Amanullah Khan’s reforms and modernization plan came face to face with 
two major obstacles, Afghan nationalism and Islam and needless to repeat that these two were foundational 
elements of the Afghan government and therefore, difficult to change. There were other reasons too such 
as the criticism against poorly planned reforms, and that the King did not wholeheartedly want the reforms 
which will be discussed later. Nonetheless, the collapse of Amanullah Khan’s government due to the 
opposition, may had greatly cautioned his successors about reforms, and again because a Tajik subdued 
Amanullah Khan, the Afghan leaders paid extra effort on political power consolidation and even more 
Afghan nationalism (discussed below). The ethnic diversity and Afghan institutions keep coming up in the 
discussion and it is good to remember this factor in stagnation and underinvestment in education in 
Afghanistan. 
A general introduction to education (with a focus on the role of Islam in education) below is followed by a 
section on history of modern schooling in Afghanistan. The next section will highlight major challenges of 
education in postwar period namely high rate of school dropout, limited capacity (in higher education), and 
other qualitative issues of education. As in previous chapter, lack of reliable data is a major bottleneck for 
this paper, therefore, it applies descriptive analysis of data on education including school enrolment ratio 
with a focus on gender and regional differences inside the country. A unique aspect of human capital 
formation in Afghanistan is its millions of refugees. Many of the top government officials and academician 
studied abroad (largely former refugees), as well as the large-scale brain-drain out of the country and the 
second generation of refugees learning in foreign language, the gap created as a result (in language, ideas, 
quality) between the refugees and the domestic education system is increasingly challenging. This chapter 
concludes with comparing Afghanistan’s level of education with selected countries in Asia. On a bigger 
picture, this chapter studies education in Afghanistan, however, an important objective in addition to 
education itself is to study it as a complement to the previous chapter on institutional challenges of 
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development in an ethnically diverse country, how education is affected (through underinvestment in public 
goods, designed illiteracy, and corruption, for example) and how education can contribute in return (thought 
productivity, improved institutions, reduction in violence, for example). Given the limits of this chapter it 
is not possible to go in to details for all of them, however, it is a deliberate attempt to include and link these 
elements (ethnic diversity, institutions ‘Afghan and Islam’, education and economic development) in a 
broader context. 
Islam and stagnation in knowledge and reform 
Islam expanded rapidly from Arabia across vast territories in all three known continents. It is not exactly 
known when Islam came to Central Asia, however, the biggest Muslim scholars who were from Central 
Asia (including parts of Afghanistan) were Avicenna (also Abu Ali Cina Balkhi) Zakariya Razi, Al 
Khwarazmi, Omar Khayyam, Al Beyruni, and Al Farabi, among others, who lived in the “Golden Age of 
Islam154” between 800-1200155. The land of Islam became home to the world’s knowledge and scholarship 
around this time (800 – 1200) and these scholars and philosophers were the backbone of knowledge and 
scholarship of the Golden Age 156 . This period experienced a rise in science, philosophy, astronomy, 
medicine and other sciences. The Muslim scholars translated and improved the Greek philosophy and 
science and improved upon them (details of this period and the scholars are provided in the footnote below). 
However, after this period the Muslim Middle East experienced a steady decline in knowledge, as the world 
of Islam was declining a new power and knowledge center was growing in Western Europe. This topic of 
the decline of the Muslim World and the rise of the Western Europe or related topics have been studied by 
many authors such as (Amiri, 2014), (Kuran, 2013), (Zanden, 2009), and (Hoppenbrouwers & Blockmans, 
2014) among others. The reason for the decline of the Muslim Middle east according to the literature vary 
and it is difficult to point at some definitive conclusion. What is certain is that the developments happening 
in the two worlds (of Islam and Europe) led them to two diverging paths, the rise of Europe and the fall the 
Middle East.  
Since this section is on knowledge and Islam the rise and fall of knowledge and the Muslim world is 
interesting to discuss. Timur Kuran’s157 book has a detailed discussion on Islamic madrasas and early 
universities in Europe. His description and comparison of the two is such that both madrasa and university 
were founded primarily as centers of religious knowledge. Universities in Europe took a different path when 
it changed from a trust organization to corporations. According to him, this transition gave universities 
some degree of autonomy and also self-reliance unlike madrasas that continued as charity-funded centers. 
“The early universities in Europe such as Paris (1118) and Oxford (1249), were founded as trusts. But they 
quickly became self-governing and self-renewing organizations through incorporation” (Kuran, 2013, p. 
114). The organizational mode of universities also changed to for-profit corporations. The concept of 
corporation evolved as prime mode of organization and unit of economic activities in Europe. The Islamic 
counterpart of corporation was the Waqf system in the Middle East. The Waqf system essentially remained 
religious and like most other religious/Islamic principles were sensitive to change and modification, they 
                                                          
154  This article is written on ‘The Islamic Golden Age’ is available on Huffington Post website: 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/sasha-brookner/the-golden-age-of-islam_b_1941608.html  
155  This article titled “10 Golden Age philosophers and why you should know them” has information on 10 
philosophers include some of the ones noted above, it is available at: https://bigthink.com/scotty-hendricks/ten-
islamic-philosophers-you-dont-know-and-why-you-shoud  
156 This website name Muslim Heritage contains great details and information about the Golden Age, this page 
introduces Ibn i Sina, Farabi and Beyruni and their contribution to the world knowledge, available here: 
http://www.muslimheritage.com/article/muslim-contributions-philosophy-ibn-sina-farabi-beyruni  
157 To avoid confusion between Kuran the author and Quran/Kuran the Muslim holy book, we use the Author’s full 
name as Timur Kuran, Kuran or Quran for the book.  
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stagnated in their structures as well as in their principles and could not evolve into an efficient (non-religious 
and self-governing) system like corporation in Europe (Kuran, 2013, p. 115). According to Timur Kuran, 
the factor, among other factors he mentioned, which prevented corporation-like institutions to emerge in 
the Muslim world may be as following. First, the tribal structure of the Arab world before Islam led to wars 
and alliances among different tribes, Islam came and united them under the banner of one Umma and 
Muslim brotherhood above tribes and clans. However, Quran does not provide any details of the ‘internal 
organization’ of the Muslim brotherhood. “no collective economic actor appears in the Quran, let alone a 
collectivity considered a legal person. Islam’s most authoritative source or guidance harbors nothing 
obvious, then, that might have inspired or supported the corporate form of organization, or justified 
borrowing it from an outside source” (Kuran, 2013, p. 106). In Europe on the other hand, although tribal 
structure existed there too, “yet, Christianity also harbors teachings that may be used to legitimize 
subcommunal autonomy. The Biblical injunction to render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to 
God the things that are God’s” (Kuran, 2013, p. 107) [Italics applied].  
The other factor which too relates to Islam’s role in stagnation of the Muslim Middle East is the difficulty 
of changing or reforming Islamic institutions. On the one hand everything in a Muslim’s life (should) come 
under Islamic laws and be permissible. On the other hand, deviation from the existing laws and traditions 
(as reforms and institutional innovation and change which would contradict Islamic laws or be perceived 
so) is prohibited and the authority and mechanism of introducing change is not provided in the Islamic laws. 
In Timur Kuran’s words “Muhammad was both a religious and a political leader, and Islamic law was 
meant to regulate all spheres of life, without ceding ground to secular legislation. On the face of it, the 
presumed comprehensiveness of Islamic law ruled out self-governance on the part of subcommunities; one 
could not replace divine law with human-made law even in limited domains. Like the commitment to a 
union of tribes in one great family, the lack of a formal separation between the religious and the secular 
thus conflicted with the concept of incorporation, and all the more so with the ideal of incorporation at will” 
(Kuran, 2013, p. 107). This inflexible nature of religious institutions kept them stagnant overtime a long 
time. According to Van Zanden Islamic institution of waqf (also talked about by Timur Kuran) which 
provided “charity, medical care, and other social needs… lacked the flexibility that would allow them to 
change course if their members decided it would have been important to do so. Such flexibility was one of 
the important advantages of the European corporate bodies” (Zanden, 2009, p. 62). Both of these authors 
discuss many other institutional differences between those of the Muslim World and those (emerging) in 
Western Europe such as waqf and madrasa versus corporation and university, zakat versus tax system, 
marriage of powers versus separation of powers, and personal versus impersonal mode of business and 
trade, and more. A simplified but key point to note from this discussion would be that institutions in the 
Middle East remained Islamic and sacredness/religiosity of law (among other things) prevented changes 
and thus the transition to modern institutions did not take place. While in Europe institutions grew as secular 
(non-religious) particularly important is the role of for-profit and self-relying corporation. This inflexibility 
and resistance to reforms and change of the Islamic institutions is still a serious challenge in Afghanistan 
albeit with a mix of local tribal traditions and ethnic politics, but the essence of institutional stagnation in 
Afghanistan as a Muslim country draws much from the Islamic laws. 
Timur Kuran’s account of ‘The Long Divergence158’ between the Muslim Middle East and Western Europe 
put institutions as key factor in ‘The Long Divergence’. A more directly linked to this paper’s topic of 
education in the Muslim world is comparison of book production and diffusion of knowledge in the two 
worlds. Van Zanden writes that book production and literacy in the land of Islam was probably higher than 
anywhere else in the world around the Middle Ages “but the region did not make the transition to mass 
                                                          
158 The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East is title of Timur Kuran’s book cited above. 
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production of books through the printing press…” (Zanden, 2009, pp. 190-197). The Muslim leaders were 
suspicious of printing press and spread of knowledge beyond control, for example he writes that “the sultan 
of the Ottoman Empire… banned the possession of printed materials after he discovered what the invention 
of printing press meant for Western Europe” (Huff, 1993, p. 133). Besides the suspicion by the sultans 
against spread of knowledge to everyone beyond the traditional sphere, another contributing factor against 
evolution of book production in the Muslim world again be correlated with Islamic institutions. According 
to Zanden “Islamic law continued to rely on memory and personal testimony and did not make to switch to 
the written record that became characteristic of the new legal system in the Latin West” (Zanden, 2009, p. 
62). The use of verbal and personal testimony as part of the Islamic institutions had a far-reaching impact 
beyond book production and spread of knowledge. The role of written document and contract is vital in 
business and trade. According to Timur Kuran trade in the land of Islam usually took place between traders 
on the basis of personal relationship and trust between individual traders. This mode of trade was not on 
the basis of written agreements/documents but on the basis verbal agreements and personal relationships, 
which was opposite to the increasingly “impersonal” nature of business and trade in Europe (Kuran, 2013).  
Also cited in Zanden’s book from Huff and Pederson is another (political and religious) reason for 
suppression of book production because of the “distrust in the common man” by the Sultan’s to have access 
to knowledge in printed materials (Huff, 1993). Therefore, possession of knowledge by common man was 
not in the interest and the authority of the faith and the sultans. Together these factors impeded flourishing 
of printing press and spread of knowledge in the land of Islam as mass production and distribution of books 
were suppressed by the Muslim sultans (Pederson, 1984).  
The Islamic institutions could not facilitate accumulation and dispersion of knowledge as their counter parts 
in Europe in ways described above. The stagnation in knowledge creation and economic development in 
the Muslim world widened and continued to modern times. For example, to get a perspective of the gap in 
knowledge creation this patent statistics over 36 years is helpful. The number of registered patent 
applications by Israel is greater than the entire Arab world combined. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
statistics159 showing registered patents from 1977 to 2015 shows that the number of patents registered by 
Arab countries totaled 2919. While the patents registered by Israel alone totaled 35900, which is 12.3 times 
more than the entire Arab world. Patents registered by Afghanistan was only 2, Iran 199 and Turkey 748 
during the same period. Of the top two-hundred universities160 in the world there are none from the Middle 
East and not many in the top five-hundred universities in the world.  
Islamic institutions being the law of the land governing the Muslim society and Muslim mindset for the 
past millennium have certainly played a role in their development pattern. Of course, this argument always 
existed that the development failure in the Muslim world was not because of Islam itself, but how it was 
(mis)interpreted and (mis)used by its followers. However, it is difficult not to see the hard truth and 
evidence of the large gap between the Muslim world and the developed world. Stagnated knowledge 
production and institutions over a long time created a large gap between the developed world and the 
                                                          
159 The US Patent and Trademark Office’s website has these statistics online which shows patents “utility patents (i.e., 
"patents for invention"), design patents, plant patents, reissue patents, statutory invention registrations, defensive 
publications” granted by it and it is available here:  
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cst_all.htm  
160 There are many websites showing university ranking, the information used here are from QS World University 
Ranking website: https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2015 and also this 
website: https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2018/world-
ranking#!/page/1/length/100/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats  
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Muslim world and the catchup process would require serious consideration of institutional change and 
modernization.  
In addition to the foregoing discussion on Islamic institutions and knowledge a third and last view point on 
the subject is the contradiction between religious belief versus science and rationality, and Islamic concept 
of predestination and man’s freewill. This topic is philosophical and requires a greater space to discuss 
which is beyond the limit of this paper. A recently written book by Ali Amiri takes on the issue of 
‘wandering reason: the rise and fall of rationality in Islam’161 (Amiri, 2014). This book discusses the conflict 
between two different schools of thoughts among Muslim scholars around the Golden Age of Islam, the 
rationalists and theologist. Translation and improvement of Greek philosophy by Farabi and Ibn i Sina, the 
two towering philosophers who worked on rationality aspects of Islamic philosophy and placed greater 
emphasis on rationality than pure theology. However, the other group of scholars perceived this a deviation 
from true path of Islam, Islam of Muhammad, Imam Ghazzali who led this school of thought rejected the 
rationalists’ view. Ghazzali won the fight and the rationalists were rejected and suppressed. Thus, the rise 
of rationality in the Golden Age of Islam ended with the with fall of rationality the decline of the Muslim 
World since. This paragraph is an oversimplified narrative of the philosophy discussed by Amiri. However, 
this philosophical discussion of the rise and fall of Islam opens a new window to the same discussion by 
Kuran, and Zanden covered previously. This ‘rationality’ view of the decline of the Muslim world is 
complementary to the previous discussion which studied the decline in terms of Islamic institutions 
resistance to reforms, both for similar reason that reforms (of institutions in earlier discussion and of 
philosophy/rationality in later discussion) may corrupt or deviate from the pure Islamic law. 
An alternative view of the rise and fall of Islam may actually explain the rise and fall as the rise and fall of 
knowledge in the land of Islam. In a critical view of the role of Islam in pure theological sense of Islam in 
the rise, one can argue that, Islam as a religion did not play much of role in shaping of The Golden Age (as 
far as scientific achievement is concerned), rather it was the rise of knowledge and rationality, which could 
happen and has happened somewhere else outside the land of Islam. The positive role of Islam was in the 
environment it created which allowed science and philosophy to flourish. But Islamic laws became the 
reason for the Islamists (Imam Ghazzali, or those who believe in pure form Islam and reject changes to it) 
to prevent the scientific and rational progress to continue its course. The intention behind this argument is 
to emphasize the role of institutions and the environment which facilitate science and rationality to flourish, 
and as importantly to be cautious about the belief that progress and Islamic laws do not contradict and they 
both can coexist and facilitate each other’s implementation, and in order to prove this claim bring The 
Golden Age of Islam as a testimony. This is a serious concern because the belief and events which 
suppressed the rationality school of thought and caused ‘the long divergence’ in the past, may continue to 
do so unless our understanding of the Islamic institutions and the great decline is accurate and correct.  
Put differently, successful accumulation of knowledge happened outside the Muslim world (Europe, Japan, 
China) not because of their religion but because of creating the right conditions (institutional reforms, 
school buildings, research etc.) for creation and accumulation of knowledge. On the contrary, the failure 
and decline of knowledge in the Muslim world has a great deal of relationship with the Islamic laws and 
traditions which became the basis for justification by the believers to resist reforms and deviation from 
original Islam, which again are based on Islamic laws. Of course, Quranic verses and hadiths calling upon 
Muslims to “seek knowledge” 162 , “learn” and “think” are examples of Islamic law’s support and 
                                                          
161 This book is Dari (Persian) and the title translation and quotation used here was personally authorized by him. The 
Dari (original) title of the book is: “ملاسا ناهج رد تینلاقع لاوز و روهظ :هراوآ درخ” ،یریما یلع 
162 There are many versus in the Quran such as this “My Lord, increase me in knowledge.” (Quran 20:114) and Hadiths 
(Prophet Muhammad’s words/traditions) such as this “Seeking knowledge is an obligation upon every Muslim.” (At-
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encouragement for seeking knowledge and rationality (thinking), however, taking history as evidence of 
whether the Muslim society chose knowledge and rationality or reverting to original and pure Islam 
(whatever that may be, and regardless of which group is right) is the cause of this alert in this text. There is 
no shortage of example in modern day of the same struggle between reform and modernization and 
establishing original and pure Islam, needless to write specific examples, there is hardly any Muslim 
country which does not struggle between the two schools of thoughts. Ali Amiri’s book was banned163 to 
participate from a book show in Iran and it caused also caused controversies and protest164 in Afghanistan 
where it was written and published. In conclusion to this section, this section briefly covered some 
important challenges of knowledge and education in the land of Islam which has significant implications 
for this study on Afghanistan. Education in Afghanistan in the past century also struggle with challenges 
discussed above. The following section covers the history and then status of formal education in 
Afghanistan. 
Modern schooling in Afghanistan 
The first formal school in Afghanistan dates back to 1868-79 (Zahir and Elmi, p. 23)165 which was mainly 
for the king’s family and not for the public. The first public school which was built in the year 1904 was 
Habibia166 School in Kabul, until 1919 there were only four schools in Kabul167, a major school building 
and opening of the Ministry of Education took place in 1920s under Amanullah Khan’s reform plan. 
Students were sent to Turkey including girls. Of the first schools built in 1920s was Lycee Isteqlal (Isteqlal 
High School) 1921, and Lycee Nejat in 1924 and Lycee Ghazi in 1926, all in Kabul168. This marks the first 
round of major school building and reforms in the country in 1920s. However, his modernization plan is 
criticized for serious defects in at least two important ways. His poor understanding and insufficient 
knowledge of modernization as well as lack of experience as he was still in his 20s. Historians described 
him, unsurprising for his age and experience, as “a reformer…[but] impulsive and tactless and tended to 
surround himself with poor advisors" (Britannica, 2016). A detailed discussion of him was given in previous 
chapter of which it is relevant to repeat. The idea of modernization and neo-nationalism came to 
Afghanistan mainly when former exiled Afghans returned from the land of the Ottomans, the most 
                                                          
Tirmidhi). This content is cited from Quran Reading website at: http://www.quranreading.com/blog/importance-of-
seeking-knowledge-in-islam/  
163 A report on this ban on two books by Amir to showcase in Iran is available here (Dari):  
http://fa.rfi.fr/%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86/20150517
-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A2%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%
DB%8C%D8%AA-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B4%D9%86%D9%81%DA%A9%D8%B1-%
D8%A7%D9%81%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%84-%D8%B3%D8
%AA%DB%8C%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AE-%D
8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85 also in the link below 
164 University professors and activists as well as media representatives protested against Afghanistan’s Ministry of 
Culture’s decision on not allowing Amiri’s book to participate in a book show in Tehran. The link to the report is on 
Etilaatroz newspaper’s website: https://etilaatroz.com/23006/  
165 This article on education in Afghanistan is posted on Encyclopedia Iranica webisite: 
 http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/education-xxvii-in-afghanistan also here:  
https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/history-education-afghanistan  
166 The first modern school ‘Habibia High School’ was built in 1904 in Kabul, but it was in 1920s that many schools 
(also the first girls school) opened as a result of Amanullah Khan’s modernization plan. This information is derived 
from Public Library website at: http://www.publiclibrary.ws/world/afghanistan/introduction-afghanistan/education 
167  Until 1919 there were only four schools in Kabul as reported by “History and Problems of Education in 
Afghanistan”: https://www.shs-conferences.org/articles/shsconf/pdf/2016/04/shsconf_erpa2016_01124.pdf  
168 The information on history of schools are cited from the links above and also from Relief Web website linked here: 
https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/history-education-afghanistan  
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influential of whom were Mahmud Tarzi. Amanullah Khan still a young prince was greatly influenced by 
Tarzi’s ideas and later married his daughter Suraya. After Amanullah’s father was killed he became the 
King and started a radical modernization based on the Turkish model. As cited by Giustozzi, even “Kemal 
Ataturk himself is reported to have advised Amanullah not to proceed with radical reforms”. This radical 
reform caused many controversies and objections by religious and other groups which ultimately forced 
Amanullah Khan out to permanent exile in 1929, as discussed in chapter four. Thus, the reforms and 
education plans failed and the succeeding Afghan kings became cautious about rapid reforms and political 
power. The collapse of Amanullah’s government led to further security and political issues as discussed 
earlier, but in the education section Afghanistan started a long period of stagnation as shown in the 
following figure. The total number of students in 1961 was only 262,501 (Figure 4. Below) all over the 
country which made around 2% of the population169. There is not much information about other education 
projects around this time and in the following decade (1929-1970). However, Kabul University was the 
first higher education project which was built in the year 1932 (as a small school of medicine) and in 1946 
it started as Kabul University offering higher education in ten different disciplines (IBRD, 1964)170. It is 
hard to find any data on education other than the following data which. Zahir Khan (1933-1973) requested 
funding for school projects from the United States government, the US government sent a team to 
Afghanistan for project appraisal and their report (link in the footnote) has information regarding education 
and schooling in Afghanistan from 1950 to 1961 as shown in the following figure. 
Figure 4. Total number of students in schools and madrasas (1950-1961)
 
Data source: IBRD (World Bank) 
This figure is a construct from the numbers included in the IBRD report. This report states that in 1962 
Afghanistan had 1,500 primary schools, 114 secondary schools and only one university with ten faculties, 
the Kabul University. The number of total school enrolment was 1,300 in 1932 which increased to 100,000 
in 1950 and to 265,000 in 1962 – at the time of this report (IBRD, 1964).  This period (1950-1961) shows 
an annual growth rate in total number students of almost four percent per year. During the same period, the 
                                                          
169 Illiteracy rate in 1960s was 98% according to (Gregorian 1969, p. 184) 
170 The education statistics used here for the period 1950-1961 is draw from one source only which was a project 
appraisal report conducted by IBRD (now World Bank) for education in Afghanistan and reported in 1964. This report 
is available on the World Bank’s website:  
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/393571467995053158/pdf/multi-page.pdf  
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number of female students grew from 5,531 to 37,024 which shows an average of 7.65 percent growth per 
year and the boys number in schools grew from 92,951 to 225,477 over the same period which shows an 
average growth rate of 3.5 percent per year. As discussed earlier the literacy rate and school enrolment ratio 
in Afghanistan was already significantly below other countries in the region. These statistics include the 
estimated number of students in rural areas including students in mosques and madrasas, which means that 
formal education level may have been lower than these numbers. 
The figure 5. below shows this growth in total number of boys and girls in schools. As figure 4. above 
shows that majority of the students were primary school boys and in the secondary and tertiary levels that 
number falls significantly. The dropout ratio and pattern for every level and every province will be 
discussed later. 
Figure 5. Number of boys and girls in schools 1950-1961 (,000) 
 
Data source: IBRD (World Bank) 
According to the report, the rural schools at that time had only one teacher and offered only classes one, 
two and three and the teacher was usually the village mullah. What that means is that after finishing the 
three-class-school the students of these rural areas could not continue to higher classes, there were no high 
schools and teachers there beyond that level. We also know that going to Kabul for further education was 
difficult, not only for economic and logistic reasons but also that schools in Kabul were already short 
running with maximum capacity. The government’s request for funding of more school buildings is an 
evidence to that. Because of shortage of schools and teachers the government was trying to build more 
schools (as in this report) and asked the literate/educated government employees to also teach in schools 
and in Kabul university as part-time teachers. This shortages of resources and infrastructure in education 
sector were as late as 1960s when urban population consisted of only ten percent of the total population 
(World Bank, 2017), in other words, the remaining ninety percent of the population lived in rural areas with 
extremely limited access to formal education, which was mainly primary school level.  
Mohammad Zahir Shah who was the king from 1933 to 1973 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2017) did not 
undertake universal education programs like other countries which announced it as a national priority 
program as was suggested by the UNICEF series of conferences on education held in Karachi, Tokyo, and 
Bangkok (Elizabeth, 2006, pp. pp 589-610). Zahir Shah’s forty years rule marked the longest period of 
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“stability” in modern Afghanistan but under the surface run the massive level of poverty, illiteracy, and 
deprivation of basic rights and services for overwhelming ninety percent of the population living in rural 
areas171. As discussed in previous sections, ethnic diversity and the government of Afghanistan based on 
two principles of Afghan and Islam was the main reason, among other reasons, for lack of investment public 
goods (education). As far as education in prewar period (before 1978) is concerned, Afghanistan further 
declined towards a dark period because of the aforementioned political and religious reasons. The post-
World War II period marked the beginning of drastic change and development in successful countries of 
Asia such Japan, South Korea, Turkey, China, Singapore, and Malaysia. Elizabeth (2006) in her paper talks 
about the ‘Asian model of education for development’. The Asian Model, as Elizabeth stated, came about 
in UNESCO’s series of conferences on education first held in Karachi in 1959 and then in Tokyo in 1962 
and in Bangkok in 1965 (Elizabeth, 2006, pp. 493-594). The second half of the twentieth century marks to 
important developments in East and Southeast Asia, according to Tilak this region of the world experienced 
the highest economic growth in the world, around the same time their investment on education was also the 
highest (Tilak, 1994, p. 59).  
The UNISCO conference, as discussed in Elizabeth (2006), in Karachi emphasized more on primary 
education urging the governments to devise plans for promoting education by making it a priority for their 
national development strategy and by investing in education sector. Studies show that increase in education 
level were the highest in the rapidly growing economies of Asia, particularly in the second half of the 
twentieth century. The next Asian miracle took place in what became known as the High Performing Asian 
Economies or also the Asian Tigers including South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. The governments in 
these HPAEs actively planned and executed universal primary education policies (Tilak, 1994, p. 55). In 
early stages of development, it was recommended to adopt universal primary education (maximizing 
literacy rate) policy as it happened in these countries. Samady discusses Afghanistan’s performance based 
on the UNESCO recommended compulsory universal primary education in which Afghanistan fell behind 
and the wars of 1980s and 1990s reduced the enrolment ratio far below the target (Samady, 2001, p. 17), as 
also shown later in (Figure 12). 
Following Karachi, the Tokyo conference recommended higher levels of education relative to economic 
and population growth, a ‘balanced development approach’ (Elizabeth, 2006, p. 594). Following on Karachi 
conference which recommended universal primary education, the Tokyo and Bangkok focused more on 
higher levels of education and industrialization. This transition from agrarian economy towards 
manufacturing and industry sector as the level of education and economy grow requires ‘structural 
adjustment policy’ the term Sing used for the transitioning. “The higher education systems have been 
developed in tandem with their industrialization policies demonstrating many of the characteristics of 
planned economies, with fixed growth targets and manpower forecasting aligned to intended growth 
patterns.” (Sing, 1991, p. 398). 
Drawing from the foregoing discussion on the Asian Model it is obvious that planning and executing those 
education and economic strategies give the government a central role which may raise concerns over the 
issues of dependency on the state, efficiency of state-owned enterprise, and weak role of private sector, 
which are among the issues often associated with centrally-planned economies and the difficulty of 
transitioning to strong private sector economy. The success story of the Asian economies under 
consideration points at a relatively favorable argument for stronger government role to lead the initial stages 
                                                          
171 “Due to high levels of illiteracy (98% according to Gregorian 1969:184), the central state could not establish links 
with its rural society and, yet, continued taxing rural people for urban reforms that targeted merely the Kabuli 
population which constituted 1.8% of the total population even as far as the 1960s” (Gregorian,1969, p. 357, in (Sungur, 
2016, p. 451)). 
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of development, but it also bears the risks associated with authoritarian types of government. This is 
particularly risky for countries like Afghanistan with a dark authoritarian past institutionalized over a long 
time. Nonetheless, contrary to the common belief in democracies being better system of government for 
economic development, economic success of South Korea, Singapore, China and Taiwan did not happen 
under democratic type of governments (democracy as elected leaders for a four/five year term for example), 
on the contrary the governments in these countries are/were authoritarian or at least nondemocratic such as 
the one party system of communist China, the leading role of Lee Kuwan Yew in Singapore who was the 
first prime minister for more than thirty years (1959-1990), similarly Park Chung-hee’s leading role as 
president of South Korea (1963-1979), and Mahathir Mohammad prime minister of Malaysia (1981-2003 
and 2018-present) all of whom played the leading role in development and modernization of their countries. 
Is the success of the Asian Model due to the efficient nature of authoritarian governments because they are 
not impeded by the slow and expensive democratic processes and do not (necessarily) require (as much) 
consensus and public approval? 
It may be true that decision making and efficiency under authoritarian system may in fact be quicker and 
less expensive, simply because it does not have to wait for approval by majority of the population, however, 
authoritarianism bears great risks and trade-offs, for example, between civil rights and economic 
achievements. The role of government (a charismatic leader in the examples given) in the Asian Model was 
key, at the same time the concerns around proposing such systems is as legitimate. In addition to the 
government or charismatic leader, the role of knowledge in modern economies (knowledge society, or 
knowledge-based economy) has gained great popularity. Castells and Himanen mentioned ‘three alternative 
routes to Knowledge Society’ which include the following. The first type is the ‘open society and market-
driven type’ like the Silicon Valley in the US. The second type is ‘Authoritarian type’ like Singapore to 
which we can add South Korea and China, and the third type is ‘the Finnish model’ which is based on ‘open 
and welfare-state-based Knowledge society’ of Finland. (Castells & Himanen, 2001). In case of 
Afghanistan, although the economic and institutional issues of the country are complex and unique in its 
own way, however, knowledge-based development may be a strong bet for its long-term economic growth. 
The effect of knowledge both through its effect on institutional quality, as well as productivity, ‘cognitive 
capacity’, and improving the ‘mental models’ of individuals as was found by different studies discussed 
earlier in details.  
From the three models discussed above, the ‘open society’ model of the US and the welfare-state model of 
Finland are based on the existence -a precondition- of well-developed institutions and governments which 
evolved over centuries. The Western model in general is slow and practically difficult for a country like 
Afghanistan which is looking for a fast-tracked economic development. The Asian model, on the other 
hand, as mentioned, is quick and more efficient and has a lot to offer for Afghanistan. It barely took one 
generation for South Korea, Singapore and now China to achieve their remarkable levels of development 
and prosperity. Acknowledging the criticisms facing the Asian model of development because of the 
leading role of a central authority, efficiency and success of this model is irrefutable. This study is interested 
in education and economic development aspect of the model and therefore it believes that from this 
particular perspective, not only this model is attractive and feasible but perhaps it is the only option for 
Afghanistan’s future development as the other alternatives (European and Islamic) are not as efficient or 
successful for the reasons discussed.  As for finding the right model of economic growth, there probably is 
no right model in the world to suggest for Afghanistan, because each country has its own unique set of 
resources and challenges and each country has to go through its own phases of trial and error to find its 
unique model. This, however, does not mean that Afghanistan cannot benefit from the experiences and 
success stories of other nations. It can and should look at the successful models such as the Asian Models 
to learn from, as much as it can benefit from its own past mistakes, particularly its institutions.  
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Status of education in Afghanistan 
Afghanistan’s education sector, like all other sectors, suffered tremendously as a result of many decades of 
war and instability in the country. Despite a significant increase in the number of students, schools and 
universities after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan still is a long way behind other countries. 
Adult literacy rate in the country was only 28% in 2012 (Gharjistani T. , 2015). The literacy rate among the 
young generation is higher at 47%, but that is only half of region’s average at 91.5% (USAID Afghanistan, 
2016). Adult literacy rate in Afghanistan slightly increased to 31.87% in 2016 (from 28% in 2012) but this 
too is way behind the average in the region at 80% (USAID Afghanistan, 2016)172.  
Primary school completion ratio in Afghanistan was 29.6% and the regional average was 96.1% of (USAID 
Afghanistan, 2016). Education sector in postwar Afghanistan is often referred to as the sector more 
successful than other sectors (based on rapid increase in school enrolment ratio and school buildings), 
however, statistical comparisons reveal that Afghanistan has a long way ahead before it catches up with 
successful countries in Asia. Women education is one particular area of concern which is facing extra 
challenges due to religious and traditional practices, among other possible reasons, which reduced women’s 
share in education even more. Different sources of data show different numbers on this, for example, 
Gharjistani stated that female share of enrolled students was forty percent and male share was sixty percent 
(Gharjistani T. , 2015, p. 48). According to some other sources, for example the Central Statistics Office, 
female share of students was reported to be approximately 40 to 45 percent (CSO Afghanistan, 2014). Data 
from Ministry of Education shows the gap between male-female share in education (Figure 13.) which 
increases from primary to higher education with more girls dropping out of schools than boys. Inconsistency 
The male-female gap pattern is not the same in different regions in the country. School enrolment ratio for 
girls is comparatively lower in the southern parts of the country whereas it is higher in big cities like Kabul, 
Mazari Sharif and Herat. But one general trend in girls’ education true for the whole country is that girls’ 
participation is lower in general and their number decreases disproportionately towards higher levels of 
education, as will be shown in tables below.  
With the overall increase in number of students in postwar era, the total number of schools also increased 
from 3,400 in 2001 to 15,076 in 2014 (CSO Afghanistan, 2014), and to 15,249 in 2015 (WENR, 2016)173. 
According to the USAID’s statistics more than 13,000 new schools were built between 2002 to 2013 
(USAID Afghanistan, 2016) and the number of students also increased from less than one million to around 
eight million during the same period. Schools in Afghanistan are mainly public schools, private schools174 
were almost nonexistent until a decade ago. With the rapid increase in number of students in the postwar 
period, public schools run short of capacity to meet the high demand (because schools damaged in the wars, 
or rural people started going to school for the time ever) which became part of the reason for the beginning 
of private schools to shoulder some of the burden. Nonetheless, as many as fifty percent of schools in the 
country run without proper school buildings175 . The government allowed private schools and private 
                                                          
172 USAID in Afghanistan supports education programs and its website has data on the status of education in the 
country, it is available here: https://idea.usaid.gov/cd/afghanistan/education  
173 https://wenr.wes.org/2016/09/education-afghanistan  
174 Referring to the private schools in postwar period, not to be confused with the schools operating with the help of 
people during the war or before the war period, which could also be called private schools because technically they 
were not supported by Kabul government but by the people themselves. 
175 This New York Times report says around half the schools are without proper buildings but this Human Rights 
Watch website says forty one percent without buildings, the links are here respectively:  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/01/world/asia/afghanistan-schools-taliban.html and 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/17/i-wont-be-doctor-and-one-day-youll-be-sick/girls-access-education-
afghanistan  
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universities to open which increased the overall intake capacity of the education system but at the same 
time private sector education added serious quality and monitoring concerns. Existence of open competition 
to attract more students within private sector and between them and the public sector is a force for good as 
it is in other open market competition. Of the total 15,076 schools in 2014 about 14,475 (95%) were public 
schools and only 669 (5%) were private schools (Ministry of Education in (Gharjistani T. , 2015), which is 
still significantly small share for the private sector, thanks to free public-sector education and high poverty 
ratio. The increase in number of school graduates has also increased the number of university applicants. 
University enrollment number increased from less than ten thousand to more than hundred and twenty 
thousand between 2002 to 2013 (USAID, 2015).  
In addition to the public and private schools, there are a big number of religious schools especially in rural 
areas which are mostly unregistered and sometimes irregular, therefore it is difficult to find statistics for 
them. But often, the students from these religious schools either continue education in public schools 
simultaneously or join the public education system after finishing religious studies. Going back a few 
decades ago when there were no schools or very limited number of schools, it was the village mullah 
(clergy) in local madrasas (religious schools) who used to teach people how to read and write religious 
scripts176. Later when some schools were built, most of the students attended both the public school and 
religious school in two different shifts (morning and afternoon) or attend schools at school time (spring to 
fall) and join the religious schools in the winter when public schools are in the winter break for three to 
four months. Religious school were the local mosques (footnote) which normally existed in every village 
and town. Whereas, schools are not as numerous and therefore as accessible. For example, one school exists 
for many villages at some median location between the villages, the villages at a farther distant are also 
farther away from school, this is not some isolated and exceptional case, in fact one major reason for some 
kids not attending school is the long walk to school (the reports in the footnote has more information). 
Afghanistan still is a country of villages and there are villages which do not have any schools, the children 
in these villages have to either walk a long distance to the nearest school or simply go to the village mosque. 
Afghanistan as Muslim majority country, every student must take mandatory religious classes as part of the 
formal curriculum at schools and universities to learn about Islam. Therefore, students attend religious 
classes and madrassas in one way or the other as they move up. It is part of the reason that Islam becomes 
part of the discussion on education as it influences education in different ways. 
Gross enrollment ratio of primary schools (both sexes) was thirty-one percent in 1970, it dropped to 
seventeen percent in the war period in 1982 and was twenty two percent towards the end of the war period 
in 2001 (World Bank, 2017). After the fall of the Taliban schools reopened and people left out of school in 
war period as well as new students enrolled in schools. This led to a sudden increase in enrollment ratio to 
more than 111% in 2004 and throughout the following decade as shown in Figure 13. (World Bank, 2017) 
and (USAID Afghanistan, 2016). School enrollment ratio is the highest for primary schools and the lowest 
for tertiary schools and universities. School dropout increases with age and education/class level. Only 
61.8% of primary school students graduate (the region average is 94%) (USAID Afghanistan, 2016). 
According to a series of articles by Eight AM newspaper as well Ministry of Education website, poverty, 
cultural and religious beliefs, security, and limited capacity are among the top challenges in education sector 
(more detail below) (Fayaz, 2018) and (Ministry of Higher Education, 2016).  
The government expenditure on education was 0.6% of the GDP in 2002 (Gharjistani T. , 2015, p. 49) it 
increased to 3.32% in 2016 closing the gap with the region average of 3.87% (USAID Afghanistan, 2016). 
                                                          
176 Earliest available statistics found by this paper is (IBRD, 1964) which is used here. This report stated that the rural 
schools were normally the village mullah who taught students up to class 3 (1,2,3 only) and the number shown in 
Table 4. as ‘rural’ refers to such schools. 
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Obviously, regarding this gap between Afghanistan’s expenditure on education as compared to its region 
average, this figure comparison does not account for the gap in GDP amount of these countries and also the 
gap in existing school infrastructure and education expenses between Afghanistan and its region, which 
does not reveal Afghanistan’s large distance behind them. Afghanistan’s GDP is smaller than the countries 
in the region so its percentage spent on education is also smaller. The other important difference is the 
baseline education expenditure. Education infrastructure and facilities are less developed in Afghanistan as 
compared to the region. Therefore, even if Afghanistan is moving at the same speed as the region, it will 
still be behind other countries, only if it moves at a higher speed will it narrow the gap. The country is 
building more schools and planning to meet the Millennium Development Goal on basic education by 2023 
which aims at helping all school age children to at least finish primary education (Gharjistani T. , 2015, p. 
44) and (UNDP MDG Afghanistan, 2012).  
Moving beyond the quantitative characteristics of education in Afghanistan, a more critical concern is the 
content and system of education. The following sections will go in to more details about them, however, in 
conclusion to this section a more important issue must be restated and that is religion and education. An 
important purpose and principle of education is to instill curiosity, reasoning, critical and free thinking, and 
questioning limitlessly from early stages of life and raise a generation equipped with these skills and ideas. 
These may be the reasons for the strength and success of science, scientific methods are based on evidence 
and logic and can pass falsification and trial and error test. Perhaps the best method to measure and judge 
the success of an education system is to check how well the education system does its job in fostering the 
students with those skills and ideas. Likewise, the failure of an education system may lie in its inability to 
train the students with those skills and ideas. When this research refers to low quality of education in 
Afghanistan, it also refers to this concept. Of many methods of evaluation of education system that may 
exist in the world, as a matter of great concern to this paper is the extent of religious influence on education 
and thinking especially in Afghanistan. It is contradictory and counterintuitive to construct a successful 
education system, when the foundation of thinking and judgement is not free thinking and scientific 
reasoning. If religion or anything becomes the reason to prevent free thinking and questioning everything 
it effectively negates the very principles and purpose of education stated above in terms of curiosity, 
reasoning, critical and free thinking, and questioning and experimenting limitlessly. This is the evaluation 
method and quality control measure that this paper utilizes and proposes for Afghanistan, and that explains 
the reason for the criticism and the unique perspective. 
Increasing dropout from education system 
Almost half of the students drop out of the school for various reasons (figure 7.). The number of students 
significantly decreases from primary to secondary to high school and to higher/tertiary education. This is a 
general trend and not unique to particular region or ethnic group. However, the data below shows that 
women participation in education is more restricted in the southern and some of the eastern provinces where 
religious groups restrict women education. At the same time, other regions of the country like city centers 
and central highland regions of Hazaristan areas women participations are higher (data below in figures) 
but the overall number of students (male and female) as percentage of total population for each province 
follow a different pattern. Nevertheless, the number of students in higher education institutions significantly 
drops as shown in the figure below. There are no survey data or studies to show the reasons for the student 
dropouts. However, this paper conducted an online search for possible reasons for the high dropout rates in 
Afghanistan. The online sources include (though not limited to) articles in newspapers such as “Challenges 
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and Advancements of Higher Education in Afghanistan177” in 8AM, Ministry of Education and Ministry of 
Higher Education’s websites and other online sources such as the USAID, UNICEF, The Asia Foundation, 
and other related articles and websites some of which already added in the footnotes and the following 
footnote has more178. The main reasons forcing students out of the education system may include the 
following,  
Poverty: the recently released survey by the Central Statistics Office claims that fifty-four percent of the 
population is now living under poverty line (Etilaatroz, 2018)179. Rampant poverty in Afghanistan forces 
students out of schools and universities probably more than any other factor. Any family member who can 
contribute to the family income will have to work to survive therefore, students leave education for work 
or stay home (especially women) to minimize the family expenses.  
Accessibility: the seventy percent of population in rural areas (table 1.) live in scattered villages some of 
which are at considerable distance away from school making it difficult and time consuming for kids to 
walk the distance back and forth. This becomes even bigger challenge for higher levels of education because 
not all primary schools offer secondary and high school classes. Thus, the number of schools significantly 
drops from primary to secondary, and to tertiary level (figure 13.) making it inaccessible for remote areas. 
Joint family system: joint family is common in Afghanistan where family members stay together as long 
as the father and mother (elders) of the family are alive and want everybody together, this joint family 
system is still prevalent in most parts of the country. Joint families are big and patriarchal and 
responsibilities are divided between family members at the will and order of the elders such as farm work, 
housework, marriage, etc. which is outdated, inefficient and more expensive, which may add extra financial 
and psychological pressure on students and elders’ decision and interest often differs from the students’. 
Early marriage: early marriage is a common practice especially in rural and less educated families which 
means most of the population. Minimum legal marriage age was sixteen years (UNFPA Afghanistan, 
2016)180 and it later changed to seventeen years for girls which is below the international rate of eighteen 
years. However, this law is only on the paper and not enforced. Islamic law does not recognize a minimum 
marriage age and this is a common practice. Early marriage forces more students out of higher education. 
Women are affected disproportionately higher than men because generally married women remain at for 
domestic responsibility (house work) and raising children.  
Unemployment: unemployment rate is reported between thirty-five to fifty percent181, even people with 
education cannot find jobs. Lack of job opportunities is a double-edged sword cutting the number of 
students down because of poverty on one side and on the other side when education cannot secure a job 
then there is not much incentive and prospect for continuation of education. Afghanistan has been the 
                                                          
177 Sharif Fayez wrote a series of more than ten articles on higher education in Afghanistan posted 8am newspaper’s 
website (Dari): https://8am.af/challenges-and-advancements-in-higher-education-in-afghanistan-part-10/  
178  Education, an ideal corrupted: an assessment of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Education report at reliefweb: 
https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/education-ideal-corrupted-assessment-afghanistan-s-ministry-education  
Measuring Afghanistan’s Education Problem: An estimated 40% of Afghanistan’s children are not in school by 
Catherine Putz at The Diplomat website: https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/measuring-afghanistans-education-
problem/  
179 It was posted on the newspaper’s website here: http://www.etilaatroz.com/60431/  
180 Full report is at UNFA’s website here: http://afghanistan.unfpa.org/node/15233  
181 As reported here by Tolo News: https://www.tolonews.com/business/54-percent-afghans-live-below-poverty-line-
survey    
88 
biggest producer of refugees in the world next to Syria182, the refugees are largely young people leaving 
education for (job) opportunism abroad. 
Safety/Security: the number of security incidence has been on the rise throughout the country barely living 
any region secure. In addition to increase in violence and political instability, school targeting and 
prohibition of education by fundamentalist groups have also been increasing in the past decade, leading to 
school closure and deprivation of education for the population.  
Systemic issues: around ninety percent of all students go to the public schools (data in the following pages). 
The education system suffers from outdated curriculum, inefficient bureaucracy, corruption in the 
government and lack of proper monitoring and evaluation of schools. Schools are often underfunded and 
undersupplied. Almost all school teachers have a side job to support their families because their government 
salary is not enough for living. Together these systemic factors create additional challenges leading poor 
education quality and capacity, and reduction in school participation. 
Religion/tradition: religious belief is very strong in the country; some people do not let their children to 
attend formal schools, they send their children to religious schools or no schools at all especially the girls. 
This becomes a bigger issue for girls in higher levels of education. Other issues related to religion and 
tradition/culture were already discussed.  
Discrimination: discrimination in Afghanistan comes in all shapes and sizes like ethnic, lingual, gender, 
and class (poor versus rich). Access to education, job opportunities, public funding and investment for 
education as well as scholarships are all subject to discrimination on different grounds restricting and 
hurting education opportunities for marginalized and/or discriminated-against people. This too is a negative 
factor in equal education opportunities and school participation. 
Until an actual data becomes available, it is hard to draw a conclusion on what drives students out of schools, 
and accurate are the reports which this paper relied on to state the above reasons. However, in the time 
being these are some of the most probable reasons for the dropout, as the reports included also cover. 
Further discussion on the challenges of education and capital formation in Afghanistan are discussed below. 
The figure below shows participation rate of students from each province as percentage of the population. 
                                                          
182 The surge in refugee issues since 2001 is also reported by other sources (besides UNHCR) such as Norwegian 
Refugee Council, their links are included in this The Guardian report https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2018/jan/25/violence-forces-refugees-to-flee-afghanistan-again 
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Figure 6. Total number of students as percentage of population for each province (2016)
 
Source: Ministry of Education, Afghanistan 
This data from the Ministry of Education shows that provinces with the lowest number of female students 
are provinces of Uruzgan, Paktia, Helmand, Zabul and Kandahar. These five provinces are in the south of 
Afghanistan predominantly ethnic Pashtun. The Taliban presence in Southern Afghanistan is stronger than 
other regions and they oppose education for women, according to this data women participation in 
education is relatively weaker in this region. On the end of the diagram are provinces of Balkh, Herat, 
Nangarhar, Daykundi and Badakhshan as the top five provinces with highest female students. The top three 
are the country’s biggest cities after capital Kabul, Daikundi is located in central Hazaristan are and 
Badakhshan in the northeast. People in big cities have better access to education in general and women in 
big cities have better chances of attending schools than rural and more traditional regions. As for the school 
dropout ratio in the country, the figure below shows that there is a large gap between the two extremes of 
the spectrum. As argued before, female dropout ratio is generally higher for most provinces, although there 
are a number of provinces where male dropout is higher than female dropout. 
Figure 7. Percent of students dropping out of school from primary to high school (MoEdu, 2016)
 
Source: Ministry of Education, Afghanistan 
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The calculation of dropout ratio in this figure is such that the total number of students in primary class one 
(k-1) is deducted from the total number of students in (k-12), and then calculated as percent of total number 
of students in each province. If X percent is shown in the diagram above, then it is derived as,  
X = ((K1 students) - (K12 students) *100 / (total number of students) for each province  
Badakhshan, Badghis, Baghlan, Bamyan and Daykundi are the provinces with the lowest rate of dropouts 
whereas Zabul, Wardak, Uruzgan, Takhar, and Saripul are the provinces with the highest rate of dropouts. 
The highest female dropouts are, again, in provinces of Zabul, Paktika, Wardak, and Khost which are areas 
where women education is more restricted and extremist groups have higher presence and influence. A 
word of caution for interpreting this figure is that the data does not account for timeseries differences for 
each province to detect their trend, therefore should be interpreted with that in mind. This data only 
considers the number of students in the year 2016 and it is highly likely that provinces with higher dropout 
ratio started schools later (which actually is the case for some provinces where schools opened in later 
years) which shows greater primary students and smaller high schools, not necessarily high dropout.  
Schooling System 
Standard schooling in Afghanistan consists of twelve years (K-12) divided as 6-3-3 years for primary, 
secondary and Lycee or high school respectively (Ministry of Education, 2003)183. After finishing the 
twelve years of schooling, students take the national higher education entrance exam known as Kankor. 
Generally, majority of students apply for the four years bachelor degree in universities (colleges), some 
(mostly leftover) students also apply for two years (12+2) “semi-higher” education which are mostly 
teacher training and vocational colleges and other technical schools (more information in the footnote). The 
government of Afghanistan has two different ministries for education. Ministry of Education is responsible 
for primary, secondary, and high school (standard twelve years of general education). Ministry of Higher 
Education is a separate ministry which is responsible for tertiary and higher education in the country, as the 
names suggest. The Kankor entrance exam, bachelors, masters and doctorate (doctors not offered yet) 
degrees come under Ministry of Higher Education jurisdiction. In addition to higher education institutes 
(colleges), the so called “semi-higher” education technical schools and vocational colleges are also part of 
the higher education system, therefore, come under the Ministry of Higher Education (Nuffic, 2015)184. In 
addition to common standard subjects such as mathematics, physics, chemistry etc. Islamic studies such as 
Fiqh and Tafsir (of the Quran) and foreign language of English and one extra language subject of Dari or 
Pashtu for non-speakers/natives are part of the curriculum185.  
Higher Education  
The first higher education institution of the country was established in the year 1932 in Kabul, the Kabul 
University, offering higher education in medical studies (only). In 1946 it expanded and officially became 
the first university of the nation with nine departments/faculties 186 . Over the following decades the 
                                                          
183 This Ministry of Education (government of Afghanistan) document shows the curriculum and education system 
for primary and secondary education in Afghanistan, available at: 
http://www.ibe.unesco.org/curricula/afghanistan/af_alfw_2003_eng.pdf  
184 Education system [of] Afghanistan as compared with Dutch system: https://www.nuffic.nl/en/publications/find-a-
publication/education-system-afghanistan.pdf  
185 In addition to the provided sources, World Education News and Reviews (WENR) has similar information on 
education in Afghanistan on their website at: https://wenr.wes.org/2016/09/education-afghanistan  
186 This report by IBRD from 1964 contains the earliest statistics on education in Afghanistan and it is available on 
the World Bank’s website: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/393571467995053158/pdf/multi-page.pdf  
91 
government established more universities in some provincial centers such as Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, 
Kandahar, and Jalalabad. The exact date of establishment and other statistics on these provincial universities 
are not available. All of these universities are public universities and offer education free of charge. With 
the growing demand for higher education the public universities could not meet the rapidly increasing 
demand and that encouraged private sector to start albeit in a small scale.  
There are thirty-one public and sixty-five private (small) universities and higher education institutes in the 
country (figure below). Private universities and higher education institutes are largely for-profit private 
sector, except for American University of Afghanistan (AUAF) and Chiragh Medical School and Hospital 
(WENR, 2016).  Despite the short history of private universities, just over a decade, their number grew 
rapidly, this rapid growth reduced some of the pressure on the public higher education system. However, 
just like with private schools, there is a concern of quality control and monitoring of these for-profit private 
universities given the already limited capacity the Ministry of Higher Education as earlier reports indicated. 
These private universities are usually small institutions offering limited number of disciplines (data below). 
The most common disciplines/majors offered by these private universities are law, economics, business, 
medicine, engineering and literature. 
Figure 8. Public and private universities and colleges statistics 
 
Data source: (Gharjistani T. , 2015) and (Ministry of Higher Education, 2016) 
The term “Daneshgah” or its Pashtu equivalent “Pohanton” are commonly used for universities and colleges 
offering four-years bachelors and two-years masters or higher programs, different from the terms 
“institutes”, “technical colleges”, “vocational schools” which offer two-years “semi-higher” education. 
This paper uses the same terminologies to differentiate between higher (4+ years) and semi-higher (2 years) 
education. The total number of students in public universities were 160,781 in the year 2013 which 
increased to 17,400 in 2015. The number of students in public semi-higher institutes were 101,315. 
Although the number of private universities in 2013 was more than double of the public universities, but 
their total share of students was about twenty percent only. The remaining eighty percent of students attend 
public universities and public institutes. This clearly shows the large gap between the public and private 
higher education in Afghanistan.  
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Postwar Afghanistan also had a great number of students studying abroad, it was around twenty-five 
thousand students in 2013 of which five thousand were in India, as reported by the Ministry of Higher 
Education (Duetsche-Welle, 2013). It is not clear whether the figures include the refugees living and 
studying abroad or not. Refugee population amounts between fifteen to twenty percent of the total 
population (approximately five to seven million of the thirty-four million population). Because refugee 
issue is important in Afghanistan’s human resource discussion, later section will discuss more on refugees.  
Education and Information Technology 
One of the biggest changes in Afghanistan since 2001 was the spread of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT). Thanks to relatively unrestricted access to the internet and use of modern technology 
such as cell phone and the internet, many areas of rural Afghanistan got connected to the world via the 
internet before getting connected to the next town via road. The internet and open access to the world 
knowledge and information has profoundly impacted every aspect of people’s lives. If printing press played 
a significant role in European advancement as Zanden described earlier, the internet is playing a similar 
role in transformation of Afghanistan. Specially the new generation who are more educated grow up with 
a different culture where their behavior and belief are less influenced by traditional value system and more 
by the world. Of special importance is how outdated beliefs and values find it increasingly difficult to resist 
the forces of change. For example, being a traditional and religious society, values, knowledge, belief and 
information, which were shunned by elders and religious leaders had no chances of entering and dispersing 
in communities187. The influence of those barriers is plummeting and the new generation grow up with 
different mindset, values and behaviors. The impact of ICT is absolutely revolutionary in Afghanistan 
considering an entire society built around old traditions and belief system over generations faces a tsunami 
of new ideas, information and connection to the world. The impact of ICT on the new generation is probably 
best visible in evolution of a new generation of activists in the form of civil society and movements for 
justice and equality led by educated young people188. They do not have political and economic power in the 
government but their influence is growing exponentially189, especially among new generation and people 
who were historically ignored (at the bottom of the pyramid). This emerging power is evident from their 
organizing massive protests, forcing highest government officials (including the president and ministers) to 
get to negotiation table, doing so by bypassing the powerful leaders, all thanks to the educated population 
and use of ICT. One of the best examples of such rise was the “enlightenment movement” organized 
primarily by educated and young university students against “systematic discrimination” by the government 
which brought the biggest protest in the history of the country. Social Media was the means and platform 
of this movement (like many other similar instances) and this was broadly covered by media inside the 
                                                          
187 The bitter animosity of the Taliban and religious leaders with any means of information and technology (including 
television and computer and any means of storing or transferring information such cassette, tape, books, et cetera) is 
well-known. The most recent case is a Mullah (not officially a Taliban member) in Herat declared Jihad against media 
and many instances of declaring jihad against journalists, media, internet. One such report on Herati Mullah as titled 
“Afghan Cleric's 'Fatwa' Against Media Makes Life Even More Dangerous for Journalists” available here on Radio 
Liberity/Free https://www.rferl.org/a/afghan-cleric-s-fatwa-against-media-makes-life-even-more-dangerous-for-
journalists/29374318.html also here: http://pasbanan.com/en/islamic-clerk-in-herat-the-one-who-kills-the-reporters-
is-ghazi/  
188 “Signposting success, civil society in Afghanistan” is reported here on Reliefweb:  
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AltaiConsulting-Signposting_Success_FinalReport.pdf  
189 The above link discusses success story of emerging educated population, the following article in United States 
Institute of Peace website has a more detailed discussion on the rising educated population and civil society 
organization in Afghanistan, it is available here: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR344-A-Rough-Guide-to-
Afghan-Youth-Politics.pdf  
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country and in the world. This article by Lauren Anderson titled “Afghanistan: civility, consciousness 
versus tyranny and discrimination”190 and “how social media is changing Afghanistan”191 by Asef Hossaini 
covers more details of education and ICT in changing Afghanistan.  
The ICT revolution in Afghanistan is rapidly transforming the country, the hypothetical projection of the 
its impact could be the following. The first round of transformation is intangible but most significant which 
is change in the traditional order and value system. Afghanistan is still undergoing this transformation, 
since literacy rate and internet access is still low, with the increase in literacy and internet access in the 
coming years this phase of transformation will grow more intense. The new generation of people with more 
education and greater access to ICT will be significantly different from the previous generation in their 
belief, behavior, world outlook and priorities. This phase of the revolution and transformation will be when 
the now well-educated population make professional use of technology. Just having access to knowledge 
and information is no longer a big deal, people need to develop skills and professions with the help of 
technology to build careers and compete with other countries. Politics aside, suspicion and disgust by 
religious fundamentalists and traditional rulers against ICT is understandable in that the old order is being 
shaken and power and control system is shifting away from them. The news of attacks on schools, female 
students, bombing ICT infrastructure (towers and stations) and punishing the use of smartphones and 
computers by fundamentalist groups are common news in Afghanistan (reports in the footnote). Education 
and ICT growth even at its current rate have great potentials and have already reshaped the society. As of 
now, besides civil society and education, it is difficult to account the actual (economic) benefits of ICT in 
terms of professional use of it in economic activities such as production, designing, marketing and research 
and development. At this stage the use of ICT remains predominantly recreational and for day to day 
communication. The two main reasons for this limited use are that economic activities apply traditional 
methods and that economic sectors using advanced technology or professional skills are significantly low. 
The second reason is low literacy rate at thirty-five percent and the percentage of people with higher 
education and advanced skills is very low. Therefore, majority of the users of the internet are people who 
use it for entertainment and communication purposes. The exception is the education sector, not only the 
educated population is rapidly growing, the use of the internet for educational and institutional change as 
discussed in the civil society organizations is also growing.  
Kankor (National Higher Education Entrance) Exam 
After completing the twelve years of schooling students take the national higher education entrance exam, 
the annual Kankor exam. The result of this exam determines whether a student will go to public higher 
education or not. This is a national level exam which is very competitive (mainly due to inadequate 
capacity), the questions include all subjects taught in the school regardless of what major the applicant 
wants to study. This is a system which has been in place for a long time (outdated) with major challenges192 
some of the challenges which are drawn from related articles from the internet193 are the following, 
                                                          
190 Posted on Huffington Post website: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/lauren-c-anderson/afghanistan-civility-and-
_b_11316254.html  
191 Available on Heinrich Boll  Stiftung website: https://www.boell.de/en/2018/02/07/you-are-what-you-share-how-
social-media-changing-afghan-society and here on LA Times: http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-afghanistan-
protest-snap-story.html   
192 The challenges of Kankor exam in Afghanistan is covered by many news articles and analysts, of which this article 
on Daily Afghanistan news titled “kankor and the challenges of Afghanistan’s higher education” posted on: 
http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post_id=14913  
193 The Asia Foundation, USAID Afghanistan, UNESCO and some other organizations have education projects in 
Afghanistan and their websites contain information on the status of education which we referred to earlier. Two more 
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First, major: selection of major (field of higher education) is based on how many marks a student obtains 
in the exam. A student may be selected to study a major he/she does not like if he/she does not score the 
number of marks required for his major of interest, or if the capacity for that major is already filled by 
students with higher marks, which means that even if someone scores high marks that does not guarantee 
him/her admission.  
Second, capacity: there is not enough capacity to admit all applicants, it is the Kankor exam that filters out 
students on the basis of marks they obtain in the exam and other students will be rejected. Rejected students 
are not necessarily unqualified students, but the higher education system will accept those with higher 
marks and when the capacity is full the rest gets dropped.  
Third, specialization: students must study all subjects even in high school level. A student wanting to 
become an engineer must do as good in mathematics and related subjects as in religious texts and history 
and unrelated subjects. Even if he already determined to become and engineer early on in high school, 
he/she must study all subjects alike so that she/he gets good marks (equal marks given to all questions) in 
the Kankor exam and she/he scores high enough to qualify for engineering department, for example. The 
students do not have a choice and any time/preparation to specialize until the exam, at the exam the 
applicants write five majors in order of interest, the exam result will dictate the rest.  
Fourth, major mismatch: it is not uncommon to see students studying a major they dislike and did not 
want to study. This is because they could not score enough marks to study a certain major/field or made a 
poor selection choice on the exam day. If the student is not interested in the major, it is unlikely that he will 
do good in the studies and become good professionals out of the subject they do not like.  
Fifth, transparency: corruption and lack of transparency of the exam are another challenge. The reports 
of organized cheating in the exam and in the results have seriously undermined credibility of the exam and 
the public’s trust in it the system (Hayward & Babury, 2015) (also in the last footnote). Like high corruption 
rate in other sectors, the education sector is also affected by corruption and frauds in exams. 
There are many more quantitative and qualitative challenges such as the above examples. The paragraphs 
below will discuss some major issues in the higher education system of Afghanistan. It is generally true 
that provinces with higher number of students in schools have higher number of students in universities. 
The data on university students as percentage of provincial population shows that pattern holds true for 
most cases as shown below. 
                                                          
such articles is provided in the link above as well as in Asia Foundations website here: https://asiafoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/AG-Education-11x17.pdf and in UNESCO’s website with great details: 
http://www.ibe.unesco.org/curricula/afghanistan/af_alfw_2003_eng.pdf  
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Figure 9. Number of students in all higher education institutions from each province
 
Source: Ministry of Education, Afghanistan 
Provinces of Zabul, Nooristan, Uruzgan, Paktia and Helmand are the bottom five provinces with the lowest 
number of students in higher and semi-higher education, whereas, Bamyan, Panjsher, Balkh, Nangerhar 
and Kabul are the top five provinces with the highest number of university students, measured in percent 
of each province’s population. What was true with the rate of dropout and share of students in school period 
seems to be somewhat true in university level as well. The provinces with highest dropout in number of 
students from primary to high school continue with further dropout towards higher education, which makes 
sense because otherwise this result would become a little difficult to explain. The data on Kankor result is 
also in line with it as shown in the following figure. The figure below shows the percentage of students who 
pass the national university entrance exam (Kankor) in 2016 as percentage of twelfth grade students for 
each province.  
Figure 10. Percentage of students who passed the Kankor exam in 2016 (MoEdu, 2016) 
 
Source: Ministry of Education, Ministry of Higher Education, Afghanistan 
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The top five provinces with highest percentage of students passing the exam are Farah, Bamyan, Logar, 
Wardak and Panjshr. On the left hand are the provinces with lowest percentage of students passing the 
Kankor exam which are Nooristan, Uruzgan, Ghor, Badghis and Nimroz. This data includes all male and 
female students as well as all higher and semi-higher education applicants. This figure is constructed from 
the data on the number of 12th grade students of each province and the number of students who passed the 
Kankor exam in 2016.  
One contradiction or inconsistency with the data is shown in the case of Farah province which shows more 
than 150% rate of acceptance which is technically wrong. The reasons for this strange case may be the 
following. Error in the data is the most probable cause, as noted earlier, there are instances of inconsistency 
in the data, although this particular set of data on education is derived from the ministry directly. Other 
possible reason for the extra students is that the students who were originally from Farah province studied 
in schools outside the province like neighboring big city of Herat or in Kabul, but at the time of Kankor 
exam they registered as Farah students since they are their national ID card will register as Farah students. 
The third possibility in this case is that students who had failed in Kankor exam in previous years 
retook/reapplied for the exam the next year and that may have disproportionately increased the applicant 
numbers for the province. Of course, fraud is a common occurrence and maybe students were announced 
passed (thus included in this data) when actually they were not in the schools of Farah which could be the 
reason for high percentage of students going to higher education.  
Inadequate Capacity 
Higher education system in Afghanistan has limited capacity to absorb the growing number of school 
graduates. Around half of higher education applicants get admitted and the remaining half are dropped at 
the Kankor exam. In 2015 a total number of 219,145 students took the Kankor exam of which only 54,737 
(25%) were accepted in public universities, and 36,750 (17%) were introduced to semi-higher education 
colleges/institutes, and another 27,000 (12%) were introduced to private universities and colleges (Khaama 
Press, 2015). The remaining half (54%) were basically announced as “failed”. These numbers could be 
even higher for not all of those who are introduced to semi-higher education institutes and private 
universities will actually go and enroll. Not being accepted for the major or university of the first choice, 
the students have two options, either go and continue with what the result dictated for them, or simply 
withdraw and wait for another year or give up altogether.  
That was a quantitative account of the current shortage in higher education against increasing demand for 
higher education. To put things in perspective, the scale of this challenge will further increase considering 
the high rate of population growth and the already limited capacity. According to UNFPA around sixty-
four percent of the population is under the age of twenty-five (UNFPA, 2017), which makes Afghanistan 
(one of) the youngest population in the whole world. Which for higher education system means that even 
if they increase their capacity at the current rate of about 3%194, they will still fall short of capacity for the 
coming generation and the accumulative leftover students (for example 54% in 2016) and the high 
population growth rate of 2.7% - (2.8% according to Ministry of Higher Education document in the 
footnote). Lack of education and job opportunities for the rapidly growing young generation bears serious 
economic and political risks for the country.  
                                                          
194 According to Ministry of Higher Education document only 19% of students got enrolled in 2012 and the gross 
enrolment ratio of higher education is around 3%, this puts Afghanistan at the lowest four countries with higher 
education enrolment ratio (next to Burundi, Chand and Eretria). The full document is available here:  
http://www.artf.af/images/uploads/HESIP_PPG_Project_Paper.pdf   
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Selection of Field/Major of Study 
The number of marks obtained in the Kankor entrance exam decides the fate of a student. A student may 
end up studying a major that she does not like but the test result left her no other options. This is big problem 
with the current system of entrance exam and choice of major. For higher education system to produce 
competent workforce and professionals, it should allow and facilitate the condition for students to have the 
choice for their major based on their passion, interest, and qualifications. The current system does not give 
that option for most students because selection of major is based on the number of marks one obtains in the 
exam. The problem is that majors are ranked and tied to test scores for example the students with highest 
scores usually go to medical studies, followed by engineering, economics, law, computer science and so 
on. A student with exceptional mathematics skill, for example, may fail to enter engineering that she wanted 
because her score in other (irrelevant) subjects were poor. She may end up studying agriculture or fine arts 
which are normally ranked the lowest on the list. On the other hand, students who have a talent and passion 
for fine arts and scores high marks may not select fine arts because it is at the bottom of the list and it is 
looked down upon, she would rather choose a high-ranking major which is socially perceived as more 
valued. 
Chances of selecting a wrong major are high because on the day of the entrance exam a student has to list 
her first, second, third, fourth and fifth choices, which itself is funny because this list usually looks 
something like 1- medicine, 2- electro-mechanics, 3- journalism, 4- agriculture, 5- fine arts, or some other 
combination in descending order of marks. This list does not and cannot reflect a student’s choice, of 
wanting to study medicine, if not then electro mechanics, or may be journalism or agriculture, and finally 
fine arts is better than failing. At the time of selection at the exam desk a student might feel that the questions 
were difficult and she did not do well, she may select any major with lower marks because otherwise she 
will fail. If she is confident that she will score good marks in the exam she will choose better faculties and 
the desired major, misjudgment, overestimation or underestimation and fear about the results are all too 
common (with any test, especially in a national level exam of this importance) and that is almost a guarantee 
to getting a wrong major. In other words, some challenges of passing the Kankor exam and getting to study 
one’s major of choice may be as a result of, 
• A student’s fear of scoring low and failing, therefore chooses a major with low marks 
• A student’s miscalculation of his test performance making him mis his first choice 
• A student quitting higher education because she is accepted in a university in a distant region that 
she/he does not feel safe or comfortable or it is too far away, especially a big concern for girls. 
• A student quit higher education because he is accepted in a university where medium of teaching 
is not his mother language (Dari, Pashtu, Uzbeki languages) 
• A student does not appear for the test at all because she/he fears failing and the shame and stigma 
that failing brings with it. 
• A student cannot participate in the exam because it is usually in winter and the regions with heavy 
snow and extremely cold temperature is either impossible to travel the distance at that time or too 
dangerous. For example, a group of students from Jaghory district of Ghazni province were trapped 
in heavy snow and almost froze to death195. Students from districts have to travel to the provincial 
capital for the test with great security and safety risks in many parts of the country. 
                                                          
195 This news of 700 people trapped in snow in Ghazni province highway in 2017 was covered by Tolo News available 
here: https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/security-forces-rescue-700-people-trapped-snow-storm  
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Many such issues are related to a bad design and poor system which could be addressed by changing the 
rules for the Kankor exam, for example just changing the exam date and location would make a big 
difference. Addressing such can increase the quality, effectiveness, and public faith in the exam.  
Medium of Education 
The three major languages spoken in Afghanistan are Dari (also known as Persian or Farsi), Pashto and 
Turkic languages of Uzbeki and Turkmani. Dari is the lingua franca spoken by majority of the population 
as well as in government offices and most importantly in education. These languages are officially 
recognized and education is offered in mother language for the native speakers. Dari, Farsi of Iran and 
Tajiki of Tajikistan are essentially the same language which are mutually intelligible with one exception 
with the Tajiki’s Cyrillic alphabet being different from Arabic alphabet of Dari and Farsi. The suspicion 
against books and other printed materials has a long history as discussed earlier and Afghan governments 
of the past century were no strangers and exceptions to restriction on knowledge and information. With the 
slow growth of knowledge and high illiteracy rate in prewar period, book production industry also did not 
grow. The decades of wars further deteriorated Afghanistan’s production of books and literature, thanks to 
the common language of Farsi with Iran, Afghanistan became the biggest costumer of Iranian books and 
other printed materials outside Iran (as they are the only two countries able to read it). Pashtu the language 
of Afghans which is also spoken by over thirty million Pashtuns of Pakistan could not grow to become the 
language of modern education. The overall status of Farsi and Pashtu in academia and literature in the 
country has been in favor of Farsi by a great margin for many reasons. Dari/Farsi is spoken by more people, 
and it has been the language of poets, governments, education and arts in the region for a long time196.  
As for the Turkic languages of Uzbeki and Turkmeni in Afghanistan the speakers of this language can 
converse with the people of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan but they cannot read the Cyrillic alphabet used 
there. Thus, Dari holds relatively stronger position in education as it is the official and educational language 
of Iran and Afghanistan which give it advantage over the Turkic language (Cyrillic and Russian factor) and 
also over Pashto. Because Pashto is not a formal and educational language in Pakistan or like Dari in 
Afghanistan, Urdu is the lingua franca in Pakistan and English is a dominant language of higher education. 
Therefore, Pashto language in both countries remained relatively weak. It is true for Dari language as well 
because none of the languages in Afghanistan is updated for modern knowledge and ideas. Despite Dari 
dominating the education, media, government and functioning as lingua franca, there is a major setback for 
Dari and (higher) education. The government and academic society in Afghanistan did not upgrade the 
language for the modern science and expressions. Specially in the last few decades of information and 
technology boom in the world and war in Afghanistan, Dari is nowhere near catching up. The Iranian 
upgrades seem as foreign for Dari speakers as English, for example, especially in higher education and 
modern science, not to mention the political ramification in Afghanistan against Iranian cultural influence. 
The Afghan government is weary of the Iranian influence, there have been disputes between mainly Pashto 
speakers and Dari speakers over the use of Farsi terminologies coined in Iran197.  
This leaves (higher) education of Afghanistan in a difficult situation where none of its national languages 
in their current capacity are capable of becoming the medium of advanced knowledge and technology so 
                                                          
196 This report on Radio Free Europe has more details about why Dari is the lingua franca and more on language in 
Afghanistan https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-dari-farsi-persian-language-dispute/28840560.html   
197 One such example is the use of the Persian word of ‘Danesgha’ for university instead of ‘Pohantoon’ in Pashtu 
which caused demonstrations in many cities and in the parliament. Many such conflicts over cultural and lingual 
differences arise regularly. The following two reports provide more detail: “Afghanistan’s war of words” in The 
Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/afghanistans-war-of-words/ and “Iran’s influence in Afghanistan” in 
Rand National Security Research Division with great detail: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a606963.pdf  
99 
needed for its progress. Afghanistan has two possible choices, either improve/upgrade the national language 
that could translate and localize foreign knowledge for domestic use or choose a foreign language for higher 
education – English for example - like India and Pakistan.  
Speaking of the national languages, Dari has greater potential to upgrade and modernize for the reasons 
stated above, and also because Dari has relatively larger and richer literature and it is most commonly used 
language in the country. Given these issues, the medium of higher education in Afghanistan remains a 
roadblock to effectively benefit from the world knowledge at a time when knowledge has never been 
accessible so easy. Former president Hamid Karzai (2001-2014) once proposed about making English as 
the language of higher education (medicine and engineering in particular), but like many other empty words 
nothing materialized. There is a trade-off between the benefits and losses in upgrading the national language 
or choosing an advanced foreign language for higher education in the country. For example,  
Benefits of education in mother language: 
• Cultural, historical and political benefits, and national pride 
• Mother language carries meanings and feelings that no other language can replace 
• Understanding in mother language can significantly be more effective than a foreign language 
because of learning, understanding, and using/expressing is all in mother language 
• Independence and less vulnerable to foreign influence 
• Long term gain from homegrown knowledge and culture 
Benefits of education in foreign language (for example English): 
• Access to the world of knowledge, technology and information 
• No need for translation, direct access to readily available knowledge 
• Meanings are not lost in translation 
• Cost-effectiveness (no need to upgrade the national language and translate) 
• Quick solution and short-term gain 
As the level of education in Afghanistan is increasing and more and more students pursue higher education, 
the issue of the medium of higher education in the country is getting serious. There is no indication of any 
meaningful policy or undertakings to improve national/mother language in order to prepare for importing 
and localizing of foreign advanced knowledge. A great number of students from Afghanistan study abroad. 
And also, millions of Afghan refugees and migrants live in many different countries and get education in 
foreign languages. As of now, there is no common language capable of transferring all those foreign 
knowledge for domestic use. This is a period of great chaos and confusion for high-tech knowledge in 
Afghanistan. On the one hand, foreign knowledge is not directly usable because it is not established and 
not officially accepted. On the other hand, national languages are uncappable to translate and localize the 
knowledge for effective and meaningful use in their current status.  
Other developing countries also adopted one of these two policies, they either improved their mother 
language and translate and localize the foreign knowledge like China, South Korea, Japan, and Turkey. Or 
let the foreign language become a national language or second language and become the medium of higher 
education in the home country, like English language in India, Pakistan, Singapore or Russian language in 
central Asian countries. The government and the people of Afghanistan have to decide on which language 
they want to choose for their higher education. This is important because the foundation of higher education 
and advanced knowledge will prove vital for the country’s economic development. This requires a 
modernized language that can fulfil the much-needed transfer of high technology and know-how and 
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accumulation of knowledge and dissemination of it for the population. To end this section, it seems that 
countries which upgraded their own language perform better in education and technology such as the first 
group of countries mentioned, while the countries adopting a foreign language perform relatively poorly 
(except for Singapore), although there many countries such as the Arab World which do not follow this 
argument, nonetheless, this could be a good topic for more research.  
Content 
Concerns around the content of higher education curriculum come from two distinct sources. Firstly, the 
current curriculum does not help effective human capital formation as it is outdated and cannot fulfil the 
nation’s need for modern skills and education. The content of formal higher education in the country has 
not been upgraded for a long time. The ministry of higher education once announced the plan for upgrading 
and modernizing higher education curriculum under the program called “National Higher Education 
Strategic Plan 2010-2014” NHESP and Higher Education System Improvement Project, HESIP198 2014-
2019. Both NHESP and HESIP, as well as Ministry of Education’s NATIONAL EDUCATION 
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN (NESP) 199  aim at increasing access, improving quality, 
increasing autonomy (decentralize) of the education system in general, and improving transparency of the 
Kankor exam. These programs have had some success in increasing access to higher education, for example 
enrolment increased from 54,683 in 2008 to 130,195 in 2013 (Hayward & Babury, 2015, p. 19). However, 
apart from increased enrolment, in which private universities also played a role, improvement of the content 
and type of higher education curriculum remains marginal. The Ministry of Higher Education’s plan about 
a major “curriculum review” and “content improvement” had some success, according to Hayward and 
Babury’s article, by 2014 around half of the curriculum was reviewed, improved and rewritten for the first 
time in decades (Hayward & Babury, 2015). There remain serious challenges to improving education in 
Afghanistan, one such challenge according to Hayward and Babury is that “continuing war, corruption, and 
mismanagement has led to a loss of trust and hope for many students who wonder if there is a future for 
them. The enthusiasm and optimism we saw in 2003 has turned to an almost universal distrust of the 
government”  
Secondly, the conflict between modern ideas and knowledge with deep-rooted religious beliefs and 
traditional values in Afghanistan is as significant of an issue, as discussed earlier under Islam. This is a 
serious concern for modernization of higher education in Afghanistan because religion and traditions have 
been challenging reforms in the past (in Afghanistan and in the Muslim World). Introduction and 
application of foundational knowledge from abroad without adaptation to the local situation may have 
greater repercussions and could face rejection like in 1920s and 1980s when the Islamists and other forces 
opposed the reforms which they perceived as threat to their belief and traditions. The earlier proposition of 
modernizing the national language for advanced education becomes more important in this context. 
Modernized mother language may prove helpful in at least three different ways, in addition to the foregoing 
discussion on the topic. First, modernized national language will translate modern ideas and introduce them 
                                                          
198 HESIP was a project plan for 2014-2019 by the government of Afghanistan to the reconstruction fund (ARTF) to 
increase capacity, improve governance (management), upgrade and modernize the system and the content of higher 
education in Afghanistan, among some other plans included in the document. The full article is available here: 
http://www.artf.af/images/uploads/HESIP_PPG_Project_Paper.pdf  
199 Like HESIP and NHESP for higher education, the education section also introduced plans such as National 
Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan to improve the education system, however as the challenges of education 
and higher education (illiteracy rate, dropout ratio, male-female gap, corruption, ghost schools…) as discussed here 
show the limited success of both education and higher education in Afghanistan. This is the link to the full NESP 
program under Ministry of Education:  
http://www.unesco.org/education/edurights/media/docs/775f72e7f059ade843d342d49d63dde1b3fbb6ad.pdf  
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for the education system and scientific community in the country by observing the needs and sensitivities 
of the host society, hence on the one hand it reduces the risk of confrontation with the beliefs and traditions, 
and on the other hand it will better reflect and fulfil the domestic needs for advanced higher education as 
compared to a foreign language. Second, new ideas and knowledge interpreted and introduced through 
certified channels into national language is more or less uniform and thus is less likely to cause confusion 
and misunderstanding, as opposed to possible contradicting interpretation and understanding of foreign 
language by different people in the home country. Although the risk of mistranslation or losing the original 
content in the translation process is also a relevant problem to mention. Third, advanced knowledge and 
education in mother language can create a foundation which then can better facilitate future expansion and 
improvement of homegrown knowledge and ideas. The expansion of knowledge has more potentials in 
mother language as it becomes readily available and usable for the entire literate population without the 
need of knowing a foreign language.  
Data and Methodology 
As noted in the previous chapter, due to unavailability of reliable data on Afghanistan conducting 
quantitative analysis is extremely difficult. The aim of this paper initially was to measure the impact of 
human capital formation on economic growth in Afghanistan using quantitative methods, however, with 
Afghanistan’s GDP statistics being inconsistent and heavily influenced by foreign aid, data analysis did not 
produce any meaningful results. Quantitative measurement of the impact of education on economic 
development requires a longer timeseries data to account for the time lag between increase in education 
(the control variable initially considered in this paper) and its actual effect on economic growth when 
students graduate and join the workforce. This timeseries data on Afghanistan is not available. The data 
available on Afghanistan’s education and GDP belongs to the postwar economy which was mainly built on 
foreign assistance. The data for the war (1980-2001) and prewar periods is not available. The available data 
is not good enough for standard econometric (regression) analysis therefore the alternative method is to 
conduct qualitative and descriptive analysis of the data and information. This research analyzes school 
enrolment ratios particularly since 1970s which is available on the World Bank website as well as on the 
Ministry of Education’s website and other miscellaneous sources. The following sections will start with the 
earliest available data and after that compare school enrolment ratio in Afghanistan with other developing 
countries in Asia. It is important to remember the main theme of this paper in the following discussion, 
which was the challenges of institutional development in ethnically diverse country. Afghanistan with the 
lowest level of education and economic growth in Asia in most of the past century particularly in postwar 
era is better understandable in the context of its ethnic diversity and politics as well as political Islam both 
of which form the foundation and backbone of the Afghan state and therefore it may be a leap forward in 
understanding the issues of development, education in particular, in the country.  
Descriptive Data Analysis 
The earliest report on education in Afghanistan is the 1962 educational report by Cowen and McLean. This 
report contains some important topics and information. As per this report, in 1964 the quality and quantity 
of education in Afghanistan was poor and had already fallen behind the regional average. According to 
Cowen and McLean, literacy rate was only fifteen percent at the time of their study (Cowen & McLean, 
1983). Afghanistan’s education system suffered from corruption and was not capable of training the 
students to development standard skills and critical thinking and according to their report the student 
assessment was only a “work of memory” not understanding and learning. The education system was not 
teaching basic skills and knowledge that could benefit the market and the economy in any effective manner. 
The qualitative aspect of the education system in Afghanistan until this time was poor even in a regional 
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level and more than eighty percent of the population were illiterate200. The formal education was open only 
for certain group of people mostly in Kabul and there is not much information about the government’s plan 
for universal education outside the cities throughout the prewar period (1880-1978). Th reasons for the 
Afghan government’s disinterest in universal education were already discussed in terms of discrimination, 
fear of knowledge and awareness, religion and tradition, and underinvestment in public goods.   
The report by Cowen and McLean shows that the highest number of students were male students in primary 
school levels. The female rate of participation in education was marginal and far below that of male students. 
Nonetheless, the statistics show a growing trend in both male and female students in later years. Primary 
schools in rural areas did not have female students until 1955 and vocational technical schools do not have 
any female students as late as 1958 as shown in the following table.  
Table 2. First available data on formal education in Afghanistan 
Source: IBRD project appraisal report, Afghanistan education, 1964 
*Rural: refers to schools in rural areas, each school has one teacher and offers three classes of one, 
two and three only, part of the reason for the dropout in enrolment ratio from primary to secondary. 
                                                          
200 Earlier figure on illiteracy level cited by Sungur from Gregorian (added in the next footnote) put illiteracy level in 
1960s at around 98% which is higher than the 80% stated here, although they may refer to different years, but the 
years are not that far apart as both of them reported it within the same decade 1960s which makes it doubtful. One 
possibility is that 98% illiteracy rate was for female population and 80 percent total or may be the male population. 
Some sources (for example in ‘Islam its law and society’ by Jamila Hussaini (2011, p. 82) reported female illiteracy 
rate in Afghanistan at around 98%, which may explain the discrepancy. Female literacy in 2015 was only 24.2% (CIA 
World Factbook) against 52% male which indicates the literacy rate gap between male and female has been high and 
probably the 98% versus 80% illiteracy in 1960s were also referring to female and male illiteracy level respectively.  
 
  
Rural* Primary Secondary Lycee (High) Vocational 
Total 
Year Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
1950 885 0 86323 5048 2141 202 723 81 2879 0 98282 
1951 6667 0 86882 5904 1959 240 824 74 2829 0 105379 
1952 9612 0 87662 6828 2288 407 885 59 2894 0 110635 
1953 12762 0 85993 7977 2928 568 911 80 3047 0 114266 
1954 14978 0 87635 9036 4018 763 825 124 2953 0 120332 
1955 16421 0 96065 10012 3705 881 900 188 3451 0 131623 
1956 21744 153 97457 11025 4103 1127 1085 251 4939 0 141884 
1957 23725 224 106007 12022 4981 1427 1266 299 4427 0 154378 
1958 25670 1091 109701 14149 5680 1606 1679 353 4897 0 164826 
1959 32505 1597 123220 18342 6936 1830 1855 468 4895 247 191895 
1960 39463 4659 145514 24045 8748 2431 2287 628 5847 275 233897 
1961 45405 4753 161085 28405 10211 2868 2297 727 6479 271 262501 
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The total number of student in the country increased from 98,282 in 1950 to 262,501 students in 1961. This 
shows an increase of average of ten percent per year across the period. The total number of students reported 
for the rural areas is approximately fifty thousand students in 1961, whereas the rural population well 
exceeded eighty percent201 of the total population. The number of students in rural areas comprises less than 
twenty percent of the total students in 1961. This shows a huge disparity on three levels. The first level is 
Afghanistan’s overall literacy rate of fifteen percent was the lowest in the region (Figure 15.). The second 
level is the large gap between rural and urban (basically Kabul) population. And the third level is gender 
gap, rural female students were (still are) largely out of school. This structure of multilayered inequality 
has been the hallmark of Afghan government and society in the past century, and more importantly, this 
structure remained similar in the postwar society of Afghanistan. The gap between rural and urban, male 
and female, Afghan and non-Afghan and the increasing gap between rich and poor remain higher and are 
prevalent issues even in postwar Afghanistan. These issues should be studied in the context of institutions 
failing to protect against such deviations.   
There is not much available data on education for the following decade (1960 to 1970). This decade is a 
decade of silence before tsunami marking the last decade of the one century of Afghan monarchy. However, 
this decade itself did not witness any major political or educational changes. The data and information for 
the next period (1970 onwards) show that the trend from previous decades continued without any notable 
change. This steady and slow progress in education continued until the war (1978), even though there was 
a change in government in 1973. Mohammad Daoud ousted King Mohammad Zahir and declared 
Afghanistan as a republic in 1973. This regime change did not alter the education trend in any noticeable 
manner. The data (below) on school enrolment ratio shows that until the war against the Soviet invasion in 
1982202, the school enrolment ratio continued the increasing trend until 1982.  
Figure 11. Pre-war statistics of formal education in Afghanistan
 
Source: The World Bank Country Data, Afghanistan 
                                                          
201 Cited by Sungur (2016, p. 451) from Gregorian stated that Afghanistan’s illiteracy rate was 98% (Gregorian 1969, 
184) and Kabul population consisted “1.8% of the total population even as far as the 1960s” (Gregorian 1969, p357)”. 
202 The report of first round of attack on the Soviet troops took place in north and south of Kabul (Parwan and Logar 
provinces) different reports give different account of casualties, but 1981 and 1982 are the start of major resistance 
against the Soviet. There are also report of people fleeing to neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran starting in 
these years. (Alan Taylor, 2014), (Cold War Musuem, 2016) and the above data picks the sudden fall in enrolment 
ratio on 1982, which coincides with the start of the wars 1981-1982. 
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There are three points to note from this data on education. First, the enrolment ratio in 1970 was sixty-one 
percent for male students and sixteen percent for female students, in about a decade it increased to ninety-
five and thirty-eight percent respectively. Although there was an increase in the overall primary enrolment 
ratio it was still very small as compared to the region (figures below). Second, the enrolment ratio suddenly 
falls from primary to secondary and to tertiary levels despite the overall increase in that period. The data 
suggests that education in Afghanistan was still stagnated in primary school level and that participation of 
women in education and therefore in the workforce was insignificant and marginal. Third, the data does not 
show whether the primary education numbers include the rural schools or not, which we know from the 
previous reports that most, if not all, of those schools were one-teacher and three-class schools. Judging 
from the sudden drop in enrolment ratio, the data probably includes the rural schools. The big drop from 
primary to secondary school is probably because of the primary schools (mostly in rural areas) offered 
education only until class three or in other words did not offer secondary school classes. That could be 
reason for the big drop in secondary and even more in tertiary levels of education.  
The sudden decline of enrolment ratio in the year 1982 was because of the war against the Soviet invasion. 
President Dawood (1973-1978) was replaced in a soviet-backed communist coup led by Noor Mohammad 
Taraki203. This was the start of the soviet invasion (1979-89) of Afghanistan and the civil war that lasted 
until the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The disparity in education between rural and urban (Kabul) 
and also between man and women continued relatively with similar proportion as before. This gap/disparity 
improved in postwar period with increased participation of rural and women population in education in 
most parts of the country as shown in the following figure.  
The data on school enrolment ratio has detected the impact of the wars accurately. The start of the war 
against the Soviets forces in 1982 is shown in the figure below as a sudden drop. Following the 1982 shock 
there was a slow recovery under the communist government until 1988. The civil wars of 1989-1995 and 
the following wars with the Taliban until 2001 brought the education system completely down as the 
schools closed and millions of people fled the country. Knowing that the educated population in the data 
predominantly consisted of the city (Kabul) population where intensity of war was the highest. A population 
movement that was not detected by the data is dislocation of the educated population from the cities to rural 
areas or to other countries. Population movement has important implications in terms of human capital and 
knowledge transfer to the host areas as well as the issues related to refugees and human capital which will 
be discussed shortly.  
The extreme shock to education system came under the Taliban as they effectively cancelled the education 
system, banned all non-Islamic education which essentially meant everything that is not related and allowed 
by the Taliban. The Taliban shutdown the schools in areas they controlled and only let male students to 
study mostly religious texts. Since the Taliban did not control the whole country, schools in non-Taliban 
areas remained open. The population movement and the refugees going back and forth in neighboring 
countries brought new ideas, books, and other printed materials in rural areas which in some areas of the 
country (for example in central Hazaristan) spread knowledge and information and led to opening of new 
schools. The population movement has been remarkably significant in knowledge transfer and demographic 
change as there probably is no family in the country which was not dislocated in the past decades (more on 
refugees below). There is no data on how many schools opened and closed during the war period, however, 
the foregoing story and the following figure may well reflect the education trend throughout the country.  
                                                          
203 A timeline and detail of the events during this period is available here on the BBC website: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12024253 
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Figure 12. school enrolment ratio 1970-2015.
 
Data source: The World Bank country data, Afghanistan 
The three distinct periods are clearly reflected in the figure above. Pre-war era (until 1982), the Soviet 
invasion and the civil war era (1982-1992-2001) and the US invasion era (2001 and after). The decades of 
war not only reduced the enrolment, it also destroyed the infrastructures and by the end of the Taliban era 
in 2001 there were virtually no schools and universities left throughout the country. The numbers shown 
for the war period consist of the schools in non-Taliban areas and religious schools and madrasas in the 
Taliban areas. The areas under their control varied in time and girls’ education was strictly prohibited under 
the Taliban rule. This is also visible in the figure; female education came to a complete stop and only 
religious schools remained open for men under the Taliban rule. The data used to construct the above figure 
are drawn from sources like the World Bank, and Ministry of Education of Afghanistan. For some years in 
the period (1982-2011) data was missing, the missing spots were simply calculated as the logarithm 
(percentage difference) of the values from the neighboring years to catch the trend. Postwar period has 
better data and figure 13. below has exact numbers for the enrolment ratio.  
Besides wars and invasions, one of the most important outcome of the war period with regards to education 
and human capital was the refugees. Population movement happened in many different directions 
depending on the location of wars. People moved inside the country and outside the country in neighboring 
countries as well as to more distant locations as will be discussed below.  
Refugees and Human Capital 
With breakout of the wars millions of people fled the country majority of whom became refugees in 
neighboring Pakistan and Iran. According to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) data204 
published in 2001which shows the number of refugees from 1980 to 2000, there were 1.5 million refugees 
                                                          
204 This data is available on UNHCR website as well as in Reliefweb at: 
https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/unhcr-afghan-refugee-statistics-10-sep-2001  
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in Iran, 2 million in Pakistan, 100,000 in Russia, 29,000 in central Asian republics, 36,000 in Europe, 17,000 
in the west and 13,000 in India totaling to 3.7 million refugees, and around one million internally displaced 
at that time. This number changed constantly as more people moved back and forth and some more refugees 
added in the following years. The number of repatriates from Iran and Pakistan between 1988 to 2000 
according to UNHCR were 4.6 million205 people, however the outflow of refugees into these countries also 
did not stop. On and off, an estimate of one to three million refugees fled to Iran and an estimate of two to 
four million refugees fled to Pakistan between the years 1982-2001. The primary destinations of most of 
these refugees were Pakistan and Iran in the neighborhood. Once in these two countries a small percent of 
the refugees who could afford or knew of better destinations left Iran and Pakistan for a third destination. 
This group of refugees were mainly the educated ones who migrated to more distant and more prosperous 
countries such as the US, Canada, and countries in Western Europe as well as Russia, as the number showed 
above. According to UNHCR “in all, during 2001, Afghans applied for asylum in at least 77 countries 
across the world”. However, majority of the refugees remained in Iran and Pakistan. With political 
instability continuing for over three decades (1982-2001-present) a new generation of refugees are born in 
exile and raised with a different culture and in different environment. Since an overwhelming majority of 
them remained in Iran and Pakistan as illegal immigrants and refugees, majority of them were not allowed 
to join the education system. The data on what percent of refugees got to schools in the host countries is 
unknown. The main point in here is that some immigrants (returnees) who attended schools and universities 
abroad occupied important government positions upon their return in the country in postwar period.  
Ministers in the first and second governments (2004-2008-2012) were predominantly returnees most of 
whom had degrees from abroad. Reviewing biographies of over a hundred government officials (mostly 
ministers) show that majority of them had their bachelor degree from Afghanistan (mostly Kabul) before 
the war. Twenty six percent of them had degrees (masters or Ph.D.) from the US, eleven percent had a 
degree from the UK, five percent from each of the countries of Germany, Pakistan and Egypt. One minister 
had a degree from Iran, one from Canada, and one from Lebanon. This list is not inclusive of all ministers, 
the data was extracted from their resumes available online, those ministers whose resumes were not 
available are not included in this list. 
An online research of resumes and biographies of thirty-two ministers in the governments of (2012-2016-
2018) show that seventeen (53%) of them had their bachelor degrees from Kabul, two (6%) from the UK, 
five (16%) from the US, four (12%) from Pakistan, another four (12%) from India, Iran, Australia and 
Russia (one from each country). Of thirty-two ministers with a master or Ph.D. degree from abroad, six 
(19%) had their degrees from the US, three (9%) from the UK, two (6%) from Pakistan and six (19%) other 
ministers had their degrees from Russia, India, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Iran (one from each 
country). Again, not all ministers are included in this sample, but the percentages in these two samples 
show that graduates from the US rank higher in number of ministers followed by the UK, Pakistan, 
Germany and other countries. Taking an average of age for ministers around fifty years, almost all of these 
ministers were born before the war and had their school and bachelor degree education inside the country 
as shown above. Postgraduate degrees were obtained outside the country particularly during the decades of 
war. Upon their return in post-war era, their education and skills were scarce and precious human resource 
                                                          
205 The document in the following link on UNHCR website shows that 3.5 million refugees returned from Iran and 
Pakistan after 2001, however it is unknown whether the 4.5 and 3.5 million stated here overlap or they are counted as 
pre-2001 and post-2001. Although the later document clearly states that 3.5 million repatriates were after 2001, put 
together this number jumps to 8 million repatriates which seems a very big number. However, accounting for the non-
stop cross border travelling between Afghanistan and its neighbors, it is possible that this number is accurate. 
http://www.unhcr.org/subsites/afghancrisis/421316072/afghan-refugee-statistics.html  
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for the country. This is also true for other refugees who returned and work for NGOs and GOs inside the 
country.  
The biggest population of refugees (still) live in Pakistan and Iran and it needs separate explanation. These 
refugees have tougher situations than in other countries, however, the refugees in Pakistan had relatively 
better access to education as compared to refugees in Iran. Refugees in Iran had better access to labor market 
(unskilled construction works) as compared to Pakistan because the overall economic condition and 
employment is better in Iran than in Pakistan. Being refugees in both of these countries mean that they are 
considered and treated as illegal immigrants/residents in the country and therefore have limited (or no) 
access to education and formal job market. For example, refugees in Iran are prohibited from getting 
education, buying property, and even in some provinces refugee movement is outlawed206. Iranian schools 
do not admit refugee children and even homerun private schools for refugees are not recognized. A tiny 
number of refugees pay their way into Iranian education system but majority of them even those born in 
Iran remain illegal and uneducated. The Iranian political system and the international sanction on Iran made 
it difficult for international (humanitarian) organizations to support schools for refugees. However, the 
refugees in Iran had better chances of earning livelihood through working in construction sector and 
unskilled jobs as compared to Pakistan which suffers from higher unemployment. Refugees in Pakistan had 
access to schools for refugees as well as to some Pakistani education facilities which show relative 
flexibility towards the refugees (for example a refugee may earn a permit). As a result, the approximately 
three million refugees in Pakistan were more educated as compared to the approximately two million 
refugees in Iran.  
The language of education in Iran is Persian which is the same as the official language of Afghanistan, they 
are mutually intelligible to most refugees in Iran, which means that it was easier for these refugees to get 
education and integrate easily. The language of education in Pakistan is Urdu and English both of which 
are foreign to the refugees. Learning English made it easier for these refugees to learn computer which 
increased their chances of finding jobs after their return to postwar Afghanistan. Obviously, the refugees 
(especially their second who enjoy equal rights and opportunities) in developed countries had better access 
to education and living conditions. The refugees in all these different countries received education in each 
country’s respective national language. Being refugees and migrants for four decades, their new generations 
grow increasingly unfamiliar with their mother language and culture which make it more and more difficult 
for the home country to benefit from the knowledge and skills they acquire abroad. This is especially true 
in the case of Afghanistan where education level is substandard and the national languages are not 
modernized to a level capable of translating modern ideas and knowledge for the local population.  
The returnees educated in Pakistan mostly understand English and computer and therefore in the post-
Taliban era most of the NGOs and other international organizations hired them, whereas returnees educated 
in Iran are fluent in Persian and not as popular candidates for those jobs, however, they dominate the media 
and literature (books and printed materials) sector where Persian language is more important than English 
                                                          
206 recently as the news of Afghan refugees went viral on social media, activists inside and outside Iran advocated 
for government of Iran to allow refugees to attend schools. This news article on RadioLiber titled “Class act: 
Iranians campaign to allow Afghan refugee kids into school” posted on: https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-afghanistan-
refugee-children-school-access-policies-campaign/28712296.html   
This Human Rights Watch article titled “unwelcome guests: Iran’s violation of Afghan refugee and migrant rights” 
shows the provinces in Iran where refugees are banned to enter: https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/11/20/unwelcome-
guests/irans-violation-afghan-refugee-and-migrant-rights  
and similar report on the Guardian website covers other issues such as refugees not allowed to schools, buying 
property, joining legal workforce, marrying et cetera: https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-
blog/2014/sep/05/iranthe-afghanistan-refugees  
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or other languages. As far as the government sector is concerned, the US-backed government of Kabul was 
established in 2001 predominantly by the former Mujahedin warlords and some technocrats from previous 
governments (of communist era). The educated returnees became demanded employees most of whom were 
absorbed by the NGOs and international organizations (e.g. embassies) in Afghanistan as they paid higher 
salary than the public sector. The public sector suffered from insufficient educated workforce. This, 
therefore, did not benefit the new government as much. The public sector has been conducting various 
capacity building programs for its employees such as trainings, scholarships and other capacity building 
programs. The process of training and raising the capacity government employees have become difficult 
for various reasons. The most important reasons are increase in violence and political instability, high 
corruption, ethnic-based (versus merit-based) employment and so on. The overall employment condition 
has been worsening as the job market plummeted in recent years, this situation not only discourages more 
refugees to return, but more importantly more people flee the country. In the last few years (2014-2017) 
Afghanistan produced the highest number of refugees in the world after Syria. This is a large-scale brain-
drain from Afghanistan for the second time period after the wars of 1980s and 1990s.   
As far as education and development is concerned, in addition to the apparent security challenges, the 
problem of modernization of education (system and curriculum) and language may become vital for the 
country’s future. If the situation improves and refugees return with knowledge, skills and ideas, 
communication may become the most important issue for effective transfer and application of their 
knowledge. Even in the current situation the students and government officials who study abroad and return 
to the country face immense communication issues not only between mouth to mouth but as importantly in 
written format. Modernization of the national language(s) is important in transmitting and diffusing modern 
knowledge and idea inside the country specially for Afghanistan with a big diaspora and non-modernized 
national languages.  
The postwar period started with a sudden increase schooling after a period of school shutdown. The postwar 
period also attracted a great number of the refugees to return and school enrolment rapidly increased as 
shown in the figure below. After the war period there has been a remarkable increase in education and 
school building. It is estimated that in 2001 there were around one million students, almost all male students, 
which rose to more than nine million in 2015, thirty-nine207 percent of whom were female students (USAID 
Afghanistan, 2016). 
                                                          
207 The percentage of female students may vary from 35 to 43 percent depending on different sources, however, the 
overall number of female students in higher education levels drops disproportionately higher than male students as 
shown before. 
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Figure 13. school enrolment ratio under the new government (post-war period, 2001-2015)
Source: The World Bank, MoEdu, Gharjistani 
Starting from 2001 as the end of the Taliban regime, school enrolment ratio rapidly increased. As can be 
seen in the figure above, primary male enrolment ratio experienced the highest growth of over hundred 
percent for the entire period followed by primary female students and then secondary school students. The 
enrolment ratio drops from primary to tertiary levels especially for female students. Tertiary enrolment ratio 
for female students rose from zero percent in 2002 to only four percent in 2015 while for the male students 
it rose from five percent in 2002 to fourteen percent in 2015. The previous section showed that the rate of 
drop out of school rises from primary to tertiary and more so for women, this figure shows that just like the 
dropout ratio, enrolment ratio decreases from primary to higher education, both of which reduce the number 
of higher education students significantly. Among the reasons explained for the dropout rate, the biggest 
reasons might be the inadequate capacity of higher education system as every year only half of the students 
are accepted for the public universities and the other half gets filtered out in the Kankor exam. The following 
section covers school enrolment ratio and the overall comparison of education in Afghanistan with selected 
developing countries in Asia. This section will be followed by the conclusion as the last chapter for the 
study.  
Education in Afghanistan as compared to selected Asian countries  
Compared to other developing countries in Asia, Afghanistan has the lowest literacy rate at less than forty 
percent (figure 14.). The increase in school enrolment ratio in the postwar period increased literacy rate 
among younger population while the decades of war left higher rate of illiteracy among now-adult 
population. The adult and youth literacy rate in Afghanistan is 31 and 47208 percent respectively showing a 
clear gap between the two generations. An important observation in literacy rate is that Afghanistan’s 
literacy and primary education were well below other countries under study before the wars which means 
that blaming the wars for high illiteracy is not entirely true, it could also mean the exact opposite that high 
                                                          
208 The source of this data is the same as the figure, the World Bank data on education, 2015. 
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illiteracy rate for decades before the war could have been one of the reasons for the wars209. As discussed 
earlier, universal primary education was a prime target for human capital formation in Asia after the Second 
World War. The decades after the second World War witnessed a dramatic increase in literacy rate and 
universal (primary) education, particularly successfully implemented in the so called Newly Industrialized 
Countries of Asia, some of which are included in the data below. The data and information available for 
Afghanistan show that around the same period (post-World War II) Afghanistan did not apply the universal 
education like other countries in the region and education remained predominantly in the cities, judging 
from the schools built in Kabul and lack of schools and investment in education in rural areas where 
overwhelming majority of the population lived (still do). 
Afghanistan was under the forty years rule of Zahir Shah (1933-1973) and the school enrolment ratio grew 
incredibly slow in this period as compared to other countries. In the last decade of his rule around 1970s 
for which the data is available, Afghanistan was already far behind in literacy rate and school enrolment 
ratio as shown in figure 15. Gross enrolment ratio for Afghanistan’s primary education in 1970 was only 
31% whereas other countries which started relatively on par with Afghanistan or even below Afghanistan 
in 1920s had already reached around 90% level in 1970s. The only other country under study in this paper 
is Pakistan which was also below other countries at around 50% until 1970s. Right before the start of wars 
in Afghanistan in 1980s, gross enrolment ratio of primary schools for Afghanistan and Pakistan were close 
at 44 and 49 percent respectively, while the rest of the countries in the group had reached 80 to 100% 
percent in 1970s thanks to their early start in 1950s and 1960s. As shown in figure (14) below is that 
Afghanistan and Pakistan are the two countries of the region with the lowest literacy rate today, and the 
former Soviet Union members and Maldives, Turkey, China, Malaysia and Vietnam have the highest 
literacy rate in the developing countries of Asia.  
Figure 14. Adult literacy rate plotted against GDP per capita for developing countries of Asia 
 
Source: The World Bank 
                                                          
209 This argument was discussed earlier that studies found that education reduces chances of violence, therefore, high 
illiteracy rate in Afghanistan could have contributed to the wars. 
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The adult literacy of developing countries included in this figure shows that countries with lower literacy 
are also the countries with lower GDP per capita. The figure above is a simple scatterplot of GDP per capita 
in current USD in 2015 on the horizontal axis and adult literacy rate on the vertical axis. Adult literacy rate 
of Afghanistan is thirty-one percent and its GDP per capita is $569 which is the lowest in the group below 
Nepal and Pakistan the other two lowest countries in the group. The countries with the highest literacy rate 
and GDP per capita are Turkey, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and Maldives on the upper-right side of the figure 
with other countries lying in the middle. Former soviet members such as Kirgiz Republic, Mongolia, 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have high literacy rate close to a hundred percent but their GDP per 
capita level is among the lowest, with the exception of Kazakhstan which has high GDP per capita in which 
their rich natural resources play an important role. This plot does not include any other variables except 
GDP per capita and adult literacy rate for the selected countries, therefore, it does not directly measure the 
impact of education on economic growth. The interpretation is strictly for a visual representation of literacy 
rate and GDP per capita scatter-plotted for these countries.  
The average literacy rate for middle-income countries according the World Bank data (same data as the in 
figure) was ninety percent in 2015. Afghanistan’s youth literacy rate at forty percent is less than half of the 
middle-income average. A noticeable pattern between these countries is the gap between youth and adult 
literacy rate. Literacy rate among the youth is higher than adults in general, and the countries with lower 
literacy rate have a bigger gap between adult and youth literacy rates like in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
Bhutan. This gap diminishes in countries with higher literacy rates. For example, in the same data as the 
above figure, adult and youth literacy rate for Afghanistan were 31 and 47, for Pakistan were 56 and 72 and 
for Bhutan they were 57 and 87 percent respectively, while the adult and youth literacy for China and 
Turkey were 95 and 99 percent and for Kazakhstan and Maldives were 98 and 99 percent respectively. The 
gap between adult and youth literacy rate is lower for countries with higher literacy and higher income rates.  
School enrolment ratio shows a similar picture, fortunately, this data contains more information and longer 
timespan. The earliest data for school enrolment ratio in the selected countries available on the World Bank 
website starts from 1970 as shown below. This 45 years of data reveal that Afghanistan indeed was already 
behind all other countries before the war period (1978-2001). As proposed by this paper, income and 
education level in Afghanistan had already fallen way behind other countries before the wars and the war 
period brought them further down as shown in figure 12. Thus, Afghanistan’s current position behind other 
Asian countries in literacy and income level as shown in Figure 14. is not merely a result of the wars but a 
century of neglect and underinvestment in education. It is important for two reasons to emphasize on this 
point. The first obvious reason is to correct the misunderstanding that if it was not for the wars, Afghanistan 
would have been more educated and richer now. Certainly, the impact of wars on education is undeniable 
as schools were shut down and damaged and people fled the country by millions, however, Afghanistan 
before the wars under stable governments such as Zahir’s forty years rule had already lagged behind all 
other countries under consideration, and this is more important. The second reason is the question that arises 
from the first reason such that why did Afghanistan ignore its public education for such a long period? 
Given the economic condition and other challenges of investing in public goods in Afghanistan, the 
underinvestment or lack of investment in public goods in Afghanistan is related to ethnic diversity/politics 
and the Afghan institutions. It is through this argument that education and institution and economic 
development in Afghanistan connect together in this research. Previous sections discussed this relationship 
in detail and the following figures support the argument that institutional failure explains the situation in 
Afghanistan more than the wars, poverty, foreign invasion and so on. 
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Figure 15. Gross enrolment ratio, primary (1970-2015) 
 
Source: The World Bank country data (education) 2018 
Countries included in this sample are Afghanistan and selected countries in the region including some of 
the more successful countries of Asia such as South Korea, Turkey and Malaysia. Earlier topics covered 
the issue with education in a Muslim-majority country like Afghanistan, this data includes two relatively 
successful Muslim-majority countries of Malaysia and Turkey which are good examples to study. The gap 
in primary school enrolment ratio between these countries and Afghanistan was already large in 1970s. 
Afghanistan’s was thirty percent, Malaysia eighty percent and Turkey over a hundred percent. The decades 
of war 1980-2001 further drops Afghanistan’s enrolment ratio, however, an interesting case for comparison 
is Pakistan which was at around equal level as Afghanistan before the war in 1980. Suppose if the wars did 
not happen and Afghanistan followed a similar trend like Pakistan, that would still put Afghanistan and 
Pakistan at the lowest level in the region. Afghanistan’s reaching a hundred percent level of enrolment ratio 
in 2002 is equal that level for Turkey in 1970, a gap of three decades, ceteris paribus. Other things equal, it 
will take Afghanistan at least thirty years to reach the current development level of, for example, Turkey or 
Malaysia. As seen in the figure and argued frequently in this paper, education and knowledge in Afghanistan 
were poor much before the wars and it would be a misconception to blame the wars for the low levels of 
education and development. As in figure 12. the impact of war on school enrollment ratio is clearly depicted 
by this data between 1978 and 2001. The first decline marks the period of war against the Soviet between 
1979-1989 followed by a rise under the communist governments until 1992 from where it declined again 
to the lowest point under the Mujahedin and the Taliban governments until 2001. The rapid rise from 2001 
marks the postwar period which witnessed an increase of more than a hundred percent primary enrolment 
ratio.  
Asian economies which experienced rapid economic growth including South Korea, China, Malaysia and 
other HPAE are the countries which started universal primary education relatively earlier in 1950s and 
1960s. The UNESCO-sponsored conferences discussed earlier had suggested that universal primary 
education should be a national priority policy, these countries increased their investment in education and 
they also witness rapid economic growth. The so called Asian model of education promoted universal 
primary education in early stages of development (Tilak, 1994, p. 55) which for these countries were in 
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post-World War II period. The focus on education and knowledge-based development proved more 
successful as the countries with lower level of literacy and education in the group are also the countries 
which experienced lesser economic development such as Pakistan, Nepal and India. As mentioned earlier, 
an important suggestion with regards to investment in human capital was that education level should 
increase “in tandem” with the level of economic development (Sing, 1991). A “balanced development 
approach” requires higher level of education and ‘structural adjustment policy’ (Sing, 1991, p. 398) of 
shifting away from agrarian economy towards manufacturing and service economies as education and 
economy grow. To examine higher levels of education in these countries since 1970s the following figures 
show secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio for the selected countries.  
Table 16. Gross enrolment ratio, secondary (1970-2015) 
 
Source: The World Bank Country Data (education 2018) 
Afghanistan’s secondary enrolment ratio increased from 8% in 1970 to 55% in 2015. Afghanistan’s 2015 
level is similar to Malaysia’s and Turkey’s level around 1995 at around 55% which is also equal to the 
average for the middle-income countries. In terms of number of years, Afghanistan’s secondary enrolment 
ratio today is equal to that of Turkey and Malaysia twenty years ago. The increase in Afghanistan’s 
secondary enrolment ratio in postwar period has been rapid, overtaking Pakistan in 2007210. However, this 
growth rate for Afghanistan stagnated post-2010 at around 55%. The countries with highest enrolment ratio 
in this group are Kazakhstan, South Korea, Turkey, and China, which also happen to have higher GDP per 
capita as seen in figure 14. Kazakhstan and South Korea reached 100% level of secondary enrolment around 
1990 and Turkey and China followed closely in 2015. Similar to the primary enrolment ratio, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan were behind from 1970s which again shows that countries at the lower level in early years 
remained at lower level in later years, and the countries that started with the higher levels remained higher 
at later years. Other countries in the middle mostly remained in the middle throughout the period and their 
                                                          
210 However, this does not mean that Afghanistan’s higher education level surpassed that of Pakistan, obviously this 
enrolment ratio does not account for the past periods when Afghanistan’s school participation in general was far below, 
nor does it account for quality of education. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Gross  enrolment  ra t io ,  secondary (%)
Afghanistan
China
Kazakhstan
Iran, Islamic Rep.
India
Malaysia
Pakistan
Korea, Rep.
Middle income
Turkey
114 
rank in the middle in 1970s remained more or less in the middle until 2015 with the exception of Turkey’s 
relatively higher enrolment ratio, this growth in secondary enrolment ratio resembles the economic growth 
in most of these countries as the countries with lower enrolment ratio such as India, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan are also the countries with lower GDP per capita (Figure 1.) as compared to other countries 
with higher growth rate and higher GDP per capita such as China, Turkey, South Korea and Kazakhstan. 
Of course, this does not account for other important factors of economic growth, nor does it suggest a direct 
causal relationship between enrolment ratio and economic growth in this particular case. 
Following on the earlier topic of investment in higher education ‘in tandem’ with higher levels of economic 
growth, countries which experienced higher economic growth, and near 100% enrolment ratio in primary 
level earlier in 1970s-1980s indeed shifted towards higher levels of secondary enrolment ratio in later years 
in 2000s as shown in figures 15 and 16. This may come naturally as a country with higher levels of primary 
education may have higher levels of secondary and tertiary education. However, as figure 17 shows below 
it may not be necessarily the case. For example, of all the countries included the sample, Turkey and South 
Korea are the top two countries with highest levels of higher education and Kazakhstan and Malaysia 
experienced a decline in tertiary enrolment ratio and other countries remaining below forty percent level, 
except for Iran’s steady rise reaching 71 percent tertiary enrolment ratio in 2015 standing behind Turkey 
and South Korea. 
Higher levels of economic development require higher education and specialization levels. Tertiary 
education is the gateway towards more specialized human capital formation. As can be seen in the following 
figure, the ranking of countries in the level of enrolment ratio takes somewhat different pattern than primary 
and secondary enrolment, perhaps a better indicator of the difference in human capital formation. The gap 
between top two countries and the rest of the group is much more than that in secondary and primary levels. 
The only two countries with more than ninety percent tertiary enrolment ratio are South Korea and Turkey. 
Majority of the countries are below fifty percent level. 
Figure 17. Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary (1970-2015) 
 
Source: The World Bank country data, education (2018) 
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Afghanistan’s level of tertiary education enrolment remains at the bottom of the list at only nine percent in 
2015 just below the next lowest country of Pakistan at ten percent, with Pakistan’s population four times 
that of Afghanistan, the overall number of people with higher education in Pakistan is four times higher 
than Afghanistan. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are well below the average for the middle-income 
countries at 33%. The gap between Afghanistan’s current level of enrolment ratio and that of other countries 
is somewhere between the gaps in primary and secondary enrolments discussed above, meaning that 
Afghanistan’s 9% tertiary enrolment ratio in 2015 is the level that other countries (Turkey and Malaysia 
for example) reached that level in late 1980s, the countries of China, India and Pakistan was at that level as 
late as 2000, which means the gap in number of years between them and Afghanistan is relatively smaller 
than that of primary and secondary levels. 
Two interesting examples in this group are Kazakhstan and Malaysia both of which have experienced 
reduction in their tertiary enrolment ratios in the past decade. Despite economic success of Malaysia in post 
2000 decade, the country remained in the “middle-income trap”. Perhaps not coincidently, the country 
experienced a decline (or stagnation) in tertiary school enrolment ratio and economic growth in the later 
period. There are many other reasons for the middle-income trap of the country, but as an observation from 
this data, they both happened to occur around the same period in the country. The countries which 
experienced sharp increase in their higher education levels are South Korea, Turkey, Iran, and China which 
are also the countries with higher level of GDP growth in the past two decades. Similar to Malaysia, 
Kazakhstan also experienced a decline in its tertiary enrolment ratio, which is remarkable because 
Kazakhstan’s primary and secondary enrolment ratios have been the highest in the group but from 1990s 
the country’s tertiary enrolment ratio fluctuated below 50% and could not go above that level. 
The points to draw from this comparison of school enrolment ratios are that Afghanistan’s school enrolment 
ratios have been the lowest since 1970s (and before). The period before 1970 in Afghanistan was the period 
that education and human capital formation remained minimal and limited to a small portion of the 
population living in Kabul, as was also pointed by Gregorian. Afghanistan’s high illiteracy and low school 
enrolment ratio throughout the period from 1930s to 2001 reveal a fact that first, it was not the wars of 
1980s and 90s which placed Afghanistan’s education level below other countries. Second, countries with 
higher economic growth tend to be the countries with higher levels of education and vice versa211. Third, 
in order to understand the low level of education and economic growth in Afghanistan, one needs to go 
beyond the popular misconception of wars and foreign intervention of later 20th century, as this argument 
cannot explain the situation before and after the wars satisfactorily. The alternative approach to 
understanding the situation in Afghanistan may be the institutional development approach taken by this 
research, even though it suffers from lack of reliable data and not going to a great detail of many topics.  
Conclusion:  
Advanced economies are characterized by their cutting-edge technology and skilled workforce, however, 
for countries in the third world getting from high illiteracy rate to accumulation and creation of advanced 
knowledge is a long and challenging process. Recognizing the significance of education for development 
whether directly through increased productivity212 and better economic decision making, or indirectly 
                                                          
211 The extent, nature and direction of this relationship between education and economic growth needs a separate 
discussion. 
212 Two central hypotheses in human capital theory are “first, education and training increase individual cognitive 
capacity and therefore augment productivity. Second, increased productivity leads to increased individual earnings, 
and these increased earnings are a measure of the value of human capital” (Marginson, 1993, p. 38) 
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through improving institutional quality213, reduction in violence214, which are particularly problematic in 
ethnically diverse countries 215  like Afghanistan, the role of education and human capital building is 
important for their economic progress. Afghanistan’s underinvestment in public goods (education) over the 
past century which kept the literacy rate at around 2%216 until 1960s and 34% until 2016 (Table 1.) was a 
curious topic for this paper to explore its reasons and implications. Ethnic diversity and the Afghan 
institutions (which is based on two key principles of ‘Afghan and Islam’)217 seem to better explain how 
Afghan institutions proved resistant and incompatible with reforms and modernization. Examples of 
Afghan institutions’ resistance or reluctance (either because of ethnic politics of the governments or 
political Islam, or both) to reforms and investment in public goods are visible in almost every one of all 
seven governments of the past century (1880-1978). Islamists’ up rise against Amanullah’s educational 
reforms in 1920s which led to his government’s collapse, and the Afghan governments’ lack of investment 
in education particularly for the majority non-Afghan ethnicities (ethnic politics) and rural Afghans 
(underinvestment in public goods in general) kept illiteracy level high at 98% until 1960s or the 70% 
illiteracy rate until 2016, are good examples. Also, important to note that the forty years rule of Zahir Khan 
from 1933 to 1973 coincided with the remarkable long period of stagnation of education (and economic 
growth) which was followed by decades of wars (1978-2001). This exactly the opposite to what was 
discussed above in the Asian miraculous growth in which the decades of high investment in education 
proceeded by high economic growth, amazingly around the same period, the second half of the twentieth 
century.  
The wars of 1980-2001 further deteriorated the education level dropping the school enrolment ratio in 2001 
to a record low in decades (Figure 12.), and millions of refugees (brain drain and loss of human capital). 
The rapid increase in (primary) school enrolment ratio in postwar period - around a hundred percent (Figure 
13.) -  has been remarkable growth in education. However, Afghanistan is still the least educated country 
in the region and in all of Asia (Figure 14.) with two-third of its population still illiterate. Wars, poverty 
religion/traditions, and quantitative (not enough schools and teachers) and qualitative (poor standards of 
curriculum, teacher and infrastructure) remain as major challenges to education in Afghanistan. Education 
data analysis shows a regional and gender patterns across the country. School participation of male students 
(as percent of population) is the highest in eastern provinces of Khost, Nangarhar and Paktia, and female 
students is the highest in the three big cities of Balkh, Herat, Nangarhar, and the central province of 
Daykundi and north-eastern province of Badakhshan.  School dropout is the highest in southern provinces 
of Zabul, Wardak, Uruzgan and northern province of Takhar and it is the lowest in provinces of central and 
northern provinces of Badakhshan, Badghis, Baghlan, Balkh and Bamyan. Provinces of (south and east) 
Zabul, Paktika and Khost have disproportionately higher level of female dropouts almost twice that of male 
students. A similar pattern to participation and dropout of schools happen in the number of students from 
each province entering higher education system. Provinces of Zabul, Nooristan, Uruzgan, Paktia and 
                                                          
213 The impact of human capital on economic growth is through improving political institutions (Glaeser, La Porta, 
Lopes-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004, p. 282) 
214 Lipset (1960) “human capital accumulation contributes to shape efficient policies, less violence and more political 
stability 
215 “ethnic diversity has a more adverse effect on economic policy and growth when institutions are poor” and “good 
institutions also lower the risk of wars and genocides that might otherwise result from ethnic fractionalization. 
Ethnically diverse nations that wish to endure in peace and prosperity must build good institutions” (Easterly W. , 
2001, p. 703) 
216 Illiteracy in Afghanistan was around 98% until 1960s (Gregorian 1969, p. 184) 
217 Abdurrahman Khan “linked elements of Islamic belief with Afghan tribal customs in ways that convinced his 
largely illiterate population that the two were identical” (Barfield, 2010, pp. 158–59) also in (Sungur, 2016, p. 442) 
and also Pashtunization efforts by the Afghan leaders discussed here (Schetter, 2016, p. 461). 
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Helmand are the top five provinces with lowest number of students in universities, whereas, Bamyan, 
Panjsher, Balkh, Nangerhar and Kabul are the top five provinces with the highest rate of university students, 
measured in percent of each province’s population.  
From an ethnic point of view based on provinces populated with one ethnic majority (it is common in 
Afghanistan), there seems to be a pattern consistent with the above result. The areas under the influence of 
religious extremists, mostly Pashtun populated regions in the south have lower students in general, as well 
as eastern provinces with a difference that eastern provinces have the highest share of male students 
somewhat compensating for the overall gap. The Hazara populated regions of central Hazaristan have the 
narrowest gap in male-female school participation in general, and the overall share of educated population 
is higher than other ethnic groups. Ethnic Tajiks specially in Badakhshan, Panjshir and Balkh have the 
highest share of students (although Balkh may not be a dominant Tajik province). Ethnic Uzbeks have 
relatively smaller participation in general, but also smaller dropout ratio placing them near the overall 
average. A word of caution with respect to ethnic representation of this data is that most provinces are 
inhabited by more than one ethnicity and the data does not reveal specifics of ethnicity in each province 
and it is not categorized based on ethnicity. This ethnic interpretation was solely based on the information 
regarding approximate ethnic distribution of the population across different regions and provinces, 
considering the south as majority Pashtun, central regions as majority Hazara, northeast as majority Tajik 
and north as majority Uzbek, which is not different from the ethnographic map of the country (in the 
appendix).   
Chapter Five: 
Conclusion and Recommendations  
The central theme of this paper is to study the issues of development in Afghanistan through the challenges 
of institutional development in an ethnically diverse country. In the absence of reliable data on Afghanistan 
and the complexity of its development issues it is extremely difficult to draw a definitive conclusion. 
However, in studying the reasons for Afghanistan’s failure in postwar development, this paper argued that 
different from the popular narrative often focusing on the last four decades of wars and foreign invasions218, 
the data from prewar Afghanistan suggest that it had already fallen behind other countries in the region 
before the war period in its level of education, infrastructure, income and other development indicators. 
Thus, an alternative approach to explaining the issues of development in Afghanistan is through studying 
the Afghan institutions since its establishment in 1880s219.  The literature on the topic of institutional 
development suggested that ethnic diversity has a negative impact on economic growth when institutions 
are weak (Easterly W. , 2001, p. 703). Other empirical studies found that ethnically fragmented societies 
suffer from under-provision of public goods (Alesina & Ferrara, 2005, p. 796), from the topic of public 
goods this paper chose to study the issue of underinvestment in education in Afghanistan, in order to 
understand the country’s high illiteracy rate before and after the war periods. Common to diverse countries 
are ‘social exclusion’ of a big portion of the society from economic power which has significant impact on 
‘social cohesion and economic growth’. In these countries according to Staveren and Pervaiz, the powerful 
elite rise to power and manipulate the institutions to benefit themselves at the cost of the rest of the society 
(Staveren & Pervaiz, 2017, p. n/a).   
                                                          
218 The reason for such a focus on war period is explained in page 68 under the conclusion section. 
219 Abdurrahman Khan (1880-1901) was the founder of modern Afghanistan (Sungur, 2016, p. 442) 
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The history of Afghan institutions since establishment in 1880s reveals that ethnic diversity was a key factor 
in the Afghan leaders’ choice of institutions to govern the ethnically diverse and fragmented country.220 
The two foundational elements in the government were Afghan nationalism and political Islam which 
helped the Afghan leaders to unite the Pashtun tribes and subjugate other tribal and ethnic power lords221. 
The two other supporting factors in the process were the highly centralized government of Kabul 222and 
foreign aid (foreign aid consisted a major part of the Afghan government throughout the past century223). 
These four factors which helped establishing ‘the first Afghan state’ became part of the Afghan institutions 
as the history of Afghan governments showed the same factors particularly Afghan nationalism and political 
Islam later became deterrents to reforms because they were institutionalized over decades of application 
and the vested interests of those who benefitted from them, namely the Afghan leaders and the Islamists. 
This became evident in the attempts made by the Afghan monarchs to introduce reforms and modernize the 
country (although there are doubts if they really wanted it, as discussed) the reforms were perceived as 
threat or contradiction to the institutions’ principles of Afghan nationalistic ambitions and/or political Islam. 
Three instances of the height of Afghan nationalism were during Abdurrahman Khan, Zahir Khan, and 
Daoud Khan and the two instances of Islamists’ rejection of reforms were against modernization and 
secularization reforms by Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) and the communist governments between (1989-
1992), in these two cases the governments lost the fight to the Islamists uprising (among other possible 
reasons) and in both cases the government collapsed. Recovering from and cautioned by the collapse of 
previous governments, Zahir Khan avoided reforms and confrontations, instead it focused on political 
stability and control as a result of which his forty years rule (1933-1973) witnessed the longest period of 
political stability in modern history of Afghanistan, however, that costed stagnation in the economy and 
education (as shown figure 15). Towards the end of his period more than 90% of the population was 
illiterate and living a subsistence live in rural areas224.  Thus, Afghanistan lagged behind in education and 
economic growth largely as a result of the ethnic politics, among other possible reasons, and the war period 
brought further deteriorated the overall growth in economics and education (figure 12). 
Despite important changes in the postwar government such as greater participation of ethnic groups in 
politics and education for example, the postwar government was basically established on the prewar 
model225 which means the institutional aspect of the ethnic diversity issues remained unresolved much like 
before. This is a key point in explaining and understanding the development issues in postwar Afghanistan. 
Just like criticism of authoritarianism against Daoud Khan and Amanullah Khan, the postwar government 
                                                          
220 Abdurrahman Khan “linked elements of Islamic belief with Afghan tribal customs in ways that convinced his 
largely illiterate population that the two were identical” (Barfield 2010:158–59, in ( (Sungur, 2016, p. 442)). Also (the 
following footnote) 
221 “the internal policy was based on tribal and religious lines and favored the Sunnis against the Shias and the Pashtuns 
over non-Pashtuns” (Kakar, 1979, p. 10). 
222  The condition was set for annihilating all oppositions and establishing the first Afghan state, Afghanistan. 
According to Sungur, “Abdurrahman as the founder of modern Afghanistan…set out to establish direct control 
throughout the country with the help of: (1) a stable basis of legitimacy for his rule… (2) reforms for centralization 
… (3) the destruction of all alternative centers of power; and (4) the recruitment of a new state elite loyal to the state 
and not to their tribal following” (Sungur, 2016, p. 442). 
223 Foreign aid consisted between 20 to 50 percent of the government expenditure in prewar period and it rose to over 
70% in postwar period. Details discussed under the foreign section. 
224 Illiteracy and rural population in Afghanistan were around 98% until 1960s (Gregorian 1969, p. 184) 
225 According to him, the reestablishment of “exceptionally strong president”, despite the opposition by non-Pashtuns 
“a Pashtun approach… was asserted, which had its historical model in the 1964 Constitution of the Afghan monarchy”. 
(Schetter, 2016, pp. 465-467)  
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of Ashraf Ghani is criticized226 on similar ground, and this paper argues that the sources of this authoritarian 
approach and the criticism of it are in the same old issue of ethnic realities versus incompatible institutions 
(with those four characteristics). The achievements in the postwar governments is particularly notable in 
education sector which rapidly increased the number of students from less than one million to more than 
eight million between 2002 to 2013 (USAID Afghanistan, 2016) and the primary enrolment ratio increased 
to around a hundred percent and remained at that level in the decade after 2001 (figure 15).  
Noticeable features of education in the past few decades are that the wars of 1980-2001 further deteriorated 
the education level dropping the school enrolment ratio by 2001 to a record low in decades (Figure 12.) and 
producing millions of refugees (brain drain and loss of human capital). The rapid increase in (primary) 
school enrolment ratio in postwar period - around a hundred percent (Figure 13.) -  has been remarkable 
growth in education. However, Afghanistan is still the least educated country in the region and in all of 
Asia (Figure 14.) with two-third of its population still illiterate. Wars, poverty religion/traditions, and 
quantitative (not enough schools and teachers) and qualitative (poor standards of curriculum, teacher and 
infrastructure) remain as major challenges to education in Afghanistan. Education data analysis shows 
regional and gender patterns across the country. School participation of male students (as percent of 
population) is the highest in eastern provinces of Khost, Nangarhar and Paktia, and female students is the 
highest in the three big cities of Balkh, Herat, Nangarhar, and the central province of Daykundi and north-
eastern province of Badakhshan. School dropout is the highest in southern provinces of Zabul, Wardak, 
Uruzgan and northern province of Takhar and it is the lowest in provinces of central and northern provinces 
of Badakhshan, Badghis, Baghlan, Balkh and Bamyan. Provinces of (south and east) Zabul, Paktika and 
Khost have disproportionately higher level of female dropouts almost twice that of male students. A similar 
pattern to participation and dropout of schools happens in the number of students from each province 
entering higher education system. Provinces of Zabul, Nooristan, Uruzgan, Paktia and Helmand are the top 
five provinces with lowest number of students in universities, whereas, Bamyan, Panjsher, Balkh, 
Nangerhar and Kabul are the top five provinces with the highest rate of university students, measured in 
percent of each province’s population.  
In short, ethnic diversity was a key factor for the Afghan governments to choose the particular type of 
institutions and development pattern in the past century, besides other important factors such as political 
and historical situation in the region and foreign invasions and influences in Afghanistan. The ethnic 
diversity effect on the choice of institutions and the associated challenges such institutions’ inability to 
facilitate or prevent reforms as well as investment in public goods (education in particular) and inclusion 
of non-Afghans as well as rural Afghans to participate and have equal access to political and economic 
opportunities. Thus, Afghanistan’s development failure is better understandable through the challenges of 
economic development in an ethnically diverse country in which the institutions fail to effectively govern 
the affairs of its diverse population. Studying the issues of Afghanistan from institutional development 
perspective requires more in-depth research, particularly interesting research area would be to measure the 
impact of the country’s ethnic diversity on institution-building and economic development using actual data. 
                                                          
226 “Mr. Ghani is bringing billions of dollars in procurement deals under his direct purview, denying ministries the 
opportunity to contract their own goods and services” and “leaving some ministry officials wondering what their jobs 
are anymore”. The increasingly authoritarian approach by the president is also felt and protested inside Afghanistan 
as well. Afghanistan’s parliament members “raised concerns over… Ghani’s authoritarianism” and that the president 
“is part of the problem in the country. The article is available here at New York Times website: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/21/world/asia/ghani-afghanistan-unity-government-plan.html and another similar 
report is available below. 
226 The link to the Tolo News webpage is here: https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/mps-split-over-
ghani%E2%80%99s-ability-fix-national-issues 
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The recommended policy suggestions for future development may include institutional reforms targeting 
specifically the four issues in the current institutions namely 1. A more egalitarian system for all ethnic 
groups protecting against the current Afghan nationalistic ambitions and ethnic marginalization, 2. 
decentralization of power and for more autonomy at regional levels away from the current centralized 
government of elites and concentration of power in the center, 3. Facilitating modernization and reforms 
through learning and localizing modern knowledge and values with greater freedom and depoliticization of 
Islam and protection against religious fundamentalism, 4. And last but not the least investing in universal 
education and agricultural productivity like early stages of development in HPAE and reducing dependence 
on foreign to strengthen the linkages between the public and the government through provision of services 
by the government and taxes and legitimacy from the people to the government. In one sentence, 
Afghanistan needs institutions appropriate for its ethnic realities and compatible with reforms and 
modernization. 
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Appendix: 
Definitions:  
Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group 
that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Primary education provides children with basic 
reading, writing, and mathematics skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, 
geography, natural science, social science, art, and music. 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based 
on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. 
GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group 
that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Secondary education completes the provision 
of basic education that began at the primary level and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning 
and human development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more specialized 
teachers. 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are 
based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation 
of natural resources. 
Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of 
mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. 
World Governance Indicator Definition  
Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Estimate gives the 
country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Estimate gives the country's score on 
the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 
2.5. 
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Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Estimate gives the country's 
score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately 
-2.5 to 2.5. 
Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, 
in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal 
distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal 
distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
 
Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media. Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate 
indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank.  Percentile ranks have been adjusted 
to correct for changes over time in the composition of the countries covered by the WGI. 
Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all countries 
covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank.  Percentile 
ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the composition of the countries covered by the 
WGI. 
Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Percentile rank indicates the 
country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, 
and 100 to highest rank.  Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the 
composition of the countries covered by the WGI. 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism.  Percentile rank indicates the country's 
rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 
to highest rank.  Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the composition of 
the countries covered by the WGI. 
Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests.  Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, 
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with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank.  Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct 
for changes over time in the composition of the countries covered by the WGI. 
Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Percentile rank 
indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to 
lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank.  Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over time 
in the composition of the countries covered by the WGI. 
 
i http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4843bd14-bb74-11df-a136-00144feab49a.html#axzz3ekeiJngP  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/world/asia/09ghazni.html?partner=rss%26emc=rss&_r=0 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/afghan-corruption-and-how-the-us-facilitates-
it/2012/11/05/d7fbce5c-2520-11e2-ac85-e669876c6a24_story.html 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/08/afghanistan-s-million-dollar-minister.html 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/3178042/Afghanistan-weakened-by-corruption-as-
fears-grown-over-Taliban.html 
https://www.sigar.mil./audits/financialreprots/index.aspx?SSR=2&SubR=13&wp=Financial%20Audit%20Reports 
ii The Ugly Truth about Foreign Aid in Afghanistan: Kabul's New Elite: Western aid agencies are lavishing vast sums 
on their officials while extreme poverty is driving young Afghans to fight for the Taliban. By Patrick Cockburn, 
Independent.co.uk May, 1, 2009. Full article is available at Independent website at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/kabuls-new-elite-live-high-on-wests-largesse-1677116.html  
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Afghanistan ethnographic map: 
 
Note: This map does not fully capture ethnic locations, for examples the Hazara population in Kabul, Balkh, Herat 
and some other areas which they make a significant population of these provinces are not shown in this image. 
However, it correctly shows general ethnographic map of the country. A big mistake in the map is counting the Hazara, 
Aimaq and Qizilbash population as Iranian whereas they are Turkic people not Iranian. This mistake commonly 
happens because of the language, these Turkic ethnicities speak Dari/Persian and often mistaken as Iranian group of 
people not as Turkic.   
 
Source: University of Texas Libraries, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection 
URL: http://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/thematic.html  
 
